The same fact existed in Mitchel v. Ede, 11 Ad. & Ell., 888. The plaintiff recovered the value of the sugars shipped from Jamaica, for the reason that, under the circumstances stated, he was held to be the owner of them. Upon the same principle is Foster v. Frampton, 6 B. & C., 107, where the goods were received from the carrier by the actual vendee, and it was held that the transitus was at an end.

We do not perceive anything adverse to the principles we have stated in the learned opinion delivered by Ch. J. Shaw in Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray, 285, nor in Lee v. Kimball, 45 Me., 172, which holds that, where a vendee of goods sells the same before reaching their destination, the right of stoppage in transitu is

ended.

551] at a distant place, can the carrier deliver | ery to him, or his order, wherever it might be, the goods to such consignees or to their order at would be a discharge to the carrier. another place, or without starting them on their journey? We think the rule is, that, where the consignor is known to the carrier to be the owner, the carrier must be understood to contract with him only, for his interest. upon such terms as he dictates in regard to the delivery, and that the consignees are to be regarded simply as agents selected by him to receive the goods at a place indicated. Where he is an agent merely, the rule is different. This is illustrated by the case of Thompson v. Fargo, 49 N. Y., 188. Thompson had, as the agent of White, collected certain moneys belonging to White, and, inclosing them in a package directed to White at Terre Haute, Indiana, sent the package from Decatur, in the same State, by the express company. Various attempts were made to deliver the package to White, but he could not be found; and Thompson, the shipper, at length demanded the return to him of the package and, on refusal, brought an action to recover its value. The Court of Appeals of New York held, that the action could not be maintained, saying that if the case had been one of a sale by the consignor, with no directions from the consignee how to ship the goods, an action might have been sustained by him; as the title would remain in him; but when the consignor was the mere agent, having no interest in the property, but acting in pursuance of the orders of the owner in shipping the property, he could not maintain an action; that a delivery to him would be no defense to an action by the owner. The case of Duff v. Budd, 3 Brod. & B., 177, holds the same rule.

We base our judgment upon the bill of lading and its legal results, adopting the fifth point of the plaintiff in error, that any antecedent agreement or understanding was merged therein and extinguished thereby. The circumstances of the shipment, how and by whom made, and the knowledge of the ownership, were proved withof lading adopted and claimed by the plaintiff, out objection. These circumstances, and the bill and the point raised by the exception to the charge of the judge, present the question we

have discussed, and no other.

his eleventh point that Dickson was not the *The plaintiff in error now contends in [553 owner of the tobacco. This point cannot be raised here. No request or exception was made which involves the question. The ownership was assumed throughout the trial; in the charge of the judge; not disputed in the requests to charge; and if a subject of doubt in any form, must be considered as settled by the verdict. The only suggestion of a denial of ownership is in the request to charge; that, if the tobacco was in the possession of Trent, as agent of Dickson or otherwise, then the delivery to him or his order was lawful. To hold this to be a denial of the ownership of Dickson, or a claim of ownership by Trent, would go far beyond any reasonable construction.

We see no error in the rulings at the trial, and are of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.

It is so ordered.

The numerous cases cited by the plaintiff in error, to the effect that any delivery to the consignee which is good as between him and the carrier is good against the consignor, are cases where the carrier has no notice of the ownership of the property other than that implied from the relation of the parties to each other as consignor and consignee. This gives to the consignee the implied ownership of the property, and hence justifies the carrier in taking his direction as to the manner of delivery. In addition to those authorities, reference may be had to Sweet v. Barney, 23 N. Y., 335, where a bank in the interior of New York sent by express a package of money directed to "The People's Bank, 173 Canal Street, New York." The package was delivered to an agent of the People's THE ETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPA552] Bank at the office of the express company, and was stolen from such agent. The bank in the interior brought its action against the express company, and the question was, whether the express company was authorized to deliver the package at any other place than 173 Canal Street. The court held, that as there was no notice to the express company that the money was not the property of the People's Bank, in the City of New York, nor any circumstances to weaken the presumption that the money belonged to that bank, any delivery that was good as to that bank discharged the carrier.

Of the character mentioned is the case of R. Co. v. Bartlett, 7 H. & N., 400, which is much relied on by the plaintiff in error. The consignee in that case was the purchaser of the wheat in question and, consequently, any deliv

NY, Plff. in Err.,

DAVID FRANCE and LUCETTA P., his Wife, in Right of said Lucetta P., and to Her Use.

(See S. C., Reporter's ed., 561-567.)

Life insurance-wager policy-application.

