Voltz v. County of Erie M. Levant Davis for Plaintiff. P. V. Gifford for Defendant. ROSSITER, P. J., August 9, 1922. This is an action in assumpsit brought by E. J. Voltz against the County of Erie to recover $765.00 and interest from August 1, 1920, for 153 days necessarily and actually employed in the performance of his duties as County Assessor at $5.00 per day, to-wit., beginning with January 2 and ending July 6, 1920. There was no dispute that the plaintiff worked the number of days claimed and the compensation per day is fixed by act of assembly. The County, however, makes defense to the claim averring that the work should have been finished in 1919; that the assessors' duties begin when he gets his precept from the County Commissioners and not before, and that those duties terminate on December 31 following; that the precept is the authority under which he acts and that this authority is limited to December 31 by law; that his term as assessor had expired on the first Monday of January, 1920, and not withstanding the fact that he was re-elected and succeeded himself, that that re-election did not carry with authority to complete duties incident to a term that had gone by; that the compensation for the prior term, to-wit., the term ending the first Monday in January, 1920, was but $2.50 per day, and that in any event, on December 24, 1919, he presented a bill and was paid for his services for the term for which he was then elected and which ended the first Monday in January, 1920. The case came on for trial before a jury and it appearing and being admitted by both sides that there was no dispute as to any of the facts, the Court directed the jury to render a verdict in favor of the defendant, whereupon a motion was made for judgment for the plaintiff n. o. v. It is true according to the testimony that the assessment has usually been commenced "one year for the next Voltz v. County of Erie succeeding year," "never finished in that year", but carried over into the year in which the taxes were payable, but it does not follow that because the work of the assessor other than the triennial and reassessment, cannot be completed in the year previous to that in which the tax is payable that it shall not be done at all, for many contingencies might arise to create just such a condition, and if that was the law it would operate to relieve those who were liable from the payment of much needed taxes, and no where can we find any indication that it was the intent of the legislature to limit the performance of the duties of the assessor to a particular period, except in that part of his duties which require him to make the triennial and re-assessment. Of course he would not make the assessment in the year after the taxes for which it was made were payable or at any subsequent time, but it seems, and common sense would dictate, that it may be made in the same year in which the tax is payable, and it has been so held in Schmuch vs. Hartman, 222 Pa., 190, where Justice Brown says "No act of assembly authorizes the assessemnt of a state tax on personal property after the expiration of the year in which it ought to have been assessed and the taxable ought to have paid it." It is also true that by the provisions of the second section of the Act of April 15, 1834, P. L. 511, part of the duties of assessors were defined and the time within which they should be completed fixed, viz., that at every third year, after the general election of that year, the commissioners should issue their precept to the assessors, requiring the assessors to make out and return within thirty days thereafter, a just and full list of the name of all taxable persons residing in their district and of all property taxable by law, together with a just valuation of the same, in the manner directed by the act, to-wit., by taking an accounting of the houses, lands, lots of ground, ground rents, mills and manufactories, furnaces, forges, distilleries, sugar houses, malt houses, breweries, tan-yards, ferries, horses, mares, geldings, cattle, offices, professions, trades and oc Voltz v. County of Erie cupations, and all single freemen over the age of 21 years who were not following any occupations or callings, and in 1893, the legislature passed an act (P. L. 292), the title of which reads "To designate a uniform date when the commissioners of the several counties shall issue their precepts to assessors, to make triennial assessment and re-assessment between the periods of the triennial assessments, of property, and fixing the time of the return thereof," that is the triennial and re-assessment, and it provided that the commissioners should issue their precept for the triennial assessment before the second Monday of September, and the assessors were required to complete the said assessment (that is the triennial assessment and re-assessment) and make their return not later than the 31st day of December. It is perfectly apparent that both these acts apply to the duties required of the assessor in relation to the triennial assessment and the re-assessment only. It is also perfectly apparent what shall be done at the triennial and reassessment, for that is