Weber, 29 id. 24; Johnston v. Kimball, 39 id. 187; Bullock v. Taylor, id. 137; S. C., 33 Am. Rep. 356; United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet. 187; State v. Cutting, 2 Ohio St. 1; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Urmston v. State, 73 Ind. 175. This is familiar law, and rests on sound reason. But has this law any application to the facts of this case? The judge of the Superior Court thought it had, and turned the case out of court. We are not satisfied he was correct in this. The bank, it appears, was one which had two departments; a savings department and a commercial department. It had for both one cashier and one general teller, and the money does not appear to have been kept separate, but was brought daily into a common fund. The receiving teller was subordinate to the general teller, as well as to the cashier. The exact duties of the receiving teller of the savings department do not seem to have been particularly defined, except as the designation of the office would define them, or as they would be indicated by the condition of the bond. He was to be responsible for all such sums of money, property, and funds as the cashier might place in his hands as such teller, and also for all such other money, property, and funds as might otherwise come into his hands as such teller. His duty was to account faithfully for all these. When the teller should stand at his desk and receive savings deposits, he would, of course, receive them as receiving teller; and it might also be said that he would receive them because they were placed in his hands by the cashier, who, as chief financial officer of the bank, had placed him at that post. But if the defense is correct in the view taken of this officer's duties, it is not very manifest that the cashier could have had any occasion to intrust him with moneys otherwise. He simply received what was paid in, and handed it over to the general teller. What occasion could have arisen for putting other moneys into his hands as receiving teller merely? But we think this view is too restricted and narrow. Every such appoint ment is made with the general course of business in such institutions in mind, and it must contemplate that what is customary will take place. If it is customary for one officer to assist another when the need arises, we must assume that he expected to render such assistance, and that by implication he undertook to do so as a part of his official duty. And if he was bound to have this understanding of his undertaking and his duty, his sureties were bound to have the like understanding. The number of officers of a bank will vary with the extent of the business and with its needs. There may be only a president and cashier, but there will commonly be a teller, and there may also be a vicepresident, assistant cashier, one or more assistant tellers, and such number of book-keepers, messengers, and other assistants as the business may require. When a cashier and a teller are sufficient for all the ordinary needs of the bank, is a cashier performing an official act, when in the temporary absence of the teller, he steps to the teller's place and receives a deposit? Or is the teller acting outside his duty, when under corresponding circumstances, at the cashier's request, he answers the ordinary calls at the cashier's table? We think not. We think any such interchange of assistance as temporary need may require is fairly within the contemplation of any appointment to such a place of the undertaking in accepting it, and of an official bond that might be given by the appointee. If this were not so, every officer in a bank would require an assistant, or the business of the bank would come to a stop whenever temporary illness or any necessity whatever should for any time, however short, take him from his desk. We agree entirely with the defense that it is not legally competent to impose new duties upon an officer to the prejudice of his sureties, but we do not think such a temporary assignment is a case of that nature." Compare National Mechanics' Banking Association v. Conkling, New York Court of Appeals, October, 1882, 14 Rep. 631, holding that the sureties on the bond of an officer of a bank are not bound for any default of their principal when appointed to another and more responsible office therein, under general words of liability for the faithful performance of other duties than those of the office to which he has been appointed, when he shall be assigned thereto. Such an assignment must be supposed to be of a temporary character, and the recital of the bond will control the liability of the sureties under a permanent change in the duties of their principal to a more responsible position. Here the recital was of "such book-keeper as aforesaid, or whilst engaged in any other office, duty, or employment relative to the business thereof." Earl, J., said: "The recital in the conditions of the bond shows that Joseph had been appointed to the office of book-keeper; that he had accepted that office and consented to perform the duties thereof. That was the office brought to the attention of the sureties, and which they had in mind when they executed the bond. The recital in such bonds, undertaking to express the precise intent of the parties, controls the condition or obligation which follows, and does not allow it any operation more extensive than the recital which is its key, and so it has been held in many cases. In London Assurance Co. v. Bold, 6 Q. B. 514, Wightman, J., said: 'In truth, the recital is the proper key to the meaning of the condition.' In Hassell v. Long, 2 M. & S. 370, Ellenborough, C. J., said that the words of the recital of a bond afforded the best ground for gathering the meaning of the parties. In Pearsall v. Summersett, 4 Taunt. 