1. Any person has a right to procure an insurance on his own life and to assign it to another, provided it be not done by way of cover for a wager policy.

NOTE-Right to take life insurance for benefit of stranger-see note, 25 L. R. A., 627. Insurance on life of another; who may have; interest necessary.

No one can have an insurance upon the life of another unless he has an interest in the continu

ance of that life. Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass., 564. A single woman, dependent on her brother for

2. Where a brother takes out a policy on his own life for the benefit of his sister, it is totally immaterial what arrangement they choose to make between them about the payment of the premiums; such policy is not a wager policy.

3. Where the answers in the application, for infoot, "the above is as near correct as I remember." the right to recover on the policy will not be defeated, unless some one of the answers was consciously incorrect.

surance are qualified by the words appended at its

[No. 234.]

Argued Apr. 19, 1877. Decided May 7, 1877.

of $243.50, to be paid to said Company on or before the thirteenth day of September in every year during the continuance of this policy, do assure the life of Andrew J. Chew, of Philadel

phia, in the County of Philadelphia, State of Pennsylvania, in the amount of $10,000 for the term of his life.

And the said Company do hereby promise and agree to and with the said assured, her executors, administrators and assigns, well and truly to pay, or cause to be paid, the said sum In Error to the Circuit Court of the United insured to the said assured, her executors, adStates for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. | ministrators, or assigns, within ninety days aft Suit was brought in this case, in the District er due notice and proof of the death of the sak Court for the City and County of Philadelphia, Andrew J. Chew; and in either case all indebt by the defendants in error, upon a certain policy edness of the party to the Company shall be de of life insurance. Upon petition of defendant, ducted from the sum insured. If any notes giv the case was removed to the court below, by en by the said Andrew J. Chew for any portion which judgment was given for the plaintiffs. of the cash part of premium on the within policy Whereupon the defendant sued out this writ of for any current year shall mature and not be paid, the policy shall become void from that date, and all payments of premium thereon for

error.

The case is fully stated by the court.

Mr. Samuel C. Perkins, for plaintiff in feited to said Company."

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court:

This action was brought by David France and Lucetta P., his wife to recover the amount of a policy of insurance for $10,000, issued by the Etna Life Insurance Company on the life of Andrew J. Chew, of Philadelphia, dated September 13, 1865, and payable to the said Lucetta, who was Chew's sister.

The proposals for the insurance made out upon one of the printed blanks of the Company, were signed by both Chew and Mrs. France. The following is a copy of the introductory part of the policy:

"This policy of insurance witnesseth, that the Etna Life Insurance Company, in consideration of the sum of $243.50, to them in hand paid by Andrew J. Chew, for the benefit of Lucetta P. France, his sister, and of the annual premium

support and education, has a sufficient interest in his life to entitle her to insure it. Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass., 115, 7 Am. Dec., 38.

The mere relationship of brother is not such as will support a policy of life insurance. Lewis V. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co., 39 Conn., 104; Bevin v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 23 Conn., 244.

It is well settled that a man has an insurable interest in his own life and in that of his wife and children, a woman in the life of her husband, and the creditor in the life of his debtor. Any reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from continued life of another, creates an insurable interest in such life. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, ante.

the

The mere relationship of father and son does not give the son an insurable interest in the life of his father unless the son has a well founded or reasonable expectation of some pecuniary advantage to be derived from the continuance of the life of the father. Guardian Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill., 355, 22 Am. Rep., 180.

A son has an insurable interest in the life of his aged father, whom he is liable by law to support. It is a provision to reimburse himself for his outlays, past or future. Reserve Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kane, 81 Pa. St., 154, 22 Am. Rep., 741.

The insurable interest in the life of another person must be a direct and definite pecuniary inter

The policy, amongst other things, contained the following stipulation:

"And it is also understood and agreed to be the true intent and meaning hereof, that if the proposal, answers and declaration made by the said Andrew J. Chew, and bearing date the thirteenth day of September, 1865, and which are hereby made part and parcel of *this [563 policy as fully as if herein recited, and upon the faith of which this agreement is made, shall be found in any respect false or fraudulent, then and in such case this policy shall be null and void."

Numerous exceptions were taken, on which errors are assigned here; but they are all reducible to two heads, or grounds of defense, viz.: (1) Want of insurable interest in Lucetta P. France; (2) Misrepresentation and breach of warranty as to the age and health of said Chew. It is insisted that the rulings and charge of the court below on these points were erro

neous.

