1841.

and THAMES JUNCTION RAILWAY

v.

WHITE.

is entitled to inspect the books, and none of them apply to such a case as this. The general management of the ComBIRMINGMAM, BRISTOL pany is vested in the directors. The 108th section enacts, that it shall be competent "at any general or special meeting" to call for information and inspection of any papers. By section 119 a book of all payments and receipts is to be kept by the Company, and open at all times to the inspection of loan creditors. By section 127 the Company are to keep a true account of the places of abode of the proprietors, which shall be at all times open to the proprietors. The statute has given a general form of declaration. The purview of the whole statute shews that it was intended to create a statutable partnership, governed in the manner and by the regulations prescribed by that statute, and that to its provisions reference must be made to determine the rights of the shareholders.

Platt contrà. The 108th section is not sufficient to give a proprietor the requisite information; he may demand it at the meeting, and be outvoted by the other members present. The special power to inspect given by the statute does not take away from the shareholders (one of whom the plaintiffs say this defendant is) the common law right of inspecting that in which they have a quasi partnership interest. It is said that the defendant here seeks for the information that he may find out some defect in the proceedings of which he may take advantage; but, if ' that were so, it would not bar his right; King v. King (a).

Lord DENMAN C.J.-In that case the plaintiff who sought the inspection had a clear and direct property. I think it could not have been the intention of the act to give to any parties so large a power of inspection as that contended for on the part of the defendant. Sufficient enable the shareholders to ascertain but the provisions of the act were not

powers are given to

what are their rights;

(a) 4 Taunt. 666.

intended to assist a defendant in the discovery of some defect in the proceedings of which he might avail himself by a plea.

LITTLEDALE J. concurred.

PATTESON J.-The defendant has neglected all the opportunities which, if he is a shareholder, he had under the statute of obtaining the information he asks, and now I think we ought not to assist him in his search for a defence to the action brought against him.

COLERIDGE J. concurred.

1841.

BIRMINGHAM' BRISTOL and

THAMES JUNCTION

RAILWAY

v.

WHITE.

G.

Rule discharged.

CHARLOTTE BACON v. SMITH and another, Assignees of

BACON, a Bankrupt (a).

ARREST of judgment. Case for permissive waste.

Tuesday, February 2d.

The

and his wife

Devise to 4.

to hold for their joint lives, and to the survivor

for his or her

declaration stated, that by devise of one Furniss, the premises wasted were given to the husband (the bankrupt) and the plaintiff, to hold the same for their joint lives, and they were afterwards devised to the survivor during his or life. The husher life. The declaration then alleged that, while the joint band during the joint lives lives were still existing, the interest of the husband vested assigned, and in the defendants, and that they entered and suffered and the assignee permitted the premises to become and be out of repair, waste:ruinous, &c. That they retained possession until the husband died, and the right and title to the premises became vested in the plaintiff.

committed

wife (who surHeld, that the vived) could

not maintain case for waste,

Verdict for the plaintiff. This rule was obtained to shew she having cause why the judgment should not be arrested.

only a contingent remainder at the time of the

Alexander, Wightman and Heaton shewed cause. It is waste done.

(a) Decided at the sittings after this term, Tuesday, February 2.

1841.

BACON

V.

SMITH.

objected that it appears on this declaration that the wife had no interest in the premises wasted at the time of the waste done, but it is sufficient that she had then a contingent interest in remainder, to take effect immediately upon the death of the then tenant for life, and that at the time of the action brought, that remainder had become vested in possession in her. [Lord Denman C. J. If the husband had remained in possession until his death, could she have maintained an action for waste against his executors?] That case might be distinguishable, if necessary; his possession would be her possession. [Coleridge J. And would not the possession of the assignees of the husband be as much his possession?] Not against her. On the death of the husband the whole survived to the wife, and he could not by any act during his life prejudice the estate, which was to come to his wife: Green d. Crew v. King (a), Co. Litt. S26 a, Com. Dig. Baron and Feme, (K). That there is no prece

dent for such an action as this, is sufficiently accounted for, for until the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 2, on the death of a tenant for life, his executors were not liable to an action for damage to the real estate in his lifetime.

