Mr. Selwyn, for the plaintiff, relied upon the case of Thomas v. Popham, Dyer 218. b. The question arose there upon the statute of enrolments, 27 Hen. VIII. cap. 16. which enacts" that the enrolment shall be made within six months next after the date of the deed." The indenture in issue bore date 9th October, 1557, and was enrolled in Chancery on the 21st of March, 1558, which was the last day of the six months, reckoning twenty eight days to each month, and making the day of the date exclusive. The court held that the indenture was well enrolled, and that the words "next after the date of the deed" were exclusive of the day of the date.

Mr. Park, in reply, urged that in that case the court was bound if possible to support the validity of the deed against the grantor, who was a subject; but that the grant here being by the king, was liable to a different rule of construction, and that it had often been decided, that where a period was to be reckoned from a date, the day of date was inclusive.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH.-It used to be held that the words "from the date" includes the day, and "from the day of the date" excludes it. But since the case of Pugh v. Duke of Leeds, Cowp. 714, these formal distinctions have been done away; and the rule of good sense has been established, that such words shall be construed according to the meaning of the parties who use them. The case cited upon the statute of enrolments, I think is expressly in point. That shews that the day on which the patent bears date is

not to be reckoned. The month, therefore, only began on the 11th of May, and included the 10th of June, the day on which the specification was enrolled.

The defendant afterwards had a verdict on the merits of the case.

IN THE EXCHEQUER OF PLEAS.

Manton v. Parker.

6th July, 1814.

In this case Joseph Manton was plaintiff, and William Parker defendant, and the action was brought for the infringement of a patent granted to the plaintiff, dated 6th July, 43 Geo. III. for "a hammer on an improved construction for the locks of all kinds of fowling-pieces and small arms."

Mr. Dauncey, for the plaintiff, stated, that for the better encouragement of the arts, patents are granted to those who make discoveries that are likely to be useful to the public, and that Mr. Manton had obtained a patent for the discovery of a new principle to be applied to the locks and hammers of guns. The substance of the specification shewed the means of letting out the air from the barrel, and causing a communication between the powder in the pan and the powder

in the barrel, without at the same time letting out the powder. Mr. Manton discovered, that if the air-hole in the lock, which is described in the specification, should be made, the purpose would bé answered, and consequently that it was an invention, attended with all the conveniences the exclusion of air could produce, and none of the inconveniences of the powder being driven out with it. If the thing was invented before, then undoubtedly Mr. Manton was not the first inventor; but there would be no difficulty in proving it to be Mr. Manton's invention, and that it had been adopted by the defendant. With respect to the proof of the preliminary formalities, there would be no doubt. It is necessary that there should be a specification of the invention, in other words; that the party should so describe that which he has invented as that any body who is skilful on the subject may be able to make the same thing; and that when the patent has expired, the world at large may have the benefit of the discovery. That has been done. It will be shewn by experienced gunsmiths, that they never knew or heard of such an invention anterior to this of the plaintiff's. The peculiar excellence of it they will speak to; and they will shew that no man of skill could be under any difficulty in making from the specification a similar article.

Mr. Scarlett, for the defendant, said, that all with which the jury had to do was the originality of the invention, and the adaptation of the means to the end; and further, whether the invention was of use to the public. The patent is

for the construction of a hammer upon a new principle. In order to find out what the construction is, you must look into his specification, and it consists of three parts: first, the part which is next the touch-hole, and is hollowed out, or perforated with a small hole, so as to let the air pass through, and not the powder; second, the seat of the hammer, which is grooved or hollowed out from the perforation, so as to let the air out of the pan, but not the powder. The learned counsel stopped here, and submitted as a clear proposition deduced from a number of cases, that if a man takes out a patent for an original invention, and he claims more in his specification than is original, or he has a right to, the patent is void for the whole; therefore, if any one of these specifications shall turn out not to be original; if the lip, the groove, or the hole, should either of them be his invention, but if there is one or either of them which is not his invention, in that 'case, as the specification gives reason to the public to suppose that he claims the whole, the patent is void, and he cannot maintain his action. Mr. Scarlett then went on with observations upon the evidence produced for the plaintiff, stating, that a groove communicating with the touch-hole existed before, and contended that the 'plaintiff ought to have limited his patent to the invention of what was new and unknown before. If hammers before existed in which grooves were made half way, he should have stated that he had carried them the remaining part of the way. He claims the groove as his original invention, and

upon

that ground his patent is void. Although the groove may only have gone across the ham

mer-seat by accident, yet if a man in making a groove should by accident have carried it across to the open air, and should have sold the article in that state, so that the public were in possession of it, though it was not intended to have been so made, yet it cannot afterwards be claimed by another as an original invention. Invention is often the fruit of accident; and there are many cases which shew, that if an invention by one man is the result of accident, it is not another man's finding a use for it that shall give him a right in law to the exclusive advantage of it; therefore, if this was discovered or done by accident, the plaintiff could not take out a lawful patent for it as his original invention. The plaintiff says, his object is to make a hole large enough to admit the air, but not so large as to admit the powder; by which means the air is let through, and the powder kept in the touch-hole. The plaintiff's patent is to prevent the piece from hanging fire, by having a perforation to exclude the air. Now, if the hole is for the purpose of letting the air pass through, it follows that in a damp day it will admit moisture; and the effect of moisture upon powder would be to make the gun hang fire, or probably miss fire but it will be proved, that almost the moment after Mr. Manton procured his patent, he found it essential to make the hole large enough for powder to pass as well as air. It was thereupon submitted, that if a man takes out a patent, professing that it is to do a certain thing,