593, it was held, as expressed in the head-note, that 'the extent of the condition of an indemnity bond may be restrained by the recitals, though the words of the condition import a larger liability than the recitals contemplate.' See also, Peppin v. Cooper, 2 B. & A. 431; Barker v. Parker, 1 T. R. 287; Liverpool Waterworks Co. v. Atkinson, 6 East, 507; Tradesmen's Bk. v. Woodward, Anthon N. P. (2d ed.) 300. Here the sureties undertook for the fidelity of their principal only while he was book-keeper; but if, while bookkeeper, the duties of any other office, trust, or employment relating to the business of the bank were assigned to him, their obligation was also to extend to the discharge of those duties. While bookkeeper he might temporarily act as teller, or discharge the duties of any other officer during his temporary illness or absence, or he might discharge any other special duty assigned to him, and while he was thus engaged the bank was to have the protection of the bond. There are no words binding the sureties in case of the appointment of their principal to any other office. They might have been willing to be bound for him while he was bookkeeper or temporarily assigned to the discharge of other duties, but yet not willing to be bound if he should be appointed teller or cashier, and as such, placed in the possession or control of all the funds of the bank. This is a case where the general words subsequently used must be controlled and limited by the recital. A surety is never to be implicated beyond his specific engagement, and his liability is always strictissimi juris, and must not be extended by construction. His contract must be construed by the same rules which are used in the construction of other contracts.. The extent of his obligation must be determined from the language used, read in the light of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. But when the intention of the parties has thus been ascertained, then the courts carefully guard the rights of the surety and protect him against a liability not strictly within the precise terms of his contract. Ludlow v. Simond, 2 Cai. Cas. 1; Crist v. Burlingame, 62 Barb. 351; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Gates v. McKee, 13 id. 232; Rochester City Bank v. Elwood, 21 id. 88; Pybus v. Gibb, 38 Eng. L. & Eq. 57." In Pollock v. U. S. Mut. Accident Association of the City of New York, Pennsylvania Common Pleas, September 29, 1882, 12 W. N. C. 251, there was a condition against liability for "any bodily injury of which there shall be no external or visible sign * * * or to any death or disability which may have been caused wholly or in part * * by the taking of poison." "And no claim shall be made under this certificate when the death or injury may have been caused by suicide * * * * * * or (felonious or otherwise, sane or insane) by self-inflicted injuries * * * or when death or injury may have happened in consequence of voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger, hazard, or perilous adventure." The decased came to his death by unintentionally drinking a deadly poison. Held, no liability. The court said: "It is admitted that this policy ought to be liberally construed, full justice should be done to the assured, and of two constructions that which is most favorable to him should be adopted. The authorities are clear as to these points, and require no discussion. The difficulty in this case arises from the fact that the words 'external, violent, and accidental means,' are qualified and limited by the proviso which declares that the benefits of the certificate shall not extend 'to any injury of which there shall be no external or visible sign * * * nor to any death or disability which may have been caused wholly or in part by taking of poison.' It is useless to decide whether this death was caused by 'external, violent, and accidental means,' while the proviso remains in the certificate or policy. If the death by poison had been intentional, it would either have been by reason of medical treatment,' or by 'suicide (felonious or otherwise, sane or insane).' The words of the certificate, 'by taking of poison,' can have no meaning unless intended to reach just such a case as this. The company did not mean to insure against a death produced by the unintentional drinking of poison, and not even to a death produced by ‘external, violent, and accidental means,' where there shall exist 'no external or visible sign.' Two ad. judged cases nearest in principle to this, Bayless v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 14 Blatch. 143, and Hill v. Hartford Accidental Ins. Co., 22 Hun, 187, both sustain the view we take; even the dissenting opinion in the last cited case contains the principle applied here." But in Penfold v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 317; S. C., 39 Am. Rep. 660, it is held that a policy of life insurance, conditioned to be void if the insured should die by his own hand or act, voluntarily or otherwise, is not avoided by his innocently taking a fatal overdose of medicine, while sane. IMPLIED COVENANT OF FITNESS ON LEASE OF REAL ESTATE. serves special attention for the importance of THE case of Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. 