to be made, she was released on fair grounds being afforded for the inference that an intention to inquire really existed.1 But acts of doubtful character will, in the absence of full explanation, be interpreted against the trader. Thus vessels running for a port, known by them to be blockaded, under pretext of taking a pilot on board, because of falsely alleged unseaworthiness, have been held liable to seizure; and the inquiries which it is eminently proper to make at a place sufficiently distant from the blockaded harbour, must not be effected at its very mouth.2 During the American civil war the Courts of the United States strained and denaturalised the principles of English blockade law to cover doctrines of unfortunate violence. A vessel sailing from Bordeaux to Havana,with an ulterior destination to New Orleans, or in case that port was inaccessible, to such other place as might be indicated at Havana, was condemned on the inference that her owner intended the ship to violate the blockade if possible, notwithstanding that the design might have been abandoned on the information received at the neutral port; and goods sent from one neutral port to another within the same dominions with an intent, formed either at the time of shipment or afterwards, of forwarding them to a place 163. 1 The Despatch, i Acton, 2 The neutral merchant is not to speculate on the greater or less probability of the termination of a blockade, to send his vessels to the very mouth of the river, and say: If you do not meet with the blockading force, enter. If you do, ask a warning, and proceed elsewhere.' Who does not perceive the frauds to which such a rule would be in troductory?' The Irene, v Rob. 80. In The Cheshire (iii Wallace (American), 235). J. Field says: If approach for inquiry were permissible, it will be readily seen that the greatest facilities would be afforded to elude the blockade ;' and see The Hurtige Hane, ii Rob. 127; The Charlotte Christine, vi Rob. 101; The James Cook, Edwards, 264. 135. 3 The Circassian, ii Wallace, under blockade were condemned, and carried with them to a common fate the vessel in which they were embarked, notwithstanding that their transhipment was intended, unless there was reason to believe that the owners of the vessel 'were ignorant of the ulterior destination of the cargo, and did not hire their ships with a view to it.'1 A vessel which has succeeded in effecting a breach of blockade is not exonerated by her success from the consequences of her illegal act. If a ship that has broken a blockade is taken in any part of the same voyage, she is taken in delicto; the offence is not terminated until she reaches the end of the voyage, and the voyage is understood to include her return;2 on this point, the breach having been in fact committed, the French doctrine can be, and perhaps is, in unison with that of England. If the blockade is raised during the voyage, the liability to capture comes to an end, the existence of the offence being dependent on the continuance of the state of things which gave rise to it.1 3 breach or § 61. As a general rule the penalty for a breach Penalty of of blockade is the confiscation of both ship and cargo; attempted but if their owners are different, the vessel may be breach. condemned irrespectively of the latter, which is not confiscated when the person to whom it belongs is ignorant at the time of shipment that the port of 1 The Bermuda, iii Wallace (American), 574; The Stephen Hart, ib. 559. It is sufficiently curious that any continental publicists should claim the United States as adhering to the French practice, in face of the extreme doctrine enforced in these and like cases. 2 Wheaton, pt. iv. chap. iii. § 28. The right of capture on the return voyage was maintained M by the United States courts 3 Ortolan (ii. 354), Haute- 4 The Lisette, vi Rob. 387; Ortolan, ii. 356. Cases of innocent destination is blockaded, or if the master of the vessel deviates to a blockaded harbour. If, however, such deviation takes place to a port the blockade of which was known before the ship sailed, the act is supposed to be in the service of the cargo, and the complicity of its owner is assumed.1 § 62. There are a few cases in which neutral proentrance of perty can be brought into or out of a blockaded port or town without the commission of a legal breach. blockaded ports. When a maritime blockade does not form part of a combined operation by sea and land, internal means of transport by canals, which enable a ship to gain the open sea at a point which is not blockaded, may be legitimately used. The blockade is limited in its effect by its own physical imperfection. Thus, during a blockade of Holland, a vessel and cargo sent to Embden, which was in neutral territory, and issuing from that port, were not condemned.2 Again, if a vessel is driven into a blockaded port by such an amount of distress from weather or want of provisions or water as to render entrance an unavoidable necessity, she may issue again, provided her cargo remains intact. And a ship which has been allowed by a blockading force to enter within its sight, is justified in assuming a like permission to come out; but the privilege is not extended to cargo taken on board in the blockaded port." 4 The right possessed by a belligerent of excluding neutral ships of war from a blockaded place is usually waived in practice as a matter of international courtesy; and for a like reason the minister of a neutral 1 The Adonis, v Rob. 258; The Mariana Flora, vii Wheaton, 57; The Alexander, iv Rob. 93; The Panaghia Rhomba, Moore's P. C. Reps. xii. 180. 2 The Stert, iv Rob. 65. 3 The Charlotta, Edwards, 252; The Hurtige Hane, ii Rob. 127. The general principle is stated by Bluntschli, § 838. 4 The Juffrow Maria Schræder, iii Rob. 160. state resident in the country of the blockaded ports is permitted to despatch from it a vessel exclusively employed in carrying home distressed seamen of his own nation.1 of river partly in neutral territory. § 63. The right of a belligerent to blockade the Blockade territory of his enemy is sometimes complicated by the territorial rights of conterminous governments. If one bank of a river is within a neutral state, or if the upper portion of its navigable course is beyond the frontier of the hostile country, a belligerent can only maintain a blockade so far as is consistent with the right of the neutral to preserve free access to his own ports or territory.2 Thus a blockade of Holland was held not to be broken by a destination to Antwerp.3 And during the American Civil War, the Courts of the United States conceded that trade to Matamoros, on the Mexican shore of the Rio Grande, was perfectly lawful; but the Supreme Court laid down the rule that it was a duty incumbent' on vessels with the neutral destination to keep south of the dividing line between the Mexican and Texan territory; and in the case of vessels captured for being north of that line, refused, while restoring them, to allow their costs and expenses.1 It is to be hoped that a rule so little consistent with the right of neutrals to uninterrupted commerce with each other will not be drawn into a precedent. 1 Ortolan, ii. 329; Phillimore, iii. § 313. 2 Ortolan, ii. 332; Calvo, § 1163. § 6. 3 The Frau Ilsabe, iv Rob. 4 The Peterhoff, v Wallace (American), 54; The Dashing Wave, v Wallace, 170; The Volant, ib. 178; The Science, ib. 179. a Conflicting theories on the sub ject. CHAPTER VI. NEUTRAL GOODS IN ENEMY'S SHIPS. § 64. THE question whether it is open to a neutral to avail himself of belligerent vessels for the maritime transport of goods in themselves innocent, has been, like the question of the effect of neutral transport upon belligerent merchandise, the subject of lively debate, and like it also it has now been reduced into insignificance by the Declaration of Paris. Two doctrines are held on the subject. According to one the neutral property retains its freedom notwithstanding its association with that of an enemy; according to the other contact with confiscable property taints it so irredeemably as to subject it to the fate of the latter. The theoretic ground upon which the former doctrine rests is that neutral goods are primâ facie free; they can be captured only because of some assistance which a belligerent immediately or remotely derives from them in the conduct of his war; goods in themselves incapable of rendering him such assistance cannot change their nature because they are carried by him; and neutrals cannot therefore be expected to refrain from conveying their property to market by means which happen to be convenient to them. The second doctrine is really the offspring of a pretension to forbid all intercourse between neutrals and an enemy; but by attaching |