fays he," by the largenefs and plenty of the foil, and fcarcity of people, all things neceffary to life are fo "cheap, that an induftrious man, by two days labour,

66

may gain enough to feed him the reft of the week. "Which I take to be a very plain ground of the laziness. <attributed to the people. For men naturally prefer "ease before labour, and will not take pains if they can "live idle; though when, by neceffity, they have been "inured to it, they cannot leave it, being grown a cuf"tom neceffary to their health, and to their very enter"tainment. Nor perhaps is the change harder, from "conftant eafe to labour, than from conftant labour to "eafe." After which the author proceeds to confirm his doctrine, by enumerating, as above, the places where trade has moft flourished, in ancient and modern times; and which are commonly obferved to be fuch narrow confined territories, as beget a neceffity for induftry.

The best taxes are fuch as are levied upon confumptions, especially thofe of luxury; because such taxes are leaft felt by the people. They feem, in fome measure, voluntary; fince a man may chufe how far he will use the commodity which is taxed: They are paid gradually and infenfibly: They naturally produce fobriety and frugality, if judicioufly impofed: And being confounded with the natural price of the commodity, they are fcarcely perceived by the confumers. Their only difadvantage is, that they are expenfive in the levying.

Taxes upon poffeffions are levied without expence; but have every other disadvantage. Moft ftates, however, are obliged to have recourfe to them, in order to supply the deficiencies of the other.

But the most pernicious of all taxes are the arbitrary. They are commonly converted, by their management, into punishments on induftry; and alfo, by their una

voidable

voidable inequality, are more grievous, than by the real burden which they impofe. It is furprising, therefore, to fee them have place among any civilized people.

In general, all poll-taxes, even when not arbitrary, which they commonly are, may be esteemed dangerous : Because it is fo eafy for the fovereign to add a little more, and a little more, to the fum demanded, that these taxes. are apt to become altogether oppreffive and intolerable. On the other hand, a duty upon commodities checks itfelf; and a prince will foon find, that an encrease of the impoft is no encrease of his revenue. It is not easy, therefore, for a people to be altogether ruined by fuch

taxes.

Hiftorians inform us, that one of the chief causes of the deftruction of the ROMAN ftate, was the alteration, which CONSTANTINE introduced into the finances, by fubftituting an univerfal poll-tax, in lieu of almost all the tithes, customs, and excises, which formerly composed the revenue of the empire. The people, in all the provinces, were fo grinded and oppreffed by the publicans, that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians; whose dominion, as they had fewer neceffities and lefs art, was found preferable to the refined tyranny of the ROMANS.

It is an opinion, zealously promoted by fome political writers, that, fince all taxes, as they pretend, fall ultimately upon land, it were better to lay them originally there, and abolish every duty upon consumptions. But it is denied, that all taxes fall ultimately upon land. If a duty be laid upon any commodity, confumed by an artifan, he has two obvious expedients for paying it; he may retrench fomewhat of his expence, or he may encrease his labour. Both these resources are more eafy

and natural, than that of heightening his wages. We fee, that, in years of fcarcity, the weaver either confumes lefs or labours more, or employs both thefe expedients of frugality and industry, by which he is enabled to reach the end of the year. It is but juft, that he fhould fubject himself to the same hardships, if they deferve the name, for the fake of the publick, which gives him protection. By what contrivance can he raise the price of his labour? The manufacturer who employs him, will not give him more: Neither can he, because the merchant, who exports the cloth, cannot raise its price, being limited by the price which it yields in foreign markets. Every man, to be fure, is defirous of pushing off from himself the burden of any tax which is impofed, and of laying it upon others: But as every man has the fame inclination, and is upon the defenfive; no set of men can be fuppofed to prevail altogether in this conteft. And why the landed gentleman fhould be the victim of the whole, and should not be able to defend himself, as well as others are, I cannot readily imagine. All tradesmen, indeed, would willingly prey upon him, and divide him among them, if they could: But this inclination. they always have, though no taxes were levied; and the fame methods, by which he guards against the impofition of tradesmen before taxes, will ferve him afterwards, and make them share the burden with him. They must be very heavy taxes, indeed, and very injudicioufly levied, which the artifan will not, of himself, be enabled to pay, by superior industry and frugality, without raifing the price of his labour.

I fhall conclude this fubject with obferving, that we have, with regard to taxes, an inftance of what frequently happens in political inftitutions, that the confequences of things are diametrically oppofite to what we

fhould

should expect on the first appearance. It is regarded as a fundamental maxim of the TURKISH government, that the Grand Signior, though abfolute mafter of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to impose a new tax and every OTTOMAN prince, who has made fuch an attempt, either has been obliged to retract, or has found the fatal effects of his perfeverance. One would imagine, that this prejudice or established opinion were the firmeft barrier in the world against oppreffion; yet it is certain, that its effect is quite contrary. The emperor, having no regular method of encreafing his revenue, must allow all the bashaws and governors to opprefs and abuse the subjects: And these he squeezes after their return from their government. Whereas, if he could impofe a new tax, like our EUROPEAN princes, his intereft would fo far be united with that of his people, that he would immediately feel the bad effects of these disorderly levies of money, and would find, that a pound, raised by a general impofition, would have lefs pernicious effects, than a shilling taken in so unequal and arbitrary

a manner.

ESSAY

Of PUBLIC CREDIT.

IX.

T appears to have been the common practice of anto

tiquity, to make provifion, during peace, for the neceffities of war, and to hoard up tréafures before-hand, as the instruments either of conqueft or defence; without trufting to extraordinary impofitions, much lefs to bortowing, in times of diforder and confufion. Befides the immenfe fums above mentioned, which were amaffed by ATHENS, and by the PTOLEMIES, and other fucceffors of ALEXANDER; we learn from PLATO†, that the frugal LACEDEMONIANS had also collected a great treasure; and ARRIAN ‡ and PLUTARCH || take notice of the riches which ALEXANDER got poffeffion of on the conqueft of SUSA and ECBATANA, and which were referved, fome of them, from the time of CYRUS. If I remember right, the fcripture alfo mentions the treasure of HEZEKIAH and the JEWISH princes; as profane hiftory does that of PHILIP and PERSEUS, kings of MACEDON. The antient republics of GAUL had commonly large fums in referve §. Every one knows the treasure.

† ALCIB. I.

Lib. iii.

• Effay V. PLUT. in vita ALEX. He makes there treasures amount to 80,000 talents, or about 15 millions fterl. QUINTUS CURTIUS (lib. v. cap. 2.) fays, that ALEXANDER found in SUSA above 50,000 talents.

§ STRABO, lib. iv.

VOL. I.

B b

feized