A PRACTICAL TREAbjects of Notice of Action; L. Engagement to superintend that Branch in some respons

LAW; embracing the Subjects of Notice of Action; Li-
mitation of Actions; necessary Parties to and proper Forms of
Actions, the Consequence of Mistake therein; and the Law of
Costs with reference to Damages. By ROWLAND JAY
BROWNE, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, Special Pleader.
Henry Butterworth, Law Bookseller and Publisher, 7, Fleet-

AW. A Gentleman who has had considerable experience in Conveyancing, is desirous of undertaking an Office in Town or Country. He is able to produce the highest Testimonials as to his Character and Competency. Address by Letter, pre-paid, to X. Y., Jurist Office, No. 3, Chancery-lane.

This must be a very useful publication to a large class ofONDON, EDINBURGH, and DUBLIN LIFE the community. The analysis is exceedingly well, executed, and the index both copious and useful."-Morning Post, June 10.

This day is published in 12mo., price 3s. 6d. bds.,
HE ACT to amend the REGISTRATION of
VOTERS, and to define certain Rights of Voting; with
an Analysis of the Act, and Observations. By FRANCIS
NEWMAN ROGERS, Esq., one of her Majesty's Counsel."
V. & R. Stevens & G. S. Norton, Law Booksellers and
Publishers, (Successors to the late J. & W. T. Clarke, of Por-
tugal-street), 26 and 39, Bell-yard, Lincoln's Inn.'
COLE ON CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS AND QUO

WARRANTO:

This day is published in 12mo., price 12s. boards, THE LAW and PRACTICE relating to CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS and INFORMATIONS in the Nature of QUO WARRANTO, with Forms of the Pleadings and Proceedings. By W. R. COLE, Esq., of the Middle Temple, Barrister at Law.

S. Sweet, 1, Chancery-lane; Stevens & Norton, 26 and 39, Bell-yard, Lincoln's-inn.

ASSURANCE COMPANY, 3, Charlotte-row, Mansion-house, and 55, Chancery-lane, London. Trustees

K. KINGSFORD, Esq.; B. IFILL, Esq.; J. BIDDEN, Esq. A MORE COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE of the effects of different systems of Life Assurance, enabled this Company in 1839, to introduce various important improvements, all tending to the greater security, convenience, and ultimate advantage of the assured.

THIS IS THE ONLY COMPANY who give to the assured on the mutual principle, the whole of the mutual accumulations, and also guarantee the sums assured.

of Constitution not to dispute any Policy, unless they can THIS IS THE ONLY COMPANY who are bound by their deed prove that it was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations; and numerous cases, particularly a late decision in the Cont of Exchequer, have shewn how worthless may be a Policy obtained from the most influential office which is unrestrained by this equitable principle.

THIS IS THE ONLY COMPANY who bind themselves to pay the sums in the Policies, although the debts for which they were effected, shall have been liquidated before the claims arise

THIS IS ALMOST THE ONLY COMPANY who grant in favour of Creditors whole world Policies, whereby the debt is secured although the debtor should go beyond the limits of Europe.

The premiums, calculated according to the Carlisle tables, are lower than usual upon young lives where participation in the profits is not required; and for short assurances, which at the option of the assured may be continued for life, the rates are as low as a due regard to complete security will permit. Specimen of Ascending Table to assure 100%. First 3 | Second 3 Years. Years.

Age.

Third 3
Years.

Fourth 3 Remainder
Years. of Life.

d. £ s. d. £ s. d.

1 11 11

228

2 17 9

1 18 4 2 49

2 10 9 2 18 10

9 11 4 2

2 16 3 3 10 10 4 5 5 5 00 514 60 4 8.11 5 17 4 7 59

8 18 2 10 2

COMMISSION.-The solicitor who transacts an assurance with this Company, is held to be the agent of the policy during its currency, and as such receives Commission upon all futur premiums, by whomsoever they may be paid. Prospectuses and Schedules are forwarded, free of expense

Of whom may be had, recently published, LOVELASS ON WILLS.-TWELFTH EDITION. "The LAW'S DISPOSAL of a PERSON'S ESTATE dies without Will or Testament; to which is added, the Dis-by the Agents or Manage posal of a Person's Estate by Will or Testament; with an Explanation of the Mortmain Act. By PETER LOVELASS, Esq., of the Inner Temple. The Twelfth Edition, remodelled | and enlarged, and adapted to the recent alterations of the Law. By ARTHUR BARRON, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. In 8vo., price 16s. boards.