clearly set forth in the Act of 1834, and were the duties as prescribed by that act, the only duties devolving upon the assessor, we might conclude that the defendant's contention in this case is correct, for the reason that the assessor would then be prevented from doing any work until he had received his precept from the commissioners and be limited in performance to December 31st. But there are a large number of other duties imposed upon the assessed, the manner of doing which or the time within which they must be done, are in no way controlled by either the Act of 1834, the Act of 1893, nor dependent upon or subject to the precept of the county commissioners; such as returning to the county commissioners the names and addresses of all taxable inhabitants of the respective districts (Acts of July 17, 1919, P. L. 1005); the furnishing of a blank prepared by the Board of Revision or county commissioners, to every taxable person, co-partnership, un-incorporated association, joint stock association, limited partnerships, and corporations in their respective districts, and the taking of affidavits of the returns, and Voltz v. County of Erie upon refusal of the taxable to make return properly verified by oath or affirmation within 10 days after being notified, the requiring of the assessor to make return for such taxable and to examine the record and lists of judgments and mortgages and other documents, and assess such negligent or recalcitrant taxable with the amount of all liens he finds, adding interest, as well as such other items as he ascertains from other sources of information, are taxable; he is also required to make up a valuation of money at interest and to compare the return of persons having such money with the statements furnished the assessor by the county commissioners of Board of Revision, and make return of any discrepancies (Act of 1913, P. L. 507). These are some of the duties required of assessors, other than those required under the commissioners' precept for the triennial and re-assessment. And the acts imposing these duties are wholly silent as to when such work shall commence or when it shall end. By the provisions of the Act of April 4, 1919, P. L. 38, the compensation of the assessors of cities of the third class is fixed at the sum of $5.00 per day for each day necessarily employed and to us it seems that it would be just as logical to say that he should be paid for other duties and not for the triennial assessment and re-assessment as it is to say that he should be paid for the triennial and re-assessment and not for other duties, for the Act of 1919, the title of which is "Requiring the assessors and assistant assessors for county purposes, to keep an account of the days actually employed and make return thereof to the county commissioners and fixing their compensation," in no way refers or is confined, to the triennial assessment or reassessment. Clearly then, the act means just what it says, viz., that the assessors are to be paid $5.00 a day for days necessarily and actually employed in the line of their duties as assessors, whether triennial, re-assessment or otherwise. We have, then, the undisputed testimony that the assessor was employed 153 days, and the amount of his compensation fixed by law at $5.00 per day. But it is con Voltz v. County of Erie tended that the work done in 1920 was work that should have been done in 1919, and that in 1919. the compensation was $2.50 per day, and that plaintiff's term of office having expired the first Monday of January, 1920, that notwithstanding the fact that he succeeded himself, he was not authorized to proceed and do the work in 1920. To this we do not agree. While the work for the 1920 taxes was commenced and the triennial and re-assessment completed in the latter part of 1919, there is no law that we know of, and none has been called to our attention, that would prevent the legally qualified assessor for 1920 from performing the uncompleted duties relative to 1920 tax in the year 1920 (except the triennial or re-assessment); hence the services all having been performed in a term commencing after the enactment of the act fixing the compensation at $5.00 per day and after the payment of the bill rendered for 1919 services, in our opinion, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the full amount of his claim, to-wit., $765.00 with interest from August 1, 1920. It would be bad public policy to stretch a point to avoid paying a diligent and active assessor, as his duties lie at the very foundation, for they make bases upon which to found the calculation for raising the funds for the conduct of public affairs, and while the very fact of an assessor's diligence will arouse opposition from those who are inclined to be reluctant to bear their just proportion of taxation, that fact should entitle him to the jealous protection of the law and insure him compensation for the faithful performance of his sometimes unpleasant duties. Now, therefore, August 9, 1922, the Prothonotary is directed to enter judgment non obstante veredicto in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of $765.00 with interest from August 1, 1920. |