Cresswell and Baines contrà were stopped by the Court.

Lord DENMAN C. J.-The right of one tenant for life to sue another for waste does not come in question in this The declaration discloses that the plaintiff had no vested interest at the time of the waste committed.

case.

LITTLEDALE J. concurred.

PATTESON J.-There is a passage in point in Co. Litt. 53 b, "Note, after waste done, there is a special regard to be had to the continuance of the reversion in the same state that it was at the time of the waste done; for, if after the

(a) 2 W. Bl. 1211.

waste he granteth it over, though he taketh back the whole estate again, yet is the waste dispunishable."

1841.

BACON

v.

SMITH.

COLERIDGE J. concurred.

G.

Rule absolute.

The QUEEN . The Inhabitants of ST. JOHN, MARGATE.

UPON

Wednesday, January 27th. An examination of a pau

an appeal against an order of sessions for the removal of John Gocher and wife, and four children, from the per stated a parish of St. John, Margate, to the parish of Playdon in settlement by apprenticeSussex, the Court of Quarter Sessions for Kent quashed the ship. The noorder, subject to the opinion of this Court on the following grounds of ap

case:

tice of the

peal stated that the pauper did not acquire a settlement by ap

premium was

statute for

were not ob

served:

Held, that the execution of

In the examination of the pauper upon which the order was made, he stated as follows:-"I am thirty-one years of age, and was born at Old Romney. When I was about fif- prenticeship, teen years old I was bound apprentice to John Clark of because the Playden. I was bound until I should attain the age of paid by the twenty-one years, and I now produce the indenture dated and the reguAug. 30th, 1821, executed by both parties and by my father; lations of the the consideration was 15/. I served the whole time, and binding parish resided in my master's house at Playden during the said apprentices service. I have been relieved by Margate parish three times." A copy of this examination was duly sent with the order the indenture of removal to the parish officers of Playden, who thereupon ship was adof apprenticegave notice of appeal, and stated the following grounds of mitted. appeal:"That the said John Gocher did not acquire a settlement grounds of appeal was altoin the parish of Playden by reason of his being bound ap- gether bad for prentice by indenture dated 30th Aug. 1821, to one John generality. Clark and serving under the same indenture, because the premium of 157. paid to the said John Clark was a payment made by the parish officers of Old Romney in the said county of Kent, and not by the father of the said John

Semble, the notice of

1841.

The QUEEN

υ.

Inhabitants of

ST. JOHN,

Gocher, and the requisitions of the statute made for the regulation and binding of parish apprentices then in force were not complied with."

Neither the indenture nor a copy of it was sent to the MARGATE. appellants at any time, nor had they seen it until the day of the appeal. At the hearing of the appeal the counsel for the respondents began by stating his case, and reading the examination and grounds of appeal, and he then produced an indenture of apprenticeship as the document referred to in the examination, and was about to have it read, when the counsel for the appellants inquired who produced it. The counsel for the respondents then called John Gocher, the pauper, who said he produced it, and had given it to the attorney for the respondents. The counsel for the respondents then proposed to read the indenture, alleging that the appellants could not dispute the signatures of the parties to the instrument, inasmuch as its execution was admitted by the terms of the grounds of appeal. The appellants, on the other hand, contended that the due execution of the indenture was put in issue by the grounds of appeal, and that, as it appeared that there was an attesting witness, that witness ought to prove the execution in the usual way. The Court decided that the execution of the indenture ought to be proved. The counsel for the respondents then withdrew the indenture, and contended that the affirmative lay upon the appellants, and called upon them to begin and prove their case. The Court decided that the appellants were not bound to begin, and they requested the respondents' counsel to proceed with his case. This the respondents did not do, whereupon the order was quashed.

The principal question for the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench is whether the due execution of the indenture was put in issue by the grounds of appeal. If this question should be decided in the affirmative, then the order of sessions is to be confirmed, unless the Court should be of opinion that the appellants were bound to begin; in which case, or if the Court should be of opinion that the