First. On the question whether Lucetta P. France had an insurable interest in the life of Chew, the conceded facts are that she was his sister, as stated in the policy; that, at the time the policy was issued, she was married to the est, and a person has not such an interest in the life of his wife or child, merely in the character of husband or parent. Charter Oak L. Ins. Co. v. Brant, 47 Mo., 424, 4 Am. Rep., 328; Gambs v. Covenant Mut. L. Ins. Co., 50 Mo., 48.

The obligation of the husband to support the wife gives the wife an insurable interest in her husband's life. Baker v. U. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 43 N. Y., 823; Thompson v. Am., etc., Ins. Co., 46 N. Y., 674; Gambs v. Covenant Mut. L. Ins. Co., 50 Mo., 48. A woman engaged to be married to a man has an insurable interest in his life. If he violated the contract, he would be liable for damages; if he kept it, she would be entitled to support as his wife. Chisholm v. Nat. Cap. L. Ins. Co., 52 Mo., 213; 14 Am. Rep., 414.

Divorce does not deprive a wife of insurable interest in her husband's life. McKee v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo., 383.

Even a woman living with a man as his wife, but not married to him and supported by him, has an insurable interest in his life. Eq. Ass. Soc. v. Patterson, 41 Ga., 338, 5 Am. Rep., 535.

Debtor's life may be insured by creditor, even where Statute of Limitations may be pleaded to the debt. Rawls v. Am. Ins. Co., 36 Barb., 357, 27 N. Y., 282; Mowry v. Home Ins. Co., 9 R. I., 346.

Partner advancing money against skill of other partner may insure the other partner's life. Valtor

other plaintiff, David France, and in no way that the premiums on the policy were paid by depended on her brother for her support; that Lucetta P. France, whether in cash or by her the latter was earning his living as a ladies' notes, there was evidence from which they could shoemaker, and was of small means. Evidence | find that the application for insurance was made was given tending to show that Mrs. France and the policy in question taken out by her for had, at different times, loaned money to her her own benefit; and, if such was the case, she brother to an amount of some $2,000, and lent must show an insurable interest in the life of him $400 more in September, 1865; that a pre- her brother, beyond that of mere relationship, vious policy of like amount with the present before she could recover. The court refused so had been obtained of the defendant Company to charge and, we think, rightly. Waiving the on Chew's life, for his sister's benefit, in June question whether merely as sister of Chew, Mrs. of the same year, and that at the time of issuing France could have effected in her own name an the policy now in suit he was unmarried, but insurance on his life, without its being obwas engaged to be married, and was in fact noxious to the charge of a wager policy, the evimarried the next day. The policy, as well as dence was incompetent to prove the fact sought the several receipts for the annual premiums, to be proved by it. The Company, when taking signed by the Secretary of the Company and the notes in question, acknowledged the precountersigned by its agent in Philadelphia, all miums to have been received from Chew, and acknowledge that said premiums were received was estopped from going behind its own admisfrom Chew. sion, under the eircumstances of the case. The contract of insurance, as correctly construed by the court, was made with Chew; and the relationship of the parties was such as to devest the assignment of the policy or the direction of its payment to his sister of all semblance of a wagering transaction. Under the circumstances, it matters not if the money or notes required for paying the premium did come from Mrs. France; at most, it was by way of advance on her brother's account, and on his contract. He had a right to take out a policy on his own life for his sister's benefit; and she had a right to advance him the necessary means to do so. As between strangers, or persons not thus nearly connected, such a transaction would be evidence to go to the jury, from which, accord- [565 ing to the circumstances of the case, they might or might not infer that it was mere gambling. But as between brother and sister, or other near relations, desirous of thus providing for each other, and (as said by Chief Justice Shaw), presumed to be actuated by "Considerations of strong morals, and the force of natural affection between near kindred operating often more efficaciously than those of positive law," Loomis v. Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 399, the case is devested of that gambling aspect which is presented where there is nothing but a speculative interest in the death of another, without any interest in his life to counterbalance it. On this ground, we

The construction given to the policy by the court below was, that it was a contract between the Company and Chew for an assurance of his life, with a stipulation and agreement that the money should be paid to his sister; and the court held that such a policy is sustainable at law on account of the nearness of the relationship between the parties, and especially as Mrs. France, at the time the insurance was effected, was one of Chew's next of kin, prospectively interested in his estate as a distributee. We concur in the construction of the policy made by the court, and in the validity of the transac564] tion. As held by us in the case of the Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, just decided [ante, 251], any person has a right to procure an insurance on his own life and to assign it to another, provided it be not done by way of cover for a wager policy; and where the relationship between the parties, as in this case, is such as to constitute a good and valid consideration in law for any gift or grant, the transaction is entirely free from such imputation. The direction of payment in the policy itself is equivalent to such an assignment.

