but willful and malicious acts, are embraced. A railroad conductor or engineer is never authorized to commit wanton or malicious acts on persons or property of others, yet our reports abound in cases holding the railroad companies employing them liable for such act done while discharging their several duties. Nor is the rule a new one in this jurisdiction, as it has obtained for a quarter of a century or more. Such acts, under the circumstances, are considered as the acts of the company, as it can act only through agents intrusted with the exercise of their franchises. In this case the clerk was in the exercise of a corporate power, engaged in the performance of a duty delegated to him by the company, and in the performance of that duty he attempted the use of illegal means for the accomplishment of a legal end, and for the benefit of the company. He did not attempt to suborn the witness for the benefit of himself, but for the benefit of the company not with the consent of his superior, but in the course of legitimate and authorized business of the company. He was unquestionably employed by the company, was acting for it, and did the act to promote its interest. He was engaged in performance of a duty for the companyhe did the act as a part of the duty, although unauthorized. We are therefore of the opinion that he performed the illegal and unauthorized act while acting in and as a part of his employment, and we must hold the company is responsible for the act. For that reason we hold that the evidence was admissible." The court disapproved Green v. Town of Woodbury, 48 Vt. 5. That was where evidence to show that a constable of the town, employed to summon its witnesses and assist in the defense, offered inducements to the plaintiff's witness to stay away from the trial, was held incompetent, in the absence of any proof of knowledge, authority or approval by any other agent of the town. Ross, J., observed: "His employment to summon witnesses for the defendant did not authorize him to try to keep the plaintiffs' witnesses away from the trial. His engagement to assist in the defense must, until the contrary is shown, be presumed an engagement to render lawful assistance. While offering inducement to a witness for the plaintiffs to keep away from the trial, if his acts were authorized by the town, instead of rendering assistance to the town in making its defense, he was furnishing evidence in favor of the plaintiffs against the town. All authorized attempts of a party to suppress the testimony of the other party are clearly admissible, and are evidence that in such party's own conviction his case will not bear full investigation. They show a consciousness in such party of the weakness of his own cause. In order to be evidence against a party, such acts must be the acts of the party, either directly, or by authorization. If the plaintiffs had shown that these acts of the constable were either directly authorized, or before the trial approved by the agent of the town, they would have been admissible A town can only act through agents, and it would be a hardship to hold it responsible for the acts of all its citizens whose zeal might happen to outrun their discretion." See also Moriarty v. London, etc., Ry. Co., L. R., 5 Q. B., 314. In re Thomas v. Witherby, California Supreme Court, July, 1882, 13 Rep. 262, it was held that in an action on a replevin bond, it is no defense that the property was lost through the act of God. This was the case of the death of a cow. The contrary doctrine was adjudged in Carpenter v. Stevens, 12 Wend. 589, and Melvin v. Winslow, 10 Me. 397; but the former is strongly disapproved in Suydam v. Jenkins, 3 Sandf. 614, is inconsistent with the earlier decision of Rowley v. Gibbs, 14 Johns. 385, and is criticised by Wells and by Sedgwick, and the contrary is held in Carrol v. Early, 4 Bibb, 270; Scott v. Hughes, 9 Barb. 104; and Hinkson v. Morrison, 47 Iowa, 167. The court in the principal case say: "The weight of authority is manifestly against excusing the party who has replevined goods from returning the same or responding in damages for their value, because they have been lost by the act of God, and it appears to us that upon no sound principle can he be excused. A plaintiff, not being the owner of goods, who takes them out of the possession of the real owner, holds them in his own wrong, and at his own risk. He has deprived the real owner of the possession, and has also deprived him of the means of disposing of the property pending the litigation; and when at the end of perhaps a protracted litigation it is determined that the plaintiff in the replevin suit had no right to the possession of the goods, and judgment is rendered against him for the return of the property or its value, he cannot, on principle or authority, be excused from satisfying said judgment under a plea that the property has been lost in his hands, even by the act of God." Sedgwick says: "It cannot be contended that a wrong-doer should be excused by any subsequent event." Damages, vol. 2, m. p. 500. The Superior Court in Suydam v. Jenkins, supra, say: "We cannot think that a wrong-doer is ever to be treated as a mere bailee, and that the property in his possession is to any extent at the risk of the owner." "A plaintiff, who without right or title has seized the property of another by writ of replevin, is as much a wrong-doer as a defendant in trover." In Hinkson v. Morrison, supra, the court said: "We think the defendant's bond cannot be discharged pro tanto by showing the mere fact that one of the horses died. By the verdict his detention of the horses was found to be wrongful. His undertaking is absolute to return the property in as good condition as it was when the action was commenced. His obligation is entirely different from that of a bailee rightfully in possession. If he was bound to return the property in as good condition as when the action was commenced, it follows that for failure to deliver he should be liable to the same damages 1or the detention as though the property had continued in the same condition." 