views. They are perfectly safe because they are in no danger of being called upon actually to run the universe.

This general ignorance of international society may be classified under three headings: the nature of the State, the interests of the State, and the laws governing and controlling these interests.

As to the nature of the State, apart from the political theorists, few persons can tell you what it is, what are its objects and how it functions. The definition of the interests of nations is so excessively difficult that it has primarily to do with the causes of war itself. If nations only could agree as to the precise interests of each and all, peace would not be difficult. But even when they have agreed upon certain of their mutual interests, the formulation of the laws to protect these interests is far from an easy task. In fact, it must be admitted that international law in this respect is still in an early stage of development. There are vast areas where no legal remedies are yet available. And then there remains the stupendous problem of the best means of safeguarding the rights of nations once their interests have been determined and the laws for their protection formulated.

I must confess to a personal impatience with the political theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and the rest. I do not deny that they served a certain valuable purpose in the early evolution of political thought. They are most ingenious, and at times stimulating, but I hold that they have very slight relations to the world of reality. I fear that they have even confused and misled many earnest political thinkers in their efforts to solve the problems of human society. It would seem as if we had now reached the stage in our political evolution when the only effective method for the study of politics is the laboratory methodthe practical, hard, objective test of analysis. I believe that this method can be applied to human society and particularly to international society with the greatest success, even where we have to take into account ideas and emotions which may be considered subjective in character. In the latter instance, as in psychology, I believe it possible to submit testimony of this subjective nature to an objective analysis which, in the case of national differences and rivalries, may be of the utmost signifi

cance. We should, in an honest spirit of inquiry, shun with horror the emotional and sentimental method of considering this problem and should concentrate our investigations open-mindedly—and not unsympathetically on the definite problem of the very nature of international society.

I know of no more fundamental problem in this connection than that of the relation of man to the State, for the reason that there is an obvious confusion of thought, a tendency to confound the State and the individual as one and the same thing. This is constantly appearing in the arguments of statesmen and publicists of high distinction. I suspect this is due in many instances to the pernicious influence of political theorists of the school of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. I recall an assertion by Lord Bryce in his lectures at the Institute of Politics in Williamstown last summer, to the effect that nations were still living in a "state of nature". Such a state of nature remains yet to be demonstrated as an actual fact and not as a mere political concept.

It is an amazing fact that little of an original analytical nature regarding the relation of man and the State has yet been published, allowing of course for occasional incidental allusions to the problem. Perhaps the most valuable contribution to the subject is to be found in the recent book of Professor MacDougall on the subject of The Group Mind. One can find here most suggestive observations as to the exact nature of international society and the functions of nations. Another book of lesser importance but still of much interest is that by Miss Follett on The New State. Certain of the most recent attempts to deal with this problem are of much less value for the obvious reason that the authors are endeavoring to sustain some preconceived theory as to the nature and organization of international society.

In approaching this problem of the relation of the individual to nations, we are bound to start with the classic statement of Aristotle, that "Man is by nature a political animal". It is necessary, however, to consider this assertion in the light of its original context. What Aristotle really said was: "It is evident that the State is a creation of nature and that man is by nature a political animal. The State is by nature clearly prior to the

family and the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part." In other words, man is a political animal not because he has a divinely given political sense, but because he is the product of organized society. This is a profound observation which demands the most earnest study. Its truth may be ascertained by various tests.

Obviously, by approaching the problem from a biological standpoint, as does Professor Henry Jones Ford, in his most stimulating volume, The Natural History of the State, it is not difficult to show that the homo sapiens was originally a gregarious animal and that it was by this gregarious instinct that he was able to secure his higher development and, specifically, his political evolution. Here we run counter to the political theorists who would insist on some intelligent, deliberate decision on the part of man to abandon a state of nature and secure for himself the benefit of organized society. It would seem as if the argument of the biologist was of infinitely greater value than that of the political theorist.