ARCHBOLD on the LAW and PRACTICE in BANKRUPTCY, Ninth Edition, with Supplement, containing Statutes 5 & 6 Vict. caps. 116 and 122, and the New Rules and Orders. By J. FLATHER, Esq. Price 27s. boards..

ALEXANDER ROBERTSON, Manager. PALMER, FRANCE, AND PALMER, Solicitors to the Company.

** Orders for THE JURIST given to any Newsman or letter STEVENS & G. S. NORTON, Successors to J. & W. T. Clarke, (post-paid) sent to the Office, No. 3, CHANCERY LANE. or to V. & of Portugal Street), 26 and 39, BELL YARD, will insure its punctual tion, through the medium of the Post Office, to the Country.. delivery in Londou, or its being forwarded on the evening of publica

London: Printed by WALTER M'DOWALL, PRINTER, 4, PR BERTON Row, and Published by STEPHEN SWEET, BOOKSELLER and PUBLISHER, 3, CHANCERY LANE. Saturday, July 15, 1843.

LONDON, JULY 22, 1843.

The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity:

JURIS

"Lord and sire,

Full often time was knight of the shire,
A schreve had been, and a coronour."

OPINIONS OF THE JUDGES IN REGARD TO

THE LAW RELATING TO ALLEGED CRIMES
COMMITTED BY PERSONS AFFLICTED
WITH INSANE DELUSIONS.

The following questions of law were propounded to the judges by the Lord Chancellor on the part of the House of Lords:

1st. What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane delusion in respect of one or more particular subjects or persons; as, for instance, where, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some supposed public benefit?

(5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 33, s. 3) which enables the latter to magistrates, whose superior means of investigation seem take bail for the appearance of persons accused of felony, to render unnecessary the exercise of the functions of does not extend to coroners, he, like the magistrates the former. We fear, indeed, that all the activity and formerly, has no such power; and the Court of Queen's ability of its holders will hardly be able to rescue the office from insignificance. Certain it is, that it will neBench must be applied to, which, as the supreme cri- ver again be what it formerly was; and we may look minal tribunal in the kingdom, has an absolute and un-in vain among modern coroners for the like of him of controllable authority to bail offenders. In one respect whom Chaucer wrotethe coroner possesses a power which the magistrates have not, and which it might occasionally be found useful to exercise. Before the stat. 1 R. 3, c. 3, it was his duty, by the statute De Officio Coronatoris, to inquire of the goods of such as were found guilty of the murder by the inquest, and to cause them to be valued and delivered to the township. This duty, as far as regards the seizure, was abrogated by the statute above mentioned; but that statute does not, it is said, apply to cases where there is a presentment before the coroner of a fugam fecit. In such a case, if the inquest finds the offender to have fled, he forfeits his goods absolutely, and the issues of his lands, until acquitted or pardoned. In a case like that which has lately occurred, the presentment of a fugam fecit might perhaps be not without some use. The striking instances which have happened within the last year or two of defective coroners' inquisitions, have no doubt caused much surprise in the minds of unprofessional persons. But when it is considered, that inquisitions require to be drawn up with the same strictness and legal precision as indictments, and that the persons whose duty it is to prepare them are not generally much conversant with the niceties of either civil or criminal pleadings, the number of bad inquisitions is not to be wondered at. It is remarkable, that the stat. 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 20, by which various technical defects in indictments and informations are aided, does not apply to inquisitions; and although requiring, as it would seem, to be looked at with greater indulgence, they are subjected to a stricter examination than even indictments. As to the effect of the inquisition, it seems to be now settled, that it is in no case conclusive; and an one affected by it either collaterally or otherwise, may deny its authority and put it in issue. This was formerly doubted with respect to inquests of flight and felo de se; but it is now agreed that these as well as other inquests may be traversed. Upon the verdict being found it is, as we have seen, the duty of the coroner to commit the accused party to prison. He also returns to the clerk of assize for the county the depositions taken before him, the recognizances entered into by the witnesses, and the inquisition itself, for the purpose of the party being tried.

2nd. What are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury, when a person, alleged to be afflicted with insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged with the commission of a crime, (murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?

3rd. In what terms ought the questions to be left to the jury as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed?

4th. If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts, commits an offence in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused?

5th. Can a medical man conversant with the disease of insanity, who never saw the prisoner previous to the trial, but who was present during the whole trial and the examination of all the witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, or his opinion whe ther the prisoner was conscious, at the time of doing the act, that he was acting contrary to law; or whether he was labouring under any and what delusion at the time?

