torn up. Loop-holes had been knocked into the walls of every room, both above and below, as if in anticipation of a stand being made if it came to street-fighting. The kotwali is a high square building; an open courtyard, with two tiers of rooms round it, and a parapet above all whence the neighbouring roofs and streets can be commanded by musketry fire. It is so closely hemmed in by buildings, however, that it would not be a good position to defend. The entrance is from the middle of the Char Chowk Bazaar, and it is the centre round which all Cabul circulates when any excitement arouses the people. When I visited it in my ramble through the city, I found 100 Sikhs and Ghoorkas garrisoning it, and ready to turn out at a moment's notice if an alarm of "ghazis" were raised. Speaking to a friendly Cabuli, he assured me that lakhs of property had been looted; he himself had had five houses cleared out, while sirdars in our camp had been treated in a similar way. Wali Mahomed especially had been a sufferer, and the ladies of his zenana had been subjected to great indignities. Believing that they had ornaments of value hidden upon their persons, they were stripped of every stitch of clothing, and turned out in all the shame of nakedness into the streets. Questioned as to the number of Mahomed Jan's followers, the Cabuli said there were fully 30,000 men, and this coincided with estimates given by our spies and others who have been examined since. Padshah Khan, the man whom we trusted so implicitly on our march from the Shutargardan, was among the leaders, and brought a small contingent to swell the army of fanatics. The systematic way in which the looting was carried on will appear from the statement that, when a man defended his house against a small band of marauders, they retired for the time, and then returned, as a Hindu put it, "10,000 strong." It was useless to offer opposition to such numbers, though I believe many of the Kizilbashes, by professing to be good Mahomedans, saved their property. There were not many inoffensive shopkeepers killed, eight or ten at the highest estimate; but the fear and terror in which they lived hidden away in cellars and holes made their life during the Mohurrum scarcely worth the living. I left Cabul, feeling that it was, indeed, a hapless city. The industrious classes, who had

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been our friends and had rejoiced at our coming, had been despoiled under our eyes; while those who had cursed us in their hearts, and longed to drive us out, were once more cowed after a short triumph, and were calculating how many of their number would shortly grace the gallows. The Military Commission under the presidency of Brigadier-General Massy has again been ordered to assemble. This time, it is to be hoped a few men of importance may be executed-always provided that we can find them. The members of the Commission are General Massy, Major Morgan, (of the 9th Foot), and Major Stewart (of the 5th Punjab Cavalry).

The remains of Captain Spens were found to-day by Dr. Duke, about ten yards from the spot where he was cut down. General Roberts, with a small force, visited Chardeh Valley to-day, to examine the ground where the cavalry and guns came to grief on the 11th. One mountain gun of Swinley's Battery, lost on the 14th, has been found. It was lying in a jheel (a shallow pool) a few miles up Chardeh Valley, where it had been abandoned by the enemy in their flight.

CHAPTER XX.

The Probabilities of the Revival of the Jehad-Insincerity of Native Chiefs-The Need of further Reinforcements-The Difficulties of Warfare in Afghanistan-Return of General Baker from Baba Kuch Kar-Recovery of the Bodies of Lieutenants Hardie and Forbes-Review of the Jehad-The Attitude of the Tribes on the Line of Communications-Asmatullah Khan's Position-Failure to check our Reinforcements The Importance of the Luttabund Post-Attack upon JugdulluckRepulse of the Lughmanis-Deportation of Daoud Shah to India-Military Execu

tions.

1st January, 1880.

THE New Year has come upon us so suddenly, that we have had no time to cast vain regrets upon worn-out months, which have witnessed the making of important pages of history, and given us a new starting-point in our relations with Afghanistan. A month ago we were dying of weary inactivity, but this feeling was swept away by the stirring events of the Mohurrum, and we have not

T

yet sunk back into our old state of lassitude. Our losses have been so heavy, that it behoves us to take precautions to prevent a repetition of the late investment; and we are bestirring ourselves right heartily to give the ghazi-log a reception worthy of their impetuous nature, if they keep their promise to return in March. Musa Jan, Yakub Khan's son, is now with Mushk-i-Alam (that unsavoury moollah, whose title means "Scent of the Universe") at Bad Mushk, twelve miles from Ghazni; and when the jehad is revived, all true Afghans will be called upon to rally round their rightful sovereign. The waverers will be wrought upon by promises of endless loot; the fanatical by opportunities of future bliss after they have died as ghazis; and the mass of the tribesmen by an appeal to their warlike instincts which lead them to fight for the sake of bloodshed. It was a grave mistake which left Musa Jan, with the women of Yakub Khan's household, in Cabul; for now a status is given to the leaders of the up-rising which they lacked before. We have Wali Mahomed with us still; and if we so far modify our policy as to make him Governor of Cabul and the districts about,-and all things are possible in the see-saw of politics,—we could make a counter-appeal, and declare Musa Jan to be merely a puppet in the hands of mischief-makers. Whether this appeal would be disregarded, one cannot say; but if it were backed by a strong display of force, say 12,000 men holding Sherpur and every post down to Jellalabad well garrisoned, it might have some effect. No faith can be put in Afghan promises we have learned that, by the falling away of Padshah Khan, if we did not already know it from past experience; and our safety from constant attack must lie in the completeness of our own preparations, rather than in contracts made with sirdars, who will only serve us so long as fair weather lasts. Padshah Khan is said to have remained faithful at least until the 14th of December. When he learned that the British had been obliged to withdraw within the walls of Sherpur, and had lost two mountain guns in the day's fighting, he may have thought that a disaster was impending, and so joined Mahomed Jan with as many Ghilzais as he could collect together. He now affirms that he was more a spectator than an active participator in the siege; and that this was so evident to the other chiefs that, after