1 * * * one another and were pretty sharply criticised by Mr. Cowen, 25 Alb. Law Jour. 278. In the former case, defendant deeded to the plaintiff, with covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment, a dwelling-house and lot, described by metes and bounds, "with the appurtenances." A bath-room and water-closet in the house discharged through pipes into a sewer on the adjoining premises owned by A. It appeared by parol evidence that the plaintiff at the time of taking his deed knew of this connection, and the apparent privilege enhanced the price of the premises. The defendant had no right to use A.'s sewer, and the plaintiff was subsequently enjoined by A. from such use. Held, that no action would be for breach of covenant. In the latter case, defendant deeded to plaintiff, with a covenant of quiet enjoyment, a tract of land, including a mill, with a dam and pond for supplying the water, "with the appurtenances." When the deed was given there were flush-boards on the top of the dam, the use of which caused the pond to overflow the land of F., who owned the adjoining premises above on the stream. F. recovered against the plaintiff for overflowing his land, and the plaintiff was compelled to reduce the height of his dam. Held, that an action would lie for breach of the covenant. In Rice v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Supreme | Conover, 87 id., seem at first sight inconsistent with Court, March, 1882, 39 Leg. Int. 321, the question what constitutes courtship, from which a promise of marriage may be inferred, was passed upon, and an instruction that attentions paid to a woman in a secluded place are quite as satisfactory evidence of a promise of marriage as any other, was held error. This was an indictment for seduction. The court said: "The learned judge also erred in charging: 'It is contended that this requires the essentials, so far as the making of presents, writing of love letters, and all of such things that pass between young people, to make out this case. But we have long passed that day, so far as courtship is concerned. One man may desire to court the girl he desires to make his wife in a secluded place, or he may desire to keep it quiet; another may be in the habit of keeping company with a young lady, and appear upon the public highway from time to time so that all may see him, hence there is no standard; each case must stand on its own four legs as the parties build it up.' This instruction was not calculated to aid the jury in arriving at a correct conclusion. In view of the character of the evidence, it was not only inadequate, but misleading and erroneous. The attentions from which the jury were permitted to infer a promise of marriage were of an equivocal character. The plaintiff in error had been in the house of the prosecutrix but four times, according to her own statement and that of her mother, and then only for a short time. He met her out in the evenings, sometimes at church, walked home with her, and left her at the gate. This is not the kind of intercourse that usually takes place between persons engaged to be married. It may tend to matrimony, but it is quite as likely to lead to something else. Circumstantial evidence of an engagement of marriage is to be found in the proof of such facts as usually accompany that relation. Among them may be mentioned letters, presents, social attentions of various kinds, visiting together in company, preparations for housekeeping and the like. These and similar circumstances, especially when the attentions are exclusive and continued a long time, may well justify a jury in finding a promise of marriage. But the court below ignored all these matters as being no longer essential, or rather as belonging to a past age, and virtually instructed the jury that attentions paid to a woman in a secluded place' are quite as satisfactory evidence of such promise. We cannot assent to this proposition. The circumstances which will warrant a jury in finding an intention to marry must be of those pure acts which mark an honorable purpose, and not attentions which are consistent only with the pursuit of lust." It may be well, preliminarily to glance at the adjudications bearing on these questions. And first, let us look at the cases of dams and mill sites, and similar openly visible property. In Manning v. Smith, 6 Conn. 289, the deed conveyed lands by metes and bounds, habendum “with all their appurtenances." Held, not to convey a right to the use of water drawn from the other land of the grantor, by an aqueduct, for cattle. This