1818. The shipment, as also of the arrival of the Robert Bruce, and the progress he had made in disposing of her cargo. The passage quoted means, therefore, (although Fortuna. somewhat obscurely expressed,) "It is possible that the outward cargo of the Robert Bruce may not be sufficient to pay for the shipment already made by the Fortuna, same, and the arrival of this go to a better market than it &c. J. F. MUHLENBRUCK." 1818. The F. rtuna. Want of e vidence that of the claim istence f of the enemy house. and you must, therefore, furnish me with a credit to make up the deficiency." Ychazo and Carricabura no doubt advanced for the purchase of the cargo of sugars upon the credit of the cargo of the Robert Bruce, and according y we find that house charging a commission for advancing. On these facts we are satisfied that the cargo was purchased with British funds. Lastly; there is no evidence that Muhlenbruck was the agent of M. & J. Krause, and there is abundant Muhlenbruck evidence of his being the avowed and confidential agent was the agent of the British house. We see in the midst of the ants, and ex-greatest anxiety to keep up the character of agent to proofs that he the Russian house, this gentleman, without being aware was the agent of it, does an act which at once shows to whom he holds himself accountable. In his letter to Bennett. & Co. of the 24th of March, he requests them to infor.n the Russian house, that he has made certain advances on account of the ship. But why request Bennett & Co. to do this, if he was himself in immediate connection and correspondence with the Russian house? The fact is, his correspondence with the Russian house was fictitious, and his object was to inform Bennett and Co. in reality, whilst he feigned to address himself to M. & J. Krause, and thus the letters to the latter house, covering the invoice and bill of lading, although of the same date with that to Bennett & Co. omits this piece of information, which, in a real correspondence, would be groundwork of a credit to himself, and contains nothing but the most general information, just enough in fact to gloss over the transaction, and give it the aspect of reality.a 1318. The his Neutral ship this owner, lending himself to co With regard to the vessel, it would be enough to Fortuna. observe, that if a neutral ship-owner will lend name to cover a fraud with regard to the cargo, circumstance alone will subject him to condemntion, ver a fraud to the carg But in this case there are, also, many circumstances to subjects ship to COL maintain a supicion that the vessel was British prop-demnation. erty, or at least not owned as claimed. Although this court, from extreme anxiety to avoid subjecting a neu- Relaxation tral to condemnation, has relaxed its rules in allowing court in alle time for further proof in a case where there was concealment of papers, yet nothing has been brought ward to support the neutral character of the ship. a (Translation) "Havanna, 24th March, 1814. Messrs. M.&J. Krause, Riga. With the present I have the honour to send you the invoice and bill of lading of a cargo of Sugars for your esteemed account in the Fortuna, Captain H. Behrens. The ship could not take more than 1520 boxes white, and 600 brown, with Campeachy wood which was necessary for stowing; together $57, 517 4, for which you will please give me credit. The sugars are of the new crop bought at a moderate price, and of a very good quality. And I flatter myself the rules of ing farther proof in a case for- of concealment No you will be content with the (Signed,) J. F. MUHLENBRUCK." of papers. 1818. Gelston V. Hoyt. charter-party, no original correspondence, nothing, in fact, but those formal papers which never fail to accompany a fictitious, as well as a real, transaction. On the contrary, we find the captain, without any instructions from his supposed owners, submitting implicitly to the orders of Bennett & Co. in every thing; and the latter assuming even a control over the contract which he exhibits with hi supposed owner in Riga, and expressing a solicitude about his expenses, which could only have been suggested by a consciousness that the house of B. & Co. would have to pay those expenses. Upon the whole, we are satisfied that it is a case for condemnation both of ship and cargo. Decree affirmed. (CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW.) GELSTON, et al. v. HOYT. Under the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20. s. 25. giving appellate jurisdiction to the supreme court of the United States, from the final judg ment or decree of the highest court of law or equity of a state, in certain cases, the writ of error may be directed to any court in which the record and judgment on which it is to act may be found, and if the record has been remitted by the highest court, &c. to another court of the state, it may be brought by the writ of error from that court. The courts of the United States have an exclusive cognizance of the questions of forfeiture upon all seizures made under the laws of the 1818. Hoyt, United States; and it is not competent for a state court to entertain or decide such question of forfeiture. If a sentence of condemnation be definitively pronounced by the proper court of the United States, Gelston it is conclusive that a forfeiture is incurred; if a sentence of acquittal it is equally conclusive against the forfeiture; and in either case, the question cannot be again litigated in any common law forum. Where a seizure is made for a supposed forfeiture, under a law of the United States, no action of trespass lies in any common law tribunal, until a final decrce is pronounced upon the proceeding in rem to enforce such forfeiture; for it depends upon the final decree of the court proceeding in rem whether such seizure is to be deemed rightful or tortious, and the action, if brought before such decree is made, is brought too soon. If a suit be brought against the seizing officer for the supposed trespass At common lay any person may, at his peril, seize for a forfeiture to the The statute of 1794, ch. 50. s. 3. prohibiting we fitting out any ship &c. for the service of any foreign prince or states, to cruise against the subjects, &c. of any other foreign prince or state, does not apply to any new government, unless it has been acknowledged by the United States, or by the government of the country to which such new state belonged. And a plea which sets up a forfeiture under that act in fitting out a ship to cruise against such new state, must aver such recog. nition, or it is bad. A plea justifying a seizure under this statute need not state the partie |