fo fatal? If the spirit of induftry be preserved, it may eafily be diverted from one branch to another; and the manufacturers of wool, for inftance, be employed in linen, filk, iron, or any other commodities, for which there appears to be a demand. We need not apprehend, that all the objects of industry will be exhausted, or that our manufacturers, while they remain on an equal footing with those of our neighbours, will be in danger of wanting employment. The emulation among rival nations ferves rather to keep induftry alive in all of them: And any people is happier who poffefs a variety of manufactures, than if they enjoyed one fingle great manufacture, in which they are all employed. Their fituation is lefs precarious; and they will feel lefs fenfibly thofe revolutions and uncertainties, to which every particular branch of commerce will always be exposed.

The only commercial state, that ought to dread the improvements and induftry of their neighbours, is fuch a one as the DUTCH, who enjoying no extent of land, nor poffeffing any number of native commodities, flourish only by their being the brokers, and factors, and carriers of others. Such a people may naturally apprehend, that, as foon as the neighbouring ftates come to know and purfue their intereft, they will take into their own hands the management of their affairs, and deprive their brokers of that profit, which they formerly reaped from it. But though this confequence may naturally be dreaded, it is very long before it takes place; and by art and industry it may be warded off for many generations, if not wholly eluded. The advantage of superior stocks and correfpondence is fo great, that it is not eafily overcome; and as all the tranfactions encrease by the encrease of industry in the neighbouring states, even a people whofe commerce ftands on this precarious bafis, may at firft reap a confiderable

confiderable profit from the flourishing condition of their neighbours. The DUTCH, having mortgaged all their revenues, make not fuch a figure in political transactions as formerly; but their commerce is furely equal to what it was in the middle of the last century, when they were reckoned among the great powers of EUROPE.

Were our narrow and malignant politics to meet with fuccefs, we should reduce all our neighbouring nations to the fame ftate of floth and ignorance that prevails in MOROCCO and the coast of BARBARY. But what would be the confequence? They could fend us no commodities: They could take none from us: Our domestic commerce itself would languish for want of emulation, example, and inftruction: And we ourselves fhould foon fall into the fame abject condition, to which we had reduced them. I shall therefore venture to acknowledge, that, not only as a man, but as a BRITISH fubject, I pray for the flourishing commerce of GERMANY, SPAIN, ITALY, and even FRANCE itself. I am at leaft certain, that GREAT BRITAIN, and all those nations, would flourish more, did their fovereigns and minifters adopt fuch enlarged and benevolent fentiments towards each other.

ESSAY

VII.

Of the BALANCE of POWER.

Tis a question, whether the idea of the balance of

power be owing entirely to modern policy, or whether the phrafe only has been invented in these later ages? It is certain that XENOPHON *, in his inftitution of CYRUS, reprefents the combination of the ASIATIC powers to have arisen from a jealousy of the encreasing force of the MEDES and PERSIANS; and though that elegant composition should be supposed altogether a romance, this fentiment, afcribed by the author to the eastern princes, is at least a proof of the prevailing notion of ancient times.

In all the politics of GREECE, the anxiety, with regard to the balance of power, is apparent, and is exprefsly pointed out to us, even by the ancient hiftorians. THUCYDIDES + represents the league, which was formed against ATHENS, and which produced the PELOPONNESIAN war, as entirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of ATHENS, when the THEBANS and LACEDEMONIANS difputed for fovereignty, we find, that the ATHENIANS (as well as many other republics) always threw themselves into the lighter scale, and endeavoured to preferve the balance. They supported THEBES against

* Lib. i.

VOL. I.

A a

† Lib. i.

SPARTA,

SPARTA, till the great victory gained by EPAMINONDAS at LEUCTRA; after which they immediately went over to the conquered, from generosity, as they pretended, but in reality from their jealousy of the conquerors*.

Whoever will read DEMOSTHENES's oration for the MEGALOPOLITANS, may fee the utmost refinements on this principle, that ever entered into the head of a VENETIAN OF ENGLISH fpeculatift. And upon the first rise of the MACEDONIAN power, this orator immediately discovered the danger, founded the alarm throughout all GREECE, and at last assembled that confederacy under the banners of ATHENS, which fought the great and decifive battle of CHARONEA.

It is true, the GRECIAN wars are regarded by hiftorians as wars of emulation rather than of politics; and each ftate feems to have had more in view the honour of leading the reft, than any well-grounded hopes of authority and dominion. If we confider, indeed, the fmall number of inhabitants in any one republic, compared to the whole, the great difficulty of forming fieges in those times, and the extraordinary bravery and discipline of every freeman among that noble people; fhall conelude, that the balance of power was, fitlelf, fufficiently fecured in GREECE, and needed not to have been guarded with that caution which may be requifite in other ages. But whether we afcribe the fhifting of fides in all the GRECIAN republics to jealous emulation or cautious politics, the effects were alike, and every prevailing power was fure to meet with a confederacy against it, and that often compofed of its former friends and allies.

The fame principle, call it envy or prudence, which produced the Oftracifm of ATHENS, and Petalifm of Sy

* XENOPH. Hit. GRÆC. lib. vi. & vii.

RACUSE,