cessary,

parties might be plainly understood. The argument on the part of the defendant arises from the latter part of the covenant in question. If the party meant to covenant for an absolute right to convey, why, it is asked, does he covenant that he has not forfeited such right? To this it may be answered, that the latter stipulation, though unneis not inconsistent with the former. The rule of construction adopted in Browningv. Wright has never been carried to such a length as to decide, that because some clauses are introduced into a deed which do not add to the security provided by other clauses, the security so provided is to be restrained. We are therefore of opinion, that the covenant for absolute right to convey is not restrained by the other parts of the deed. It is contended, however, that the defendant has conveyed a good title to the plaintiff; and, first, it is said, that admitting the interest in the patentright to have passed under the assignment of the commissioners, yet the assignees have reconveyed to the bankrupt the whole of their interest therein by the deed of the 9th September 1801. It must be remembered, however, that nothing short of an actual conveyance by the assignees can sustain that argument, and that a mere release will not be sufficient; and it was therefore insisted that the deed amounted to a conveyance. But I have no hesitation in saying, that the deed alluded to was neither intended to convey, nor did it operate in law as a conveyance. By that deed the two persons who were the assignees of Koops, together

with his several other creditors parties thereto, in consideration of his having agreed to pay them 15s. in the pound, and to secure the debts of the foreign creditors after the same rate, did remise, release, and quit claim to him, all actions, suits, claims, and demands whatsoever: But it is to be observed that the persons who were assignees did not convey as such. Indeed, if they acted as assignees, why was it necessary that the other creditors should join? And they do not pretend to bind the other creditors who were not parties to the deed. This is the deed which is said to convey to Koops, as a purchaser, all the interest of the assignees, and to make him a new man. But the words are not sufficient for that purpose; it could not have been the intention of the parties. The assignees do not affect to convey for any persons not parties to the deed; and the instalments have not been paid according to the agreement. We are therefore clearly of opinion, that it is impossible to construe this deed to be such a conveyance as has been contended for on the part of the defendant. With respect to the supposed power of the assignees to make such a compromise with the bankrupt as that stated in the case, and the attempt to shew that it amounts to a sale of the property to him; it was not competent to assignees to make such compromise, unless the other creditors had consented; nor could the transaction be deemed a sale under the usual powers. Next it is contended that the nature of the property in this patent was such that it did not pass under the

assignment; and several cases were cited in support of this proposition. It is said, that although by the assignment every right and interest, and every right of action, as well as right of possession and possibility of interest, is taken out of the bankrupt, and vested in the assignees, yet that the fruits of a man's own invention do not pass. It is true that the schemes which a man may have in his own head before he obtains his certificate, or the fruits which he may make of such schemes, do not pass, nor could the assignees require him to assign them over, provided he does not carry them into effect until after he has obtained his certificate. But if he avail himself of his knowledge and skill, and thereby acquire a beneficial interest, which may be the subject of assignment, I cannot frame to myself an argument why that interest should not pass in the same manner as any other property acquired by his personal industry. Can there be any doubt, that if a bankrupt acquire a large sum of money, and lay it out in land, that the assignees may claim it? They cannot, indeed, take the profits of his daily labour. He must live. But if he accumulate any large sum, it cannot be denied that the assignees are at liberty to demand it; though, until they do so, it does not lie in the mouth of strangers to defeat an action at his suit in respect of such property by setting up his bankruptcy. We are therefore clearly of opinion, that the interest in the letters patent was an interest of such a nature as to be the subject of assignment by the commissioners.

Lastly, it is contended that the act of parliament stated in the case vested a legal interest in Koops, for that he must be taken against all the world to have that interest which the act of parliament recites to be vested in him, that act being a public act. But though the act be public, it is of a private nature: the only object of the proviso for making it a public act is, that it may be judicially taken notice of, instead of being specially pleaded, and to save the expense of proving an attested copy. But it never has been held, that an act of a private nature derives any additional weight or authority from such a proviso; it only affects Koops, and those claiming under him, and authorises him to do certain acts which by the letters patent he could not have done. It recites the letters patent, containing a clause which prevents him from assigning to more than five persons, and then enables him to assign to any number of persons not exceeding sixty. It is not possible then to consider this act as giving any title to Koops, which he had not at the time when it passed. Such has been the construction which has always been put upon acts of parliament of this nature. We are therefore of opinion, that no aid is to be derived to the defendant from that act of parliament.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

265

IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH.

Huddart v. Grimshaw.

23d Dec. 1803.

THIS was an action brought by Captain Huddart against the defendant, to recover damages for the violation of a patent, dated 25th April, 33 Geo. III. for a new mode or art of making great cables, and other cordage, so as to attain a greater degree of strength therein, by a more equal distribution of the strain upon the yarns.

Mr. Erskine, after stating to the jury that this cause would require a great deal of their attention, it being important as it relates to the public, and most important indeed as it respects the ingenious individual who is the plaintiff in the cause, proceeded to describe the common method of rope-making, and its imperfections, and the advantages of this invention, describing its different parts, and then went on with the following observations. There are legal considerations which a court of justice must not overlook, and all these must be regulated according to the justice of the claims of individuals. Many persons have formed different ideas; and certainly the minds of different persons, and some of the learned judges, have been very different as to the advantage to the public in different ages since the statute which gives these monopolies; some have thought that patents ought to be favoured, some that they ought to be most strictly regulated. This is not