We may, however, approach the problem from the political point of view, or rather the philosophical point of view, and seek by an analysis of the exact nature of political society to test Aristotle's assertion that man is the product and not the creator of organized society. It is a matter of common experience that a man living in the open country apart from the immediate restraints of society is quite distinct from the citizen living within an organized community. When men met in the open country in what we were formerly accustomed to call "the frontier", they met in a challenging spirit and reserved to each an enormous liberty of action which they could not claim in a city. From the higher intellectual and ethical point of view, it may be argued whether this was true liberty, but it certainly was liberty of a very primitive sort.

When a man leaves the open country and settles in an organized community, he submits himself to many restraints. He makes, for the sake of other compensating advantages, what might be termed actual sacrifices. First of all, there is the sacrifice of physical freedom. He cannot dash madly through the crowded street as he would in the open prairie. There are

fences, walls and policemen to impede his freedom of movement. He may not shout and sing as he may feel inclined to do in the open. There are others not only to be considered but to be protected against noise, disturbance and injury.

Secondly, the individual in society makes the great sacrifice of freedom of judgment. He cannot decide, even regarding his own family affairs, without running counter at times to the judgment of men about him. The first lesson he must learn in organized society is "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind". This he finds to be a basic principle of political society. Those who have served on committees, on boards of directors, on college faculties and other deliberative bodies, know this painful truth. Deliberation and discussion in groups not infrequently lead to decisions which no one individual of the immediate group concerned would be prepared to admit conformed entirely to his own personal judgment. In such discussion each makes his own contribution and oftentimes throws light on the subject for the rest. "Taking common counsel" is literally to submit a problem to the consideration and decision of all. It is viewed from every angle of fact, of opinion, of logical deduction and of ethical consideration. The consensus of opinion a decision attained in such a manner generally represents the mature judgment of no one individual in the group. It is a resultant-a composite, a strange product that may not always be conformable to the ordinary tests of logic. Such is the normal process by which a nation reaches its decisions and governs its actions. Such is the sacrifice of the freedom of individual judgment which a man must make when he claims the privileges of organized society.

Thirdly, from the foregoing it is evident that the individual in society is compelled to make a sacrifice of his freedom of will. He can neither decide nor act according to the imperious demands of his own personality. He is compelled to merge his own will into the general will of the State. This often seems to exact a most painful sacrifice, but it is one that he makes as a "political animal" for the greater good of the whole.

And fourthly, it is evident that under such conditions the individual citizen is compelled to make a certain sacrifice of

conscience. He must be governed by the judgment and the will of his fellow citizens as expressed through the State. This implies obviously an abdication of his own moral conscience. He may doubt; he may seriously question; he may even fear the wisdom and the moral value of their decision and action; but unless he is a genuine revolutionist, or an extreme individualist, or an actual anarchist, he conforms his conscience to the composite conscience of all. Here we have the justification for revolutions where a citizen firmly believes that an intolerable wrong is being committed which compels him conscientiously to take up arms. Ordinarily, such revolts are due to the tyranny of a few, and are much less frequent in recent times. It is possible, naturally, that even in the best organized democracy a moral issue may arise through the tyranny of the majority where revolt is the only available recourse. This, however, is not very likely and in the ordinary course of events, no matter what personal reservations of conscience an individual citizen may make concerning the decision of the rest, he literally assents to the bold statement of patriotic duty, "My country, right or wrong." All that he means by this would appear to be that once democracy has decided, a due regard for the opinions of his fellow men compels him to submerge his own judgment, will and conscience into one national judgment, will and conscience.

These are the main influences working in organized society which would seem amply to demonstrate the truth of Aristotle's assertion that "Man is a political animal", that he is a different individual in the State from the individual in the so-called "state of nature", that, in sum, he is the product of the State and not the original builder of the State. In other words, the State is to be regarded as an organism in which man finds his own peculiar functions and his greatest opportunity for individual development. The sacrifices which he may appear to make of the freedom of his own personality are more than compensated by the opportunities for his higher intellectual and ethical evolution within the State. He serves the State because the State best serves him. But he is not to be identified with the State itself; a nation is something more than an aggregate of individuals. It is, as Vattel says, "a moral person who possesses an