On the 19th June, 1843, the following answers were returned by the judges to the above questions:Mr. Justice Maule.-I feel great difficulty in answer

We have been induced to make the foregoing observations respecting the authority and duties of co-ing the questions put by your Lordships on this occa roners by a, perhaps false, impression that the subject is not generally so accurately known as it ought to be. According to Blackstone, the office is of equal antiquity with the sheriff, and was ordained together with him to keep the peace when the earls gave up the wardship of the county. The statute of Westminster 1, made 3 Edw. 1, c. 10, enacted, that the coroners should be chosen of the most loyal and wise knights; and in ancient times, none under that degree were chosen. And when the sheriffs ceased to be elected by the people, the coroner, who was chosen by the freeholders, and whose office was for life, acquired increased dignity. Matters however were greatly changed even as long ago as when Blackstone wrote, who complains, that, through the culpable neglect of gentlemen of property, the office had been suffered to fall into disrepute, and had got into low and indigent hands. Of late years also, in the metropolis and other places, the dignity of the coroner's court has received some rude shocks from a comparison with the courts of the police

sion: first, because they do not appear to arise out of and are not put with reference to a particular case of for a particular purpose, which might explain or limit the generality of their terms, so that full answers to them ought to be applicable to every possible state of facts not inconsistent with those assumed in the ques tions; this difficulty is the greater, from the practica experience of the bar, and the court being confined to questions arising out of the facts of particular cases secondly, because I have heard no argument at you Lordship's bar or elsewhere on the subject of thes questions, the want of which I feel the more, the greate is the number and the extent of questions which might be raised in argument; and thirdly, from a fear, of which I cannot divest myself, that as these questions relate t matters of criminal law of great importance and fre quent occurrence, the answers to them by the judges may embarrass the administration of justice when they are cited in criminal trials. For these reasons I should have been glad if my learned brethren would have

