was induced to remark, that "no one who reads the old historians and chronicles will discern any strong allusion or trace of it (i. e. the interference of the commons in the legislation), if he does not sit down to the perusal with an intention of proving that they formed a component part of it." The last mentioned author, indeed, in the face of all Mr. Tyrrel's learning, to which he had just been referring his readers for the display of the arguments on both sides of the controversy, considers the question as reduced to little more than a point of mere speculation for the discussion of the antiquary.

It is rather amusing after these considerations, to turn to the volume of Lord Lyttleton, where we find him, much at his ease, talking of "the presence of the people in the great council of the Saxons, and from thence continued after the conquest, in parliament, nearly as now understood, down to the present time." What is apt to perplex enquiry, and confound the judgment, in investigating the political condition of the people, during the period which intervened between the reign of the conqueror and that of Henry the Third, is the incongruous mixture of boldness and submission, of arbitrary encroachment and sudden relinquishment, which characterize the events of those times, both in relation to the prince and the people. The feudal system is very remarkable for these contrary tendencies. Its genius at once proud and obedient, combined loyal service with martial independence, freedom with fidelity, and the principle of honour with the spirit of disorder. So that the speculative politician, to whatever side he inclines, may select abundant instances from those times to prove his favourite theory. The error, or the imposition, consists in assuming insulated facts, or extraordinary crises, as the ordinary condition and constant attitude of the country, neglecting that underworking process which alters by degrees the constitution of society, and silently devciopes a new arrangement of property and power. For it is worthy of remark, and the fact involves a curious problem in politics, that while this nation has appeared to be going on in a rapid course towards arbitrary power, and the will of the prince has threatened to be triumphant over law, liberty has been secretly accumulating strength; not unlike, if on such a subject a simile may be allowed us, those contrary currents of air, which in a direction seemingly opposed to the wind, conduct in solemn stillness the majestic march of the thunder-storm.

Before the invasion of William the First, the civil state of this country appeared to be tending towards the feudal constitution. It was the immediate operation of that event to establish it in its full perfection. Of all complex and unna

tural schemes of government it was best adapted for duration. Too aristocritical to be consistent with pure despotism, it was still well calculated to uphold arbitrary domination. But it had its weak and fallible parts. The machinery was nicely framed, but without sufficient allowance for wear and tear. It was held together with too much tension, being so rigidly constructed as to be sooner broken than bent. The truth is, that whatever opposes itself to the natural order of things, must of necessity be unsafe. Two things were required to be stationary to secure the permanence of that system-property and mind; which by the appointed order of things are flux and mutable. Where human beings are in a moral state, that is, so circumstanced as to be capable of evolving and improving their faculties, their appetites are sure to lead them on in a career of advancement. The exercise of one faculty developes another, discoveries are stimulated by wants, and wants are created by discoveries, the individual draws from the collective competence, society becomes a great partnership, enjoyment is multiplied into itself, and increased to each by being shared by all; social intercourse and the temptations of commerce, at length burst the barriers to the diffusion of property; its great masses are broken down, and its real value is found to consist in the facility and freedom of its transmutation and conversion. The mind keeps pace with this progress in the use and application of wealth, extends its views, contemplates its dignity, and demands its rights. This blessed tendency in human affairs was the slow and silent subverter of the feudal constitution. A multitude of accidental particulars in the circumstances of this country helped forward this tendency here, and ripened it into operation. And to these peculiar advantages we owe, under Providence, that clear and ultimate demonstration of tempered liberty, which belongs to our present condition.

Under the auspices of the feudal system, and the dazzling conjuncture of his affairs, William the First established an arbitrary if not an unlimited monarchy. But his power was derived at least as much out of his princely domains, as his sovereign prerogatives. His will was nearly a law, while his possessions maintained him in independence upon his people. In the territorial division of the kingdom, the demesnes reserved to the crown consisted of 1422 manors and lordships, besides detached possessions, and some share of the four northern counties. The crown also originally possessed all the towns and ports, though these were occasionally granted out to different barons. It enjoyed the profits of wardships, marriages of heirs, reliefs, and fines, which last were very numerous, and many of

which, especially those for offences, were unfixed and discretionary. There were besides a vast list of tolls and customs for passage, postage, markets, protections, besides duties on merchandize, and on permits to quit or enter the different ports. To these may be added the great revenues from estreated estates, and ecclesiastical benefices. Mr. Hume considered the conqueror's revenue to have been ten millions annually. Mr. Carte carries it to eleven millions. Other writers have differed very much from this computation. It seems indeed very difficult, if not impossible, to come to a conclusive estimate, by adjusting the comparative values of the ancient and modern denominations; but enough is ascertainable to manifest the enormous revenues of the crown in those days, and to shew its sufficiency for all its exigencies. The necessity for preserving whole these two great constituents of power, was either not understood by, or neglected in the ambitious ardour of, the succeeding monarchs. Their prodigality, enthusiasm, and lust of power, all encouraged by their continental connections and possessions, increased the expences of the crown even beyond its vast resources. The fund of ambition decreased in a ratio inverse to the extension of its ob

jects. While the sovereigns appeared to themselves to be enlarging their power, they were really employed in providing for its permanent limitation. Prerogative and financial independence were together an overmatch for liberty and law; but when prerogative was left to its substantive vigour, and the ambition of the monarch was to be fed by the bounty of the nation, reciprocity, and the basis of compromise, were established between the king and the people: and though the career of government went on for some time with a sort of habitual impulse, or, if we may so say, with its acquired velocity, at length perpetual efforts became necessary to supply its decays of strength, and every effort brought with it an accession of debility. This was pretty nearly the posture of things when the Stuarts succeeded to the crown, and the sharp struggle between the habitual claims of prerogative deprived of its real strength, and the wealth and grandeur of the commons produced by the commercial prosperity of the nation, ended in the dire catastrophe of the king's execution, and the temporary dissolution of the monarchy.

