... recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. In Defense of the Bush Doctrine - Seite 167von Robert G. Kaufman - 2007 - 264 SeitenEingeschränkte Leseprobe - Über dieses Buch
| United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services - 2005 - 1004 Seiten
...attacking their own enemies. Second, let's consider the operational realities. The Strategy declares that "We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the...capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries." But that requires a sophisticated understanding of what those capabilities and objectives actually... | |
| Seyom Brown - 2004 - 228 Seiten
...responsibilities. [On preempting threats from "rogue states" possessing weapons of mass HpQf rnrrmnl destruction] Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the...armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. ons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without... | |
| Seyom Brown - 2004 - 220 Seiten
...willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people and the wealth of their nations. ln the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered...armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. ons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without... | |
| Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay - 2003 - 286 Seiten
...jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat — most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and...do not seek to attack us using conventional means." Of course, force would not have to be used "in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations... | |
| Michael Mann - 2003 - 300 Seiten
...exercise our right of selfdefense by acting preemptively . . . our best defense is a good offense. . . .We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the...capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. . . . To forestall or prevent hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary,... | |
| Raymond W. Copson - 2003 - 106 Seiten
...Administration, in particular, argued in a national security strategy document released in 2002 that "we must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's ... rogue states and terrorists" by expanding the parameters of preemptive self-defense to include... | |
| Oliver O'Donovan - 2003 - 154 Seiten
...here we need not resist in principle the proposal of the US National Security Strategy document to 'adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries'. That need only mean that the meaning of'imminent' is context-dependent and content-dependent, which... | |
| Armin Von Bogdandy, Rüdiger Wolfrum, Christiane E. Philipp - 2004 - 479 Seiten
...doctrine of pre-emption" used to justify the United States position regarding its invasion of Iraq: "For centuries, international law recognized that...armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack." 46 Taft and Buchwald argue that pre-emptive self-defence, in and of itself, cannot be considered legal... | |
| David Malone - 2004 - 764 Seiten
...jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat — most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and...threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.23 This passage's reference to "imminent threat" harks back to a classic exposition of... | |
| Alexander T.J. Lennon, Camille Eiss - 2004 - 396 Seiten
...1967 was, in the purest sense, a preemptive attack as described in chapter 5 of the new NSS, based on "an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization...armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack." 9 Israel's objective case for striking first in this instance was sufficiently obvious to keep the... | |
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