joined me in praying your Lordships to excuse us from ground of insanity, may be such that such a question as answering these questions, but as I do not think they either of those suggested is proper to be asked and aneught to induce me to ask that indulgence for myself swered, though the witness has never seen the person individually, I shall proceed to give such answers as I before the trial, and though he has been present and can, after the very short time which I have had to con- heard the witnesses; these circumstances, of his never sider the questions, and under the difficulties I have having seen the person before and of his having mentioned, fearing that my answers may be as little sa- been present at the trial, not being necessarily suffitisfactory to others as they are to myself. The first cient, as it seems to me, to exclude the lawfulness of question, as I understand it, is in effect, what is the law a question which is otherwise lawful, though I will not respecting alleged crime, when at the time of the com- say that an inquiry might not be in such a state, as mission of it the accused knew he was acting contrary that these circumstances should have such an effect. to the law, but did the act with a view, under the in- Supposing there is nothing else in the state of the trial fluence of insane delusion, of redressing or avenging to make the question suggested proper to be asked and some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some answered, except that the witness had been present and supposed public benefit? If I were to understand this heard the evidence, it is to be considered whether that question according to the strict meaning of its terms, it is enough to sustain the question. In principle it is would require, in order to answer it, a solution of all open to this objection, that, as the opinion of the witness questions of law which could arise on the circumstances is founded on those conclusions of fact which he forms stated in the question, either by explicitly stating and from the evidence, and as it does not appear what those answering such questions, or by stating some principles conclusions are, it may be that the evidence he gives is or rules which would suffice for the solution. I am on such an assumption of facts as to make it irrelevant quite unable to do so; and, indeed, doubt whether it be to the inquiry. But such questions have been very possible to be done; and therefore request to be permit- frequently asked, and the evidence to which they have ted to answer the question only so far as it comprehends been directed has been given, and has never that I the question, whether a person, circumstanced as stated am aware of been successfully objected to. Evidence in the question, is for that reason only to be found not most clearly open to this objection, and on the admisguilty of a crime respecting which the question of hission of which the event of a most important trial proguilt has been duly raised in a criminal proceeding; bably turned, was received in the case of The Queen v. and I am of opinion, that he is not. There is no law M'Naughten, tried at the Central Criminal Court in that I am aware of, that makes persons in the state de- March last, before the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice scribed in the question not responsible for their criminal Williams, and Mr. Justice Coleridge, in which counsel acts. To render a person irresponsible for crime on ac- of the highest eminence were engaged on both sides; count of unsoundness of mind, the unsoundness should, and I think the course and practice of receiving such according to the law as it has long been understood and evidence, confirmed by the very high authority of these held, be such as rendered him incapabable of knowing judges, who not only received it, but left it, as I underright from wrong. The terms used in the question cannot stand, to the jury without any remark derogating from be said (with reference only to the usages of language) its weight, ought to be held to warrant its reception, to be equivalent to a description of this kind and degree notwithstanding the objection in principle to which it of unsoundness of mind. If the state described in the may be open. In cases even where the course of pracquestion be one which involves or is necessarily con- tice in criminal law has been unfavourable to parties acnected with such an unsoundness, this is not a matter cused, and entirely contrary to the most obvious prinof law, but of physiology; and not of that obvious and ciples of justice and humanity, as well as those of law, familiar kind as to be inferred without proof; secondly, it has been held that such practice constituted the law, the questions necessarily to be submitted to the jury and could not be altered without the authority of parare those questions of fact which are raised on the re- liament. cord. In a criminal trial the question commonly is, Tindal, C. J.-My Lords, her Majesty's judges, with whether the accused be guilty or not guilty; but in the exception of Mr. Justice Maule, who has stated his order to assist the jury in coming to a right conclusion opinion to your Lordships, in answering the questions this necessary and ultimate question, it is usual proposed to them by your Lordships' House, think it and proper to submit such subordinate or interme- right in the first place to state that they have forborne diate questions as the course which the trial has taken entering into any particular discussion upon these quesmay have made it convenient to direct their attention tions, from the extreme and almost insuperable diffi to. What those questions are, and the manner of sub-culty of applying those answers to cases in which the mitting them, is a matter of discretion for the judge; facts are not brought judicially before them. The facts a discretion to be guided by a consideration of all the of each particular case must of necessity present themcircumstances attending the inquiry. In performing selves with endless variety, and with every shade of difthis duty it is sometimes necessary or convenient to in- ference in each case, and it is their duty to declare the form the jury as to the law; and if on a trial, such as law upon each particular case on facts proved before is suggested in the question, he should have occasion to them, and after hearing argument of counsel thereon. state what kind and degree of insanity would amount They deem it at once impracticable, and at the same to a defence, it should be stated conformably to what I time dangerous to the administration of justice if it have mentioned in my answer to the first question, as were practicable, to attempt to make minute applicabeing, in my opinion, the law on this subject; thirdly, tions of the principles involved in the answers given by there are no terms which the judge is by law required them to your Lordships' questions: they have thereThey should not be inconsistent with the fore confined their answers to the statements of that law as above stated, but should be such as, in the dis- which they hold to be the law upon the abstract quescretion of the judge, are proper to assist the jury tions proposed by your Lordships; and as they deem it in coming to a right conclusion as to the guilt of unnecessary in this particular case to deliver their the accused. Fourth, the answer which I have given opions seriatim, and as all concur in the same opinion, to the first question is applicable to this. Fifth, they desire me to express such their unanimous opinion whether a question can be asked depends, not merely to your Lordships. In answer to the first question, ason the question of fact raised on the record, but on suming that your Lordships' inquiries are confined to the course of the cause at the time it is proposed to those persons who labour under such partial deluask it; and the state of an inquiry as to the guilt of sions only, and are not in other respects insane, we person charged with a crime, and defended on the are of opinion, that, notwithstanding the party accused

to use.

Imperial Parliament.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Tuesday, July 18.

The House went into committee on the Defamation and Libel Bill. The proposed 13th and 14th clauses were withdrawn, and, subject to some alteration, the other clauses of the Bill were agreed to, and the report ordered to be received on Friday,

HOUSE OF COMMONS.
Wednesday, July 19.

The Coroners Bill passed through committee pro formâ.
Thursday, July 20.

Sir R. Peel intimated that the Ecclesiastical Courts Bill

would be postponed till next session; but the Government entertained a hope of being able to proceed with the County Courts Bill.

in force for one Year the Law relating to the Trial of ControSir G. Clerk moved for leave to bring in a Bill to continue

verted Elections.

London Gazettes.

TUESDAY, JULY 18.

BANKRUPTS.

