Ituitive, I. 69, I
Intuitive, the clearest, ibid.
Intuitive, irresistible, ibid.
Demonstrative, II. 70, 2
Of general truths, is all either
intuitive or demonstrative,
II. 76, 14

Of particular existences, is sen-
sitive, ibid.

Clear ideas do not always pro-
duce clear knowledge, II.77,

615
What kind of knowledge we have

of nature, II. 296, § 12
Its beginning and progress, I.
142, § 15, 16, 17: I. 20-1,
15, 16

Given us, in the faculties to at-
tain it, I. 64, § 12
Men's knowledge according to
the employment of their facul-
ties, I. 72, § 22

To be got only by the applica
tion of our own thought to the
contemplation of things, I.
74, $23

Extent of human knowledge, II.
78

Our knowledge goes not beyond

our ideas, ibid. § 1
Nor beyond the perception of
their agreement or disagree-
ment, ibid. § 2

Reaches not to all our ideas,
ibid. § 3

Much less to the reality of
things, II. 79, § 6
Yet very improveable if right
ways were taken, ibid. § 6
Of co-existence very narrow, II.
106-7, 9, 10, II
And therefore, of substances very
narrow, II. 108, &c. § 14,

15, 16

Of other relations indetermina.
ble, 11. 1, § 18

Of existence, II. 116, § 21
Certain and universal, where to

be had, II. 123, § 29
Ill use of words, a great hin
drance of knowledge,II, 124,
· $30

General, where to be got, II. -

125, 31

Lies only in our thoughts, II.
154, § 13

Reality of our knowledge, II.
126

Of mathematical truths, how
real, II. 128, $6
Of morality, real, II. 129; § 7
Of substances, how far real, II.
132, 12

What makes our knowledge real,
II. 127, § 3

Considering things, and not
names, the way to knowledge,
II. 133, § 13

Of substances, wherein it con-
sists, II. 132, § II
What required to any tolerable
knowledge of substances, II.
155, 14

Self-evident, II. 157, § 2
Of identity, and diversity, as
large as our ideas, II. 106,
68; II. 158, § 4
Wherein it consists, ibid.
Of co-existence, very scanty,
II. 160, § 5

Of relations of modes, not so
scanty, II. 161, $6
Of real existence, none, ibid. §7.
Begins in particulars, II. 162,
$9

Intuitive of our own existence,
II. 187, 3

Demonstrative of a God,ibid. §I
Improvement of knowledge, II.

Its use, I. 466, § 7
Its imperfections, II. 6, § 1
Double use, ibid.

The use of language destroyed
by the subtilty of disputing,
II. 25-6, § 6, 7, 8
Ends of language, II. 37, § 23
Its imperfections, not easy to be
cured, II. 42, § 2: II.
§ 4, 5, 6

43-4,

The cure of them necessary to
philosophy, II. 43, § 3
To use no word without a clear
and distinct idea annexed to it,
is one remedy of the imperfec-
tions of language, II. 46, $8,9
Propriety in the use of words,
another remedy, II. 47, § 11
Law of nature generally allowed,
I. 37, 6

There is, though not innate, I.
43,13

Its inforcement, I. 371, $6.
Learning, the ill state of learning in

these latter ages, II. 6, &c.
Of the schools lies chiefly in the
abuse of words, II. 11, &c,

II. 25
Such learning of ill consequence,
II. 27, § 10, &c.
Liberty, what, I. 224-7, § 8, 9,
10, 11, 12: I. 228, § 15
Belongs not to the will, I. 227,

Light in the mind, what, II.
279, $13

Logic has introduced obscurity into
languages, II. 25-6, § 6, 7
And hindered knowledge, II.
26,-$7

Love, I. 216, § 4

M.

MADNESS, 1. 140, § 13. Op-

position to reason deserves
that name, I. 419, § 4
Magisterial, the most knowing are
least magisterial, II. 232, § 4
Making, I. 322, § 2.
Man not the product of blind
chance, I. 189, § 6

The essence of man is placed in

his shape, II. 136, § 16
We know not his real essence, I.
475, 3: I. 487, § 22: I.
491, $27

The boundaries of the human
species not determined, I.
491,27

What makes the same individual

man, I. 342, § 21: 1.347, §29
The same man may be different
persons, I. 341, § 19
Mathematics, their methods, II.
213, 7. Improvement, II.
219,15

Matter incomprehensible, both in
its cohesion and divisibility, I.
303, § 23: I. 309, §. 30, 31
What, II. 30, § 15
Whether it may think, is not to
be known, II. S0-103, § 6:
II. 88, &c.
Cannot produce motion, or any
thing elfe, II. 192, § 10
And motion cannot produce
thought, ibid.

Not eternal, II. 197, § 18
Maxims, II. 157, &c.: II. 171-3,
§ 12, 13, 14, 15

Not alone selfevident, II.158,53
Are not the truths first known,
II. 162, 9.
Not the foundation of our know
ledge, II. 163, § 10

Wherein

Wherein their evidence consists,
II. 164, § 10
Their use, II. 165-71, 11, 12
Why the most general self-evi-
dent propositions alone, pass
for maxims, II. 171, § 11
Are commonly proofs, only
where there is no need of
proofs, II. 173, § 15
Of little use, with clear terms,
11. 175, § 19

Of dangerous use, with doubtful
terms, II. 171, &c. 12: IL
176, 20

When firft known, I. 17, &c.