seems to have been put on the form of the deed; the habendum cannot enlarge the subject-matter of the grant. (So in Spaulding v. Abbott, 55 N. H. 423, and Swazy v. Brooks, 34 Vt. 451, it was held that by the use of the word "appurtenances " in the habendum an easement will not pass unless legally appurtenant.) But the court say that the deed "did not convey any right to the easement unless it belonged naturally and necessarily to the premises." In New Ipswich Factory Co. v. Bachelder, 3 N. H. 190, where a grantor deeded a tract of land described by metes and bounds, with a mill upon the same, and at the time of the conveyance there was a raceway to conduct the water from the mill, running along the side of the natural stream, into other lands of the grantor, and there discharging the water into the natural stream, which raceway had been used with the mill sixteen years, and was necessary to the convenient use of the mill; held, that the right to have the water flow off uninterruptedly through the whole extent of the raceway passed as appurtenant to the mill. In Mitzell v. Paschall, 3 Rawle, 76, a testator owning four contiguous tracts of land, devised one to grantor at the time was not in actual use of the reservoir and flume, and the mill was fitted with steam power as well. In Lampman v. Milks, 21 N. Y. 505, where the owner of land, accross which a stream had flowed, diverted it through an artificial channel so as to relieve a portion of it formerly over his son, describing it as "the saw-mill land, with all the rights and privileges thereunto appertaining." Held, to embrace the right of swelling the water back to the boundary of one of the other tracts, which he had devised to another son, as it had long flowed. But in Messer v. Rhodes, 3 Brews. 180, it was held, that the grant of land necessary for a mill-flowed, and conveyed that portion, held, that neither site and water-power, with the right to build a dam and dig a race, does not necessarily convey a house and lot of land appurtenant to the mill-site, although measurably necessary to the enjoyment of the privileges granted. In Vermont Central Railroad Co. v. Hills, 23 Vt. 681, a grant of a messuage, to which water was conducted for use, by an aqueduct from a spring on another portion of the grantor's land, was held to convey the right to continue to use the water, as appurtenant. (Disapproving Manning v. Smith, supra.) To precisely the same effect: Coolidge v. Hager, 43 id. 9; S. C., 5 Am. Rep. 256. In Perrin v. Garfield, 37 id. 304, the deed of a will was held to pass, by implication, an easement which the grantor had acquired, by adverse possession, in a dam and flume a mile distant, on the land of a third, indispensably necessary to the mill. In Brace v. Yale, 4 Allen, 393, it was held that the grant of a tract, described by metes and bounds, with the right to erect a dam and flood the land above, gives no right to the use of a reservoir dam above, owned by the grantor, although the stream is small and the use of the reservoir dam is necessary to the beneficial use of the mill on the granted premises. (Of the argument founded on natural necessity and appurtenances the court said, "this doctrine is novel, and none of the cases cited give countenance to it.") In Neader houser v. State, 28 Ind. 257, it was held, that a deed of a mill and mill-seat as such, by metes and bounds, will embrace the dam near by, though not included within the bounds given, and not abutting on the land described. In Decorah Woolen Mill Co. v. Greer, 49 Iowa, 490, A., grantee of land on a stream with the privilege of damming, granted to B., without expressing the privilege and without ever having exercised it, held, that the privilege did not pass. (The court said that though express words were not necessary to convey an easement, yet the easement must be actually appurtenant and practically annexed.) In Comstock v. Johnson, 46 N. Y. 615, there was a grant of land on which stood mills, with the privilege of drawing from the grantor's dam sufficient water "for the use of said works." The grantor had for forty years used an open space belonging to him in front of the mills for piling and sawing wood, for the use of the mills. On this space the grantee placed a buzz-saw, driven by water from the dam. Held, that he could not use that space for that pur. pose. In Simmons v. Cloonan, 81 id. 557, it was held that a deed of land with a mill on it, "with the appurtenances," carries the right to draw water through an existing flume from a reservoir on other land of the grantor, and this is so, although the he nor his grantees of the residue might return the stream to its original bed to the damage of the first grantee. Selden, J., stated the rule thus: "The principle is that where the owner of two tenements sells one of them, or the owner of an entire estate sells a portion, the purchaser takes the tenement, or portion sold, with all the benefits and burdens which appear, at the time of the sale, to belong to it, as between it and the property which the vendor retains." This decision was disapproved in Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 287. Judge Selden adopts the definition of "apparent signs," as given in Pyer v. Carter, infra, and approved by Mr. Goddard, namely, "not those which must necessarily be seen, but those