The above is a very rapid sketch of a very slow revolution in the early history of our constitution; for such was the strength and solidity of that mass of power which the first William had heaped together, such was the productiveness of the fund which he had provided for the support of his feudal sovereignty, and so cheap a military apparatus was supplied to him out of the sys tem of tenures which he had brought with him, that had it not

been for foreign wars, to which the feudal military establishment was ill adapted (the obligatory service being only for forty days), it scarcely seems possible for the crown, without considerable mismanagement, to have fallen into a state of pecuniary dependence. It was long, therefore, before it felt itself in this new situation; very long before it felt itself under the necessity of drawing the supplies for its ordinary expenditure from regular and constant impositions on the people. With this massive and momentous power, the monarchy in the hands of the first feudal sovereigns was hardly susceptible of limitation or definition. It is not surprising therefore, that, as the very discerning and manly writer of the "Historical Reflections" has observed, during the space of time from the conquest to the accession of Edward the First, there is no appearance of the exist ence of any representative system in, such assemblies as were convened. There seems, indeed, according to the clearest evidence produced by this writer, to be the best reason for doubting the exercise of any independent deliberative power, even by the barons and great men, of which the grand councils of the nation were then composed.

The three great national alterations made in the reign of the conqueror, viz. the subjecting of the lands of the clergy to military tenures, the forest laws, and the separating of the civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions anciently exercised by the county courts, were, as Mr. Jopp observes, pointed acts of legislation, effecting important changes; yet in none of them does there appear any trace of deliberate legislative sanction in a general national assembly. He admits, "that some of these momentous regulations were promulgated at the councils of the state festivals," but he contends, with the clearest reason, that "there is no evidence of the concurrence of a council having been obtained, or even of the matter having been transacted there, otherwise than as it was announced as an edict of the king.'

The context of the famous charter of William the First, for the disjunction of the old jurisdictions of the county courts, imply nothing beyond the mandate of the prince, depending on his own authority, accompanied with the advice of his council. The words of the charter, as far as they are connected with any references to authority, advice, or consent, are as follow: "W. Dei Gratia Rex Anglorum, sciatis vos omnes et cæteri fideles mei, qui in Anglia manent, quod Episcopales leges, quæ non bene, nec secundum sauctorum canonum præcepta, usque ad mea tempora in regno Anglorum fuerint, communi concilio, et concilio Archiepiscoporum, et Epis

tained, of the burthensome duties of their tenures. Meanwhile from behind this unpromising exterior, a more cheerful order of things was slowly coming on, and a careful observer may discern in the very abuses of power, the first developement of a better system.

As the crown became impoverished by military undertakings abroad, or profusion at home, it was gradually reduced to the condition of a suitor to the people; and, in some measure became a dependent upon their bounty. From these necessities arose a series of charters, which, though frequently broken and neglected, were nevertheless the groundwork of greater acquisitions, and raised at length the minds of the people to the firm contemplation of their legitimate rights, and the proper means of securing them. Some of our princes, indeed, whose titles were dubious, may be said to have purchased their kingdoms by their charters. Whilein France the succession was uninterrupted from father to son for a period of three hundred years; in England during the same period there were five deviations from the lineal course of descent; and it is well known that disputed successions are fruitful in arrangements of conciliation and compromise.

During the reign of Henry III. the number of the crown vassals, or tenants in capite, had, from various causes, greatly increased. Among these causes, forfeitures and regrants, the consequences of civil contentions, were principally operative. The policy of the crown, more afraid of the refractory opulence of the nobility, than of the growing importance of the people, was glad of every opportunity of breaking down the great baronies, by splitting the tenures; whereby they obviously multiplied the number of the persons entitled to seats in the national council. It is well known how much the diffusion of property was promoted by the expeditions to the Holy Land. Commerce in the mean time had begun to expand itself, and to strike against the barriers which restrained the alienation of land. These barriers were in part opened by the great statute of Quia emptores terrarum, 18 Edward I., which by permitting the sale of lands, while it forbad the creation of new and subordinate feuds, opened the condition of society, and gave vent to overgrown estates. And it is no improbable supposition that the multiplication of the tenants in capite gave birth to the representative system. The smaller barons would doubtless find their attendance in the council burthensome, while their inferior weight and importance was mortifying to their pride. The expedient, therefore, of appointing one out of a number to represent the rest at the common expence, would naturally suggest itself; and this seems to have been the real origin of the