The defendant below (the Insurance Company) gave in evidence three promissory notes given by Lucetta P. France herself for part of the last three premiums paid on the policy, and requested the court to charge that, if the jury believed

V. Natl. L. F. Life Ass. Soc., 22 Barb., 9, 20 N.
Y., 32.

So may one loaning to another to start in business, to be repaid with profits. Bevin v. Conn. Ins. Co., 23 Conn., 244; Morrell v. Trenton Ins. Co., 10 Cush., 282; Trenton Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 24 N. J., 577. Master has an insurable interest in life of servant.

Miller v. Eagle Ins. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 268. So has servant in the life of master who has hired him for a fixed term. Hebdon v. West, 3 Best & Sm., 578.

A father has a right to make an insurance on the life of a minor son to whom he has made large advances. Mitchell v. Union L. Ins. Co., 45 Me., 104. A father has an insurable interest in the life of his minor son. Loomis v. Eagle L. & H. Ins. Co., 6

Gray, 396.

A person cannot purchase and hold by assignment, as a speculation, a policy of insurance on the life of one in whose life he has no insurable interest. He cannot recover on the policy unless he has an insurable interest in the life of the insured. Franklin L. Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind., 116, 13 Am. Rep., 313; Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass., 564; Mo. Valley L. Ins. Co. v. Sturges, 18 Kan., 93, 26 Am. Rep., 761; Franklin L. Ins. Co. v. Sefton, 53 Ind., 380.

If a policy is valid in its inception it may be assigned to anyone, whether he has any interest in the life of the assured or not. St. John v. Am. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 13 N. Y., 31, 2 Duer, 419; Valton v. Natl. L. F. Life Ass. Co., 20 N. Y., 32; Ashley v. Ashley, 3 Sim., 149; Cunningham v. Smith, 70 Pa. St., 450; Clark v. Allen, 11 R. I., 439, 23 Am. Rep., 496.

In England, statute provides that no person shall recover any greater sum than the amount or value of the interest of the insured during such life. 4 Geo. III.. ch. 48.

This statute does not extend to Ireland, where It has been held that policies of insurance are valid without any interest. Bunyon, Life Ass., 11; Shannon v. Nugent, 1 Hayes, 536; Ferguson v. Lomax, 6 Dru. & War., 120; Scott v. Roose, Long & Town., 54; Brit. Ins. Co. v. Magee, Cooke & Al. (Irish Rep.). 182.

It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove an insurable interest_in_the_life of the insured, Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 4 Zab., 576.

Policy of insurance procured by uncle on life of his nephew, in which he had no insurable interest, is void. Burden of showing insurable interest is on claimant. Singleton v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 66 Mo., 63, 27 Am. Rep., 321.

566] *The answers were followed by this qualification: "The above is as near correct as Ily: that the answers called for were material. remember."

Insurance by parol—when valid—Massachusetts clearly ultra vires, and being by its terms exec

NOTE.-Agreement for insurance made by letter. See note to Tayloe v. Merch. F. Ins. Co., 50 U. S. (9 How.), 390.

Parol insurance, when valid.

Contract of insurance must be in writing, and must contain the terms sufficiently expressed. Bell v. Western Mar. & F. Ins. Co., 5 Rob. (La.), 423, 39 Am. Dec. 542.

An oral contract to issue a policy of insurance is binding and may be specifically enforced, or the court may award damages, the same as in an action en an executed policy. Security F. Ins. Co. v. Ky. Mar. & F. Ins. Co., 7 Bush., 81, 3 Am. Rep., 301.

A parol agreement to insure is valid and binding. Palm v. Medina Ins. Co., 20 Ohio, 529; Trustees of Bapt. Ch. v. Brooklyn F. Ins. Co., 19 N. Y., 305; Audubon v. Excelsior Ins. Co., 27 N. Y., 216; Brayton V. Appleton Mut. Ins. Co., 47 Me., 259; McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Pick., 278; Hamilton v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 5 Barr., 339; Andrews v. Essex Ins. Co., 3 Mason, 6; City of Davenport v. Peoria Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 276; Walker v. Met. Ins. Co., 56 Me., 371: Goodale v. N. E. Mut. Ins. Co., 25 N. H., 169; Mobile & M. Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 31 Ala., 711; Constant v. Ins. Co., 3 Wall., Jr., 313; Ide v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 2 Biss., 333.