which may be seen or known, on a careful inspection, by a person ordinarily conversant with the subject." In Farmer v. Ukiah Water Co., 36 Cal. 11, L., owning a house and four acres of land, purchased from defendant the right to draw water from its pipes, aqueducts and reservoirs, and constructed a pipe accordingly, and a tank, cistern and bathroom in the house, which he fed through the pipe. He afterward conveyed the premises and appurtenances to B., and still later he conveyed the waterright to T., who conveyed it to the defendant. Held, that B. took the water-right as appurtenant. In Cave v. Crafts, 53 Cal. 135, the right to the use of an existing canal from other lands of the grantor, for irrigation, was held to pass as appurtenant. In Baker v. Bessey, 73 Me. 472, it was held that a deed of a "mill and dam, with the appurtenances," will pass not only the dam at the mill, but an ease ment in a reservoir dam half a mile above, owned by the grantor of the mill and the lower dam, and for many years and in conjunction with them, and up to which the lower dam has always flowed, although the grantor did not own all the adjoining intervening land. Second, let us look at the cases of underground drains and similar non-apparent appurtenances. In Johnson v. Jordan, 2 Metc. 234, where the owner of two lots constructed a drain through one for the drainage of the other, and sold both lots on the same day to different purchasers, and did not mention the drain in the deed of the lot drained, held, that the purchaser of that lot acquired no right to the drain, if by reasonable labor and expense he could make a drain without going through that lot. To the same effect, Thayer v. Payne, 2 Cush. 327; Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen, 364; Randall v. McLaughlin, 10 id. 366. In Philbrick v. Ewing, 97 Mass. 133, there was a grant of a house and lot with warranty. The only supply of water was by a pipe laid across land of a third person, to a highway, where it joined the pipes of an aqueduct company. By con ** * tract with the company the grantor had a right to draw water through his pipe. His pipe had been laid by a tenant of his, under an oral license from the third person whose land it crossed, and purchased from him by the grantor. The deed did not mention the pipe. After deeding, the grantor dug up the pipe on the land of the third person and carried it away. Held, that it was a fixture appurtenant and passed by the deed, but that the deed conveyed no right to draw water through the pipe from the highway. The court said it was a novel case, and observed: "We do not perceive, upon these facts, that any right of water would pass by the grant of the house, as an appurtenance. An easement, where it is not expressly described in the conveyance, must actually belong to the estate conveyed, in order to pass by implication. The rule is commonly stated to be that the grantor conveys by his deed, as an appurtenance, whatever he has the power to grant, which is practically annexed to the premises at the time of the grant, and is necessary to their enjoyment in the condition of the estate at that time. * *The defendant did not own the water that came to the plaintiff's house. *** The pipe was put in by his tenant, and afterward purchased from the tenant by him, as one entire thing. It was designed for the use of the plaintiff's house and for no other purpose. If it extended into the land of a third person, and into the highway, it does not appear that the owner of that land objects to its continuance, or authorized or required the defendant to remove it. We are therefore of opinion that the whole of it, at the time of his conveyance to the plaintiff, was a fixture annexed to the house and passed by the deed. He had no more right to cut off a piece of the pipe, because it ran into another's land, than he would have had to cut off a piece of a spout which projected over the adjoining premises. If the owner of that land objected to its continuance, the plaintiff would be obliged to draw her pipe in; but until objection was made, or if she could obtain for it a license for it to continue, she could let it remain as her predecessor had done." In Dolliff v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 68 Me. 173, the doctrine of Johnson v. Jordan was held, on the authority of the Massachusetts cases. In Butterworth v. Crawford, 46 N. Y. 349; S. C., 7 Am. Rep. 352, under similar circumstances, the grantee of the lot containing the drain was held warranted in closing the drain, having purchased without knowledge of it, and there being no apparent mark of its existence. The court distinguished Pyer v. Carter, infra, on the ground that there must have been some outward sign of the existence of the drain, and concluded that otherwise that case is contrary to the current of authority. The leading English case is Nicholas v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121, where it was held, that "if one erect a house, and build a conduit thereto in another part of his land, and convey water by pipes to the house, and afterward sell the house with the appurtenances, excepting the land, or sell the land to | another, reserving to himself the house, the conduit and pipes pass with the house, because it is necessary and quasi appendant thereto; and he shall have liberty