331, dethe question under consideration, and for the exhaustive review of the authorities in point. It was there held that upon a written lease of a factory with its fixtures and machinery, there is no implied warranty that the machinery is in good repair or of sufficient capacity for the work for which the premises are designed; and that oral testimony was inadmissible to prove that the landlord, during the negotiations, guaranteed that the engine and boiler were in thorough repair and would furnish sufficient power for the business. After laying down the general rule of the inadmissibility of parol evidence to add to or alter the terms of a written contract, and specifying the chief exceptions, namely, a distinct and collateral parol agreement (Lindley v. Lacey, 17 C. B. [N. S.] 578); and a written agreement conditioned on an unperformed oral agreement (Pym v. Campbell, 6 E. & B. 370; Wallis v. Littell, 11 C. B. [N. S.] 369); the Supreme Court, by Dupue, J., thus comment on some other cases: "Three recent English cases have carried the doctrine of the admissibility of parol evidence where there is a written agreement between the parties, to an extreme length. Morgan v. Griffith, L. R., 6 Exch. 70; Erskine v. Adeane, L. R., 8 Ch. App. 756; Mann v. Nunn, 43 L. J., C. P. (N. 8.) 241. Morgan v. Griffith and Erskine v. Adeane are almost identical in their facts. A farmer in treaty for grass lands declined to take them, on the ground that the property was overrun with rabbits. The lease, as prepared in writing, reserved to the lessor the right to kill game. The lessee refused to exe cute it until the lessor promised to kill down the game. The rabbits not having been destroyed, the tenant sued the landlord for the damage done by them to the grass and crops; and evidence by parol of the landlord's undertaking to keep down the game was admitted. Morgan v. Griffith was decided upon little consideration. The ground of decision was that the verbal agreement was collateral to the lease, and did not affect the mode of enjoyment of the land demised. Erskine v. Adeane was decided by two equity judges on the authority of Morgan v. Griffith, reversing the decision of Lord Romilly, M. R., who had excluded the evidence, for the reason that the alleged agreement was not a distinct agreement, but an alteration of the original terms of agreement, and to be binding, should have been inserted in the lease. Morgan v. Griffith was approved in Angell v. Duke, L. R., 10 Q. B. 174; but it is apparent from the report of the latter case that the approbation expressed had reference only to the fact that such an agreement was not within the statute of frauds; for Angell v. Duke, on that occasion, was argued on demurrer, and the only point of demurrer was that the agreement in question was for an interest in lands within the statute of frauds; and it appearing on the face of the pleading that the landlord's agreement sued on - to put the house in repair and send more furniture into it was antecedent to and collateral to the contract of letting, the declaration was sustained. But at the trial oral testimony was tendered of the alleged promise in the course of a treaty for the lease, and the lease | containing a demise of the house and the furniture | in it, comprised in a schedule annexed, Blackburn, J., rejected the testimony, and held that the lease was conclusive as to all that referred to the taking of the house and furniture, and his ruling was sustained by the court in banc. Angell v. Duke, 32 L. T. (N. S.) 320; 23 W. Rep. 548. In Mann v. Nunn the defendant let a messuage in an unfinished state, by a written agreement. Before and at the time of signing the agreement, he verbally promised to put the premises in a condition fit for habitation-mentioning, among other things, a new water-closet. He failed to put in the closet, and oral testimony of his promise was held to be competent in an action by the tenant for damages. The landlord's promise possibly may be considered to relate to what Chief Justice Erle, in Lindley v. Lacey, calls a preliminary matter to be done at once, before the lease should take effect. Mann v. Nunn was doubted by Blackburn, J., in Angell v. Duke, 32 L. T. 320, and if the landlord's promise be regarded as in the nature of a covenant to repair, is contrary to that line of cases which hold that such an undertaking cannot be established by parol if the premises are let by a lease in writing." After reviewing the application of the general rule to a number of related cases, the court continue: "In the present case the lease is perfect and complete in all its parts. On its face it purports to express the terms of the letting as finally agreed upon. The effort is to engraft, by parol evidence, a contract of warranty upon a contract in writing, which appears to be complete and perfect, and is silent on that subject. Oral testimony cannot be admitted for this purpose without breaking down the rule which permits parties to make their written contracts the only evidence of their undertakings, and enables them to protect themselves from the hazard of uncertain oral testimony with respect to their engagements. Where the lease contains no warranty of the condition of the premises, declarations of the lessor on that subject are not admissible to create a warranty; such proof would be adding to the written agreement by parol evidence. Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 89, and Brigham v. Rogers, 17 Mass. 571, are directly in point. In the first of these cases parol evidence of a warranty of the condition of the premises demised - there being a written lease was excluded; and in the second it was held, that where an estate was demised by lease under seal, no action lay on a parol promise made by the lessor at the time of executing the lease, that the water on the premises demised would be good and that there would be enough of it, and if not he would make it so. "Nor will a warranty, such as has been sued on, be implied from the contract of letting. The general doctrine of the law is, that upon a demise there is no implied contract that the property is fit for the use for which the lessee requires it, whether for habitation, occupation or cultivation. Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W. 52; Hart v. Windsor, id. 68; Erskine v. Adeane, L. R., 8 Ch. App. 756; Clives v. Willoughby, 7 Hill, 83; Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 89; Foster v. Peyser, id. 242; Wood on Land. & Ten., § 382. There is no implied duty on the owner of a house which is in a ruinous and unsafe condition to inform a proposed tenant that it is unfit for habitation, and no action will lie against him for an omission to do so in the absence of express warranty or deceit. Keates v. Earl of Cadogan, 10 C. B. 591. An obligation on the part of the landlord will not be implied that he shall make substantial repairs because of the premises being in a dangerous condition. Gott v. Gandy, 2 E. & B. 845. The doctrine with respect to covenants implied from the letting has been held in great strictness in this State. A covenant on the part of the lessor, even for title, will not arise from the relation of landlord and tenant; there must be either an express agreement to that effect, or words must be used from which such an agreement can be implied. Gano v. Vanderveer, 5 Vroom, 293. "Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. & W. 5, contains the only exception to the general rule that from the letting no implied undertaking will arise that the premises are fit for or adapted to the purposes for which they were let. There a furnished house was let to a tenant for a short term-five or six weeks. court. It was found to be infested with bugs and unfit for habitation. The tenant quit for that reason, and set up these facts as a defense to an action for use and occupation, and his defense was allowed by the This case was explained and distinguished by Lord Abinger in Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W. 52, as resting on exceptional grounds. It was greatly shaken by Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W. 68, but has since been followed in the English courts as an exceptional case in Wilson v. Finch, L. R., 2 Exch. Div. 336, where the court, following Smith v. Marrable, held that a family taking a lease of a furnished | house might refuse to occupy it, and defend an action for rent, if the house, owing to the defective drainage, was unfit for habitation. The reasoning on which these cases were decided was subjected by Bramhall, L. J., in Robertson v. Amazon Tug and Lighterage Co., 46 L. T. (N. S.) 146, to a criticism bordering on ridicule. Smith v. Marrable was distinguished by Parke, B., in Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W. 65, on the ground that the contract was of a mixed nature, being for a house and furniture; and in Cleves v. Willoughby, 7 Hill, 86, the case was likened to a sale of provisions for domestic use, on which the law will imply a contract that they are wholesome and fit for use. Certain it is that Smith v. Marrable has never been followed, except under the precise circumstances on which it was decided, and then only as enabling the tenant to abandon the premises, rescind the lease, and defend against the payment of rent. The case has never been cited to raise an implied warranty under any other circumstances without disapproval. The distinction between such a condition of the premises as will justify the refusal of the tenant to enter and occupy, and a warranty which will subject the lessor to an action for damages, is referred to by Cotton, L. J., in Robertson v. Amazon Tug and Lighterage Co." For some comments on Smith v. Marrable, see 2 Alb. Law Jour. 3. In Lewis v. Seabury, 74 N. Y. 409; S. C., 30 Am. Rep. 311, in a written lease, silent as to fixtures, it was provided that the lessee should make all necessary "improvements and repairs." For an inde pendent consideration, the lessor agreed that certain fixtures should remain for the lessee's use. An outgoing tenant removed them, and the lessor promised to replace them, but failing to do so, the lessee replaced them at her own expense, and the lessor promised to make it right. Held, that parol evidence of the agreement about the fixtures was competent, and the lessee was entitled to recover the sum so expended. Hand, J., said: "The case is undoubtedly very near the line, but I am inclined to think that such parol agreement was a separate and independent one, touching a subject not covered by the lease, and made for an independent consideration paid by the plaintiff, not stipulated for or referred to in the lease." Citing Hope v. Bale, 58 N. Y. 380, and distinguishing Johnson v. Oppenheim, 55 id. 280. In the absence of fraud or express agreement, the lessor is not liable to the tenant or others for the condition of the premises, nor does he un dertake that they are tenantable for the purposes for which they are apparently intended. Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398; S. C., 15 Am. Rep. 438. In this case the defect was the lack of a safety-valve to a boiler. But fraud will be imputed where the landlord lets premises for habitation, knowing them to be infected by a contagious disease, without notifying the tenant, and he will be held liable in damages to the tenant attacked by such disease. Cesar v. Karutz, 60 N. Y. 229; S. C., 19 Am. Rep. 164; Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477; S. C., 17 Am. Rep. 122, and note, 127. So in Eaton v. Winne, 20 Mich. 156; S. C., 4 Am. Rep. 377, where defendant, occupying plaintiff's lands as licensee, pastured upon it sheep affected with an infectious disease, and told him there was no danger, and plaintiff, ignorant of his danger, turned his sheep in, and they contracted the disease. This seems somewhat opposed to Erskine v. Adeane, supra, holding that on a lease of land for agricultural purposes there is no implied warranty that no noxious plants are growing on the premises. VALIDITY OF DIVORCES UPON CON- Here, as in the Cheever case, the members of the au thority cited are essential to the proposition of the court, and here again it cannot be fairly said that the unqualified indorsement of the conclusions does not Indeed the parallel reasoning is plain in the distinction indorse the reasoning necessarily leading to them. marked in the case between the invalidity of a judgment to directly affect interests without the State, and the validity of a judgment which may affect them indirectly (p. 725), and further in the court's basing its proposition as to divorce upon the right of the scvereignty to regulate status. Note also that if the propositions laid down by the cases cited by People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78, 83, "were not inconsiderate expressions nor dicta merely." (Id.) Not inconsiderate expression nor dictum merely, as well was the contrary proposition of Pennoyer v. Neff. It was a distinction expressly and designedly marked in order to stop an inference from the broad language before used that under no circumstances could jurisdiction be had by constructive process upon non-resident unless property was attached. "To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion," says the court (p. 734). And there was grave necessity that the distinction should be sharply drawn. For the authority of the Supreme Court upon intestate judgments is final. To it the States must bow. Now let it be thought that by that supreme authority any judgment whatever is absolutely null when had against a nonresident by constructive process without attachment of property, and this would follow until the mistake could be corrected by the court itself. There would fall to the ground the absolute and fundamental right of a sovereignty to adjudicate upon the status of its citizens; there would fall with the right, every divorce against a non-resident upon constructive process had under statutes enacted by virtue of that right; there would fall marriages had in the faith of the statutes, and the legitimacy of children begotten in those marriages, while rights of property dependent upon marriage and legitimacy would be in endless contest and confusion. Plainly indeed this was no inconsiderate expression nor dictum. Notwithstanding these clear consequences of such a mistake, the doctrine was put forth by dicta and dicta in case after case in New York, until this very case of Pennoyer v. Neff. It was when driven home by that case that the stubborn logic of the opposite doctrine first got from our Court of Appeals this admission: "We must and do concede that a State may adjudge the status of a citizen toward a non-resident; and may authorize to that end such judicial proceedings as it sees fit; and that other States must acquiesce, so long as the operation of the judgment is kept within its own confines." People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78, 84. And this further admission: "Hence if one party to a proceeding is domiciled in a State, the status of that party as affected by the matrimonial relation may be adjudged upon and confirmed or changed in accordance with the laws of that State." Id. 84, 85. These admissions are fatal. For by those admissions a State may adjudicate upon the marriage status of a citizen by such judicial proceedings as it sees fit, the judgment had to be valid within its own confines. And by the higher authority of the United States Supreme Court, a judgment of divorce had upon constructive process only against a non-resident would be a judgment valid to determine the status of one of its own citizens and binding within the State. Pennoyer v. Neff, p. 734; Cheever v. Wilson, as analyzed supra. But the effect of the valid judgment would not stop there. For the Constitution of the United States (art. 4, § 1; 1 U. S. Stat. at Large, 122, cap. 11; U. S. R. S., § 905) gives full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of a State in every other State. Those judicial proceedings are not circumscribed by the Constitution-they are not judicial proceedings in personam only-but are all judicial proceedings whatsoever. Cf. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. (U.S.), 582, 591. Now that full faith and credit gives to every valid judgment the same effect in every other State as in the State where recovered. Mills v. Duryea, 7 Cranch, 481; Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat. 234; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 325. Hence, if a husband is freed from the marital relation by a judgment of divorce had and admittedly valid in his new domicile, the judgment of divorce to have the same effect in every other State must there also free him. Barber v. Barber, supra. And hence a wife, a resident of New York, the partner to the marital relation, would there find herself barred by the judgment from asserting any right as a wife, against the former husband. every turn of her proceedings to bold him as her husband, the judgment would conclusively establish that where it was validly had, the man was made single by it, that he was also under the Constitution made single by it in New York, and that no man thus conclusively single can be under any marital duty or disability that there is no marriage in fact as to him. Furthermore the State itself, if the man remarried within it, would be powerless to punish him; the judgment again would conclusively establish that the man was single when he married, and to so marry is certainly legal. It would follow that out of regard for the wife's rights, which the State can in no wise enforce, People v. Baker deprives her of rights common to every husband less woman, and binds her to celibacy with a criminal sanction. And this simply because she failed to do what she may have had neither the means nor the power to do, voluntarily appear to the husband's divorce. For at The fundamental trouble with People v. Baker would seem to be that it is based on false premises. There is not as supposed any attempt made by the foreign judgment to subvert the policy of this State. Such an attempt would of course be nugatory. What the judgment does is simply to destroy effectually everywhere the marriage status of the citizen of the State wherein the judgment was had. The actual effect of the judgment upon the marriage is the effect of necessity. There can be no wife without a husband or husband without a wife, in nature, in reason or in law. People v. Hovey, 5 Barb. 117. The two are indispensable elements. Eliminate one of them and the relation necessarily falls. Before going further let there be noted some distinctions and some rules. There has already been seen the marked distinction between the action in rem and the ordinary action in personam. The distinction is here so vital that it should be again put forth; the more so since around this subject there has formed such a nimbus of prejudice that elementary propositions must be iterated and reiterated in order that there may be clear seeing. The judgment in rem then acts upon the res within the territory only-it is confined in its direct effect to the res, both where had and everywhere else-but so far as it does act it acts conclusively, and it needs to its validity everywhere neither service of process nor appearance, but only such notice as the sovereignty has deemed enough to be fairly likely to apprize those interested in the res of what is doing. That notice however is essential. The action in personam, on the contrary, goes to the performance or non-performance by the defendant of an act, or to the recovery against him of money simplyit is personal in its aim-and as against a non-resident is null, unless he either voluntarily appears or has process served upon him within the State. This rule is so strict that without that appearance or service, though there is in the State property of the nonresident defendant, over which the State has therefore sovereignty and jurisdiction, yet to the satisfaction of a judgment in a personal action the property cannot be applied, if before the judgment the property has not, by process upon itself, been directly subjected to the jurisdiction of the court. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714. It is therefore in the action in personam that the strict rule of justice requires personal notice (process), and a chance to be heard " (per Folger, J., People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78, 88), though of course in an action in rem that chance is given. For a judgment in personam may be made the means, and a practically irresistible means, of the successful prosecution elsewhere of an action in personam of the defendant. Contrariwise the action in rem cannot go beyond the res adjudicated upon-beyond the res it is no evidence whatever. Pennoyer v. Neff, supra. The defendant in the latter case is therefore personally safe. But radically different as the types of the actions are, they may show in one action. Pennoyer v. Neff, supra; Cooper v, Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308. Such is the ordinary case of an attachment against a non-resident's property within the State-when the action is in rem simply-followed by personal service of process upon the defendant within the State, or by a voluntary general appearance by him-when the action becomes in personam as well. Id. It is indisputable that the judgment would be valid and conclusive as to the property against the owner, even within his own foreign State, though he neither appeared nor had valid personal service of process upon him, and notwithstanding that his interest in the property, the interest of one domiciled in another State and protected by its laws, may be profoundly affected or completely annulled. The court would have had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person of the owner as well, in order to effectually adjudicate upon the thing subject to its absolute sovereignty. 66 In like manner, the action of divorce often has the two phases of an action in rem and an action in personam. For a wife, obtaining a decree of divorce, |