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assigning him a post in the fore-front of the attack, they withdrew him from his command at the last moment, so great was their mistrust of his sincerity.

The Khyber Force will relieve us of all garrison work at Luttabund, which sets free 800 men and two guns for duty here; so that with the 1,400 men General Charles Gough brought with him we shall be over 2,000 stronger. But our losses have been heavy, and there are now 800 men on the sick list, many of whom must be sent back to India. The present campaign cannot be brought to a successful conclusion without a much greater display of force than we have hitherto made; and I believe every effort is now being put forth to collect further supplies, so that, if necessary, 15,000 or 20,000 men could be fed during February and March preparatory to our resuming the offensive in the spring. The warning of Sir Henry Durand, in his criticism of the old war, must have recurred to our leaders when contemplating a new accession of strength to the force now here. He wrote:"Everything in the expedition was a matter of the greatest uncertainty, even to the feeding of the troops; for Afghanistan merited the character given to Spain by Henry IV. of France: Invade with a large force, and you are destroyed by starvation; invade with a small one, and you are overwhelmed by a hostile people.'" We have tried the latter alternative, and, after being shut in by 50,000 Afghans (for such it is now said was the numerical strength of Mahomed Jan's following), we have no wish to repeat the experiment. To avoid it, we must have a large and handy force ready to cope with the enemy before he can reach Cabul; and here the starvation difficulty crops up. After paying fabulously high prices for everything from a sheep to an onion.

we had laid in stores sufficient for the consumption of our original division until the spring; but these will not suffice when they are drawn upon by the troops which have since joined us (9th Foot, Guides, 2nd and 4th Ghoorkas, Hazara Mountain Battery, and Sappers), apart from any others that may yet come up. The Khyber transport is not strong enough for much reliance to be placed upon it in the matter of bringing up supplies from Peshawur, and we shall probably have to requisition the country and force the people to sell their hidden stores at our own prices.

We cannot starve, and the military exigencies of the position render it imperative that we should have Sherpur not only well garrisoned, but a movable force of sufficient strength to disperse all Cabul gatherings, and regiments stationed along our line of communication, equal either to punishing chiefs like Asmatullah, or moving westward to Cabul if a second jehad brings about another great combination of the people. Our latest reinforcement, which arrived here, on the 24th, under General Gough, is now garrisoning the Bala Hissar; while the Guides have been attached to General Macpherson's Brigade, and will remain in cantonments. They have done good service since their arrival, and well deserve to be attached to the army which captured Cabul single-handed.

General Baker returned yesterday from his excursion to Baba Kuch Kar, where he destroyed the forts and villages belonging to Mir Butcha. This place was demolished by Sale on the 8th of October, 1840. It was considered at that time a stronghold which would have given an army without a battering-train much trouble; but now the fortified enclosures were less formidable. They were not defended, Mir Butcha and his retainers have fled northward to Charikar when he saw how quickly we were following him after his retreat from Sherpur on the 3rd December. No opposition on the road to, or from, Baba Kuch Kar was offered to General Baker, who was only away five days. The snow-covered roads and hills were very trying to the soldiers and followers; and it was conclusively proved that camping out in this weather is likely to sow the seeds of much sickness among our men. The country visited was not Kohistan proper, which lies north of Istalif, but the Koh-Daman ("Skirt of the Hills "). The valleys were found. to be marvellously fertile, the orchards and vineyards on the hillslopes stretching away on either side for miles. Cabul is said to draw most of its delicious fruit from the Koh-Daman, the fertility of which we had every opportunity of observing. In the spring the district must be the most beautiful spot in Afghanistan, the Chardeh Valley sinking into insignificance before it. Great difficulty would be experienced by an army marching through in the face of determined opposition. Sunken roads, irrigated tracts, walled fields, and innumerable watercourses form such a network