by law to dig in the land for amending the pipes, or making them new as the case may require." In Pyer v. Carter, 1 H. & W. 916, a house was converted into two, and sold to different persons, and there being but a single drain, it was held that there passed by implication to the subsequent purchaser the right to use it. Here, although the defendant was ignorant of the drain at his purchase, it was held he must, or ought to have known that some drain existed; that he was put on inquiry, and inquiry would have disclosed the existence of the drain; and that by "apparent signs" must be understood not only those necessarily visible, but those which might be ascertained by careful inspection by an ordinarily careful person. The same principle was declared and this decision was approved by the House of Lords, in Ewart v. Cochrane, 4 Macq. 117. It was also approved and followed in Polden v. Bastard, in the exchequer chamber, L. R., 1 Q. B. 156; and in Watts v. Kelson, L. R., 6 Ch. App. 166. But it was disapproved and rejected in Suffield v. DeG., J. & S., 185; Crossley v. Lightowler, L. R., 2 Ch. App. 486; and Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 287; and doubted in Butterworth v. Crawford, supra. Mr. Washburn and Mr. Goddard, however, in their works on Easements, seem to regard it as still authoritative and not necessarily overruled. Brown, 4 In Brain v. Marfell, English Court of Appeal, 41 L. T. (N. S.) 455, defendant sold to plaintiff a spring and the right of conveying water therefrom through defendant's land, without interruption or disturbance by him, his heirs, assigns or others. The defendant also sold to a railway company other lands near the spring, and the company drained the land so that the water was cut off before it reached the spring, and no water flowed through the plaintiff's pipes. In an action for breach of agreement, held that the defendant had only conveyed the flow after the water had reached the spring, and the action would not lie. THE CIVIL DAMAGE LAW. Chapter 646, of the Laws of 1873, known as the "Civil Damage Law," provides that "every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person who shall be injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action in his or her name, against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving away intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person or persons; and any person or persons owning or renting, or permitting the occupation of any building or premises, and having knowledge that intoxicating liquors are to be sold therein, shall be liable severally or jointly with the person or persons selling or giving intoxicating liquors aforesaid, for all damages sustained and for exemplary damages, etc." The Excise Law of 1857, chapter 628, section 28, con tains a limited civil damage provision, as follows: "Any person who shall sell any strong or spirituous liquors or wine to any of the individuals to whom it is declared by this act to be unlawful to make such sale -shall be liable for all damages which may be sustained in consequence of such sale, etc." The persons to whom it is unlawful to sell, are Indians, apprentices, or minors under eighteen years of age, without the consent of their master, or parent or guardian, intoxicated persons, persons guilty of habitual drunkenness, persons against whom the seller may have been notified by parent, guardian, husband or wife, from selling intoxicating liquors, and paupers or inmates of poorhouses outside of any poor-house. It will be observed that the cases in which damages could be recovered under these provisions are quite limited. A difficulty would be found in most cases in making the necessary proof. I have been unable to find any reported case in which damages were sought to be recovered under the provisions of the law of 1857. Probably it would be necessary in a case under this law to show that the injuries complained of arose wholly from the sale of liquor in question. The Legislature evidently considered that more stringent measures were necessary for the relief of persons injured in consequence of the traffic in intoxicating liquors. Hence the passage of the Civil Damage Law, which is very broad and comprehensive in its scope and meaning. It has frequently been the subject of judicial construction under a great variety of circumstances; and a review of the cases may not be without interest. In the first reported case, Baker v. Pope, 2 Hun, 556, November 1874, the constitutionality of the law was brought in question on demurrer to the second count in the answer. The complaint alleged sales by the defendant, a retail liquor dealer, of liquors to the plaintiff's husband, who thereby became intoxicated, squandered his earnings, destroyed his and plaintiff's property, and injured the plaintiff personally and in her means of support. The defendant set up a State and a United States license as a defense, and claimed that the License Law and the Civil Damage Law are in conflict, and that therefore the latter was invalid. He also claimed that for a good consideration the excise board had given him the right to sell liquors, and that any law which deprived him of the fruits of his contract made with the board-by making him liable in damages to third persons for the indiscretion or willful misconduct of the buyer