9, 12, 13: I. 19,

1. 21,

16

14:

How they gain assent, I. 25-6,

21, 22

Made from particular observa-
tions, ibid.

Not in the understanding before
they are actually known, I.
2622

Neither their terms nor ideas

innate, I. 27, 23
Least known to children and il-
literate people, 1, 30, $27
Memory, I. 128, 2
Attention, pleasure, and pain,
settle ideas in the memory, I.
129,3

And repetition, ibid, 4: I.
131, $6

Difference of memory, I. 129-
30, § 4, 5

In remembrance, the mind some-
times active, sometimes pas-
sive, 1. 131, $7
Its necessity, I. 130, § 5: I.
132, $8

Defects, I. 132, § 8, 9
In brutes, I. 133, TO
Metaphysics, and school divinity
filled with uninstructive pro-
positions, II. 184, §9
Method used in mathematics, II.
213, $7

Mind, the quickness of its actions,
I. 125, § 10

Minutes, hours, days, not necessary
to duration, I. 174, § 23

Miracles, the ground of assent to
miracles, II. 239, § 13
Misery, what, I. 245, § 42
Modes, mixed, I. 274, § I
Made by the mind, I. 275, $2
Sometimes got by the explication
of their names, 1. 276, § 3
Whence a mixed mode has its
unity, ibid, § 4

Occasionof mixed modes, I. 277,
65

Mixed modes, their ideas, how
got, I. 278, § 9
Modes simple and complex, I.
145, 5

Simple modes, I. 147, § 1
Of motion, I. 209, 2
Moral good and evil, what, 1. 370,
$5

Three rules, whereby men judge

of moral rectitude, 1. 371, § 7
Beings, how founded on simple
ideas of sensation and reflec-
tion, I. 377-9, § 14, 15
Rules not self-evident, I. 35,4
Variety of opinions, concerning
moral rules, whence, I. 36,
$5,6

Rules, if innate, cannot with
public allowance be transgres.
sed, I. 40, &c. ₫ 11, 12, 13
Morality, capable of demonstra.
tion, II.250, 16: 11.112,f
18: II. 214, § 8
The proper study of mankind,
II. 216, 11

Of actions, in their conformity

to a rule, I. 379, § 15
Mistakes in moral notions, owing
to names, ibid. § 16
Discourses in morality, if not
clear, it is the fault of the
speaker, II. 51, § 17
Hindrances of demonstrative
treating of morality. 1. Want
of marks. 2. Complexedness,
II. 113, § 19. 3. Interest,
II. 115, § 20

Change of names in morality,
changes not the nature of
things, II. 130, 19

And

And mechanism, hard to be re-
conciled, I. 45, § 14.
Secured amidst men's wrong
judgments, I. 268, § 70
Motion, slow or very swift, why
not perceived, I. 166-7, § 7,
8, 9, 10, 11
Voluntary, inexplicable, II.198,
$ 19

Its absurd definitions, I. 455-6,
$8,9

N.

AMING of ideas, I. 138, 8
Names, moral established by
law, are not to be varied from,
II. 132, § 10

Of substances, standing for real
essences, are not capable to
convey certainty to the un.
derstanding, II. 146, § 5
Standing for nominal essences,

will make some, though not
many certain propositions, II,
147, § 6
Why men substitute names for
real essences, which they know
not, II. 33, § 19

Two false suppositions, in such
an use of names, II, 35, § 21
A particular name to every par-
ticular thing impossible, I.
435, § 2

And useless, ibid. § 3
Proper names, where used, I.
436, § 4, 5

Specific names are affixed to the
nominal essence, I. 450, § 16
Of simple ideas and substances,

refer to things, I. 453, § 2
What names stand for both real

and nominal essence, 1.454, $3
Of simple ideas not capable of
definitions, ibid. § 4
Why, I. 455, $7

Of least doubtful signification,
I. 460, § 15
Have few ascents "in linea præ-
dicamentali," I. 461, § 16
Of complex ideas, may be define
ed, 1. 459, § 12
VOL. II.

Of mixed modes stand for arbi-
trary ideas, I. 463, § 2, 3:
I. 504, § 44

Tie together the parts of their
complex ideas, I. 468, § 10
Stand always for the real essence,
I. 471, § 14

Why got, usually, before the
ideas are known, ibid. § 15
Of relations comprehended under
those of mixed modes, I. 472,
$16
General names of substances stand..
for sorts, I. 473, § 1
Necessary to species, I. 501,39
Proper names belong only to sub-
stances, I. 503, § 42`
Of modes in their first applica
tion, I. 504-5, § 44, 45
Of substances in their first appli
cation, I. 506-7, § 46, 47
Specific names stand for different
things in different men, I.
508, § 48

Are put in the place of the thing
supposed to have the real es-
sence of the species, ibid. § 49
Of mixed modes, doubtful often,
because of the great composi-
tion of the ideas they stand
for, II. 8, § 6
Because they want standards in
nature, II. 9, § 7

Of substances, doubtful, because
referred to patterns, that can-
not be known, or known but
imperfectly, II. 12, &c. § 11,
12, 13, 14

In their philosophical use hard to
have settled significations, II.
15, $15
Instance, liquor, II, 16, § 16:
gold, II. 17, § 17; II. 302,

17
Of simple ideas, why least doubt.
ful, II. 18, § 18
Least compounded ideas have
the least dubious names, II.
19, $19
Natural philosophy, not capable of
science, II. 120, § 26; II.
216, 10