THOMAS CHAPPELL, Sudbury, Suffolk, licensed victuallet

and paper hanger, July 25 and Aug. 29 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Alsager; Sol. Lott, Bow. lane, Cheapside.- Fiat dated July 15.

and chain-cable manufacturer, blacksmith, and ship owner
Aug. 3 and 31 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off.
Ass. Pennell; Sol. Phillips, 31, St. Dunstan's-hill, City.-
Fiat dated July 6.

did the act complained of, with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable, according to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew at the time of committing such crime that he was acting contrary to law, by which expression we understand your Lordships to mean the law of the land. As the third and fourth questions appear to us to be more conveniently answered together, we have to submit our opinion to be, that the jury ought to be told in all cases, that every man is to be presumed to be a and sane, to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that, to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved, that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the accused at the time of doing the act knew the difference between right and wrong, which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading to any mistake with the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when put generally and in the abstract, as when put with reference to the party's knowledge of right and wrong in respect to the very act with which he is charged. If the question were to be put as to the knowledge of the accused solely and ROBERT RICHARDSON, High-street, Wapping, anchor exclusively with reference to the law of the land, it might tend to confound the jury, by inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of the law of the land was essential in order to lead to a conviction, whereas the law is administered upon the principle, that every one must be taken conclusively to know it, without proof that he does know it. If the accused were conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable; and the usual course therefore has been to leave the question to the jury, whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was wrong; and this course we think is correct, accompanied with such observations and explanations as the circumstances of each particular case may require. The answer to the fourth question must of course depend on the nature of the delusion; but making the same assumption as we did before, namely, that he labours under such partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, we think he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility, as if the facts, with respect to which the delusion exists, were real. For example, if, under the influence of delusion, he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was, that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment. In answer to the last question, we state to your Lordships, that we think the medical man, under the circumstances supposed, cannot in strictness be asked his opinion in the terms above stated, because each of those questions involves the determination of the truth of the facts deposed to, which it is for the jury to decide; and the questions are not mere questions upon a matter of science, in which case such evidence is admissible. But where the facts are admitted, or not disputed, and the question becomes substantially one of science only, it may be convenient to allow the question to be put in that general form, though the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right.

JOHN HARWOOD and FREDERICK HARWOOD, Fen
church-street, London, stationers, July 25 and Aug. 26 at
2, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Pennell; Sols
Clark & Davidson, Essex-st., Strand.-Fiat dated July 13.
RICHARD ARMFIELD, King-street, Cheapside, buttor
manufacturer, July 25 at 10, and Aug. 26 at 1, Court of
Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Belcher; Sol. Ellis, Cow-
per's-court, Cornhill.-Fiat dated July 12.

MATTHEW NELMS, Back-hill, Hatton-garden, hearth-rug
manufacturer, July 27 at half-past 12, and Sept. 15 at 1,
Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Edwards; Sol.
Cox, 16, Pinners'-hall, Old Broad-st.-Fiat dated July 11.
JAMES BINION COOPER, Drury-lane, ironfounder, July
29 at half-past 12, and Sept. 15 at half-past 2, Court of
Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Edwards; Sols. Carlon &
Haynes, 6, Chancery-lane.-Fiat dated July 15.
GEORGE SIMONS, King's-square, Goswell-road, St. Luke,
watch manufacturer, July 27 at half-past 2, and Sept. 15 at
12, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Groom; Sols.
E. & C. Harrison, 14, Southampton-buildings, Chancery
IBBS WILLIAM HODGES BROWN, Little Bowden,
lane.-Fiat dated July 12.
Northamptonshire, dealer in horses, July 29 at 11, and Sept.
15 at 2, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Edwards
Sols. Austen & Hobson, 4, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn.
Fiat dated July 8.

THOMAS RADCLYFFE, Birmingham, stationer, July 27
at 2, and Aug. 21 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bir-
mingham: Off. Ass. Whitmore; Sol. Cox, Pinners'-hall
Old Broad-street, London.-Fiat dated July 13.

MEETINGS.

W. Fletcher, Birmingham, oil man, Aug. 16 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Birmingham, pr. d.-J. Stevens, Brit well, Salome, Oxfordshire, ironfounder, July 27 at 1, Cour of Bankruptcy, London, last ex.-Wm. Gordon, Colchester Essex, coach proprietor, July 28 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy London, last ex.-Jas. Whiting, Seckeford-st., Clerkenwell ex-John Dewhurst, Preston, provision dealer, Aug. 3 at 11 carpenter, July 21 at 2, Court of Bankruptcy, London, las District Court of Bankruptcy, Manchester, last ex.-Richard W. Carpenter, Holloway, cheesemonger, Aug. 8 at half-pas 2, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-Richard Parker Hambro-wharf, London, and Oxford, wharfinger, July 27 a