of such liquors, whereby such damages are caused - must be unconstitutional and void. The court however, held, that the law of 1873, and the general License Law were to be read as one act; and that the Legislature intended to impose upon every person selling liquor, whether with or without a license, the conditions that he should be liable in damages for the injuries done by the purchaser of such liquors, if intoxicated thereby. It does not forbid the sale, but imposes upon the seller the duty of guarding his conduct so as to produce no mischievous consequences. He must not use his license to aid the poor in squandering the means necessary for the aid and support of families or the education of children. The act was declared to be constitutional. In Hayes v. Phelan, 4 Hun, 733 (June, 1875), it was held in the third department that the damages resulting from the death of the intoxicated person could not be recovered uuder this act. Judge Learned - who wrote the prevailing opinion, argued this question at considerable length; and he thought that no right of action existed against the vendor or giver of the liquor, unless an action might also have been brought against the intoxicated person. He was not fully sustained in this view, for Judge James wrote a dissenting opinion, and Judge Boardman concurred only in the result. (See Judge James' Opinion in 5 Hun, 335.) The next case, Dubois v. Miller, 5 Hun, 330 (September, 1875) has no present interest, the principal point decided being as to the admissibility of evidence of sales to the intoxicated person before the passage of the act, and such evidence was held to be improper. In Jackson v. Brookins, 5 Hun, 530 (October, 1875), the question came before the general term in the fourth department, as to the right of a widow to maintain an action against the person who had sold her husband the liquor which caused his death; and that court held, contrary to the decision in Hayes v. Phelan, that she could maintain such an action. In discussing this question Judge Merwin said that the act "provided for injuries to means of support, and made actionable a new class of injuries, without remedy at the common law, and unprovided for by any previous statute. The wrong consisted in the fact that the sellers of liquor shut their eyes to the conditions, in person or family, of those to whom they sold. They dealt out an article which, under certain circumstances, often liable to exist and to be known to the seller, would, without fail, produce injury and perhaps death. Carelessness and neglect, morally criminal, were shielded under the license law. For this wrong the statute provided a remedy. "It was also decided in this case that a joint action may be maintained against a landlord and his tenant, but a joint action will not lie against two or more persons who, separately, at different times and places, have sold liquor to the same person, each quantity of liquor sold having contributed to produce the intoxication that caused the injury. Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 8 Hun, 16 (June, 1876), was a joint action brought against the owner and the keeper of a place where intoxicating liquors were sold without a 11cense. The son of the plaintiff on a Sunday took plaintiff's horse, saying he was going to see a friend about four miles distant, but instead went directly to the place where the liquor was sold, and became intoxicated there, and when in such a state, drove the horse so violently that he died. The action was brought under the civil damage act, to recover the value of the horse, and it was held, that the action was maintainable against the landlord and tenant jointly. In this case, the tenant who sold the liquor had no license. The decision of the general term was affirmed by the court of appeals (74 N. Y. 509), where the principal question discussed by Judge Andrews in his decision was as to the constitutionality of the law. This question was fully considered (for the first time by this court) and the court were unanimous in holding that while the act was a great innovation on the common law, there was nothing in it repugnant to any constitutional restraints or prohibitions. Franklin v. Schermerhorn, 8 Hun, 112 (June, 1876) was a case involving another peculiar feature of the law. The husband of the plaintiff was a cripple and could earn but little for the support of his family, consisting of the plaintiff and four children, all under eight years of age. He received a quarterly pension of fiftyfour dollars. The plaintiff and her children were dependent upon the husband, and he was unable to support them without this pension. On the day he received his pension he became intoxicated, in part at defendant's house, and thereby lost or had stolen fifty dollars. The wife brought an action against the liquor seller and his wife- who owned the building where the business was carried on to recover the amount lost by the husband. It was held that she could maintain an action for an injury to her means of support, but could only recover one-fifth of the money lost; as that was the proportion which would presumably have been used for her support. It follows as a necessary consequence from this decision, and it is so intimated by the court, that each one of the children could have maintained a separate action for one |