ceive, that an object is approved of, on account of its tendency to a certain end, while the end itself is totally indifferent; let us fwallow this abfurdity, and confider what are the confequences. The preceding delineation or definition of VIRTUE muft ftill retain its evidence and authority: It must still be allowed, that every quality of the mind, which is useful or agreeable to the perfon himself or to others, communicates a pleasure to the fpectator, engages his efteem, and is admitted under the honorable denomination of virtue or merit. Are not juftice, fidelity, honor, veracity, allegiance, chastity, esteemed folely on account of their tendency to promote the good of fociety? Is not that tendency infeparable from humanity, benevolence, lenity, generofity, gratitude, moderation, tenderness, friendship, and all the other focial virtues? Can it poffibly be doubted, that industry, difcretion, frugality, fecrecy, order, perfeverance, forethought, judgment, and that whole class of virtues, of which many pages would not contain the catalogue; can it be doubted, I fay, that the tendency of thefe virtues to promote the interest and happiness of their poffeffor, is the fole foundation of their merit? Who can difpute that a mind, which fupports a perpetual ferenity and cheerfulness, a noble dignity and undaunted fpirit, a tender affection and goodwill to all around; as it has more enjoyment within itself, is also a more animating and rejoicing fpectacle, than if dejected with melancholy, tormented with anxiety, irritated with rage, or funk into the most abject baseness and degeneracy? And as to the qualities, immediately agreeable to others, they fpeak fufficiently for themselves; and he must be unhappy, indeed, either in his own temper, or in his fituation and circumftances, who has never perceived the charms of a facetious wit or flowing affability, of a delicate modefty or decent genteelness of addrefs and manner.

I AM fenfible, that nothing can be more unphilofophical than to be pofitive or dogmatical on any subject; and that, even if exceffive fcepticism could be maintained, it would not be more deftructive to all just reasoning and enquiry. I am convinced, that, where men are the most fure and arrogant, they are commonly the most mistaken, and have there given reins to paffion, without that proper deliberation and fufpence, which can alone fecure them from the groffeft abfurdities. Yet I must confefs, that this enumeration puts the matter in fo ftrong a light, that I cannot, at prefent, be more affured of any truth, which I learn from reasoning and argument, than that virtue confists entirely in the usefulness or agreeablenefs of qualities to the perfon himself poffeffed of them, or to others, who have any intercourfe with him. But when I reflect, that, tho' the bulk and figure of the earth have been measured and delineated, tho' the motions of the tides have been accounted for, the order and economy of the heavenly bodies fubjected to their proper laws, and INFINITE itself reduced to calculation; yet men ftill difpute concerning the foundation of their moral duties: When I reflect on this, I fay, I fall back into diffidence and fcepticism, and fufpect, that an hypothefis, fo obvious, had it been a true one, would, long ere now, have been received by the unanimous fuffrage and confent of mankind.

PART

PART II.

HAVING explained the moral approbation attending virtue, there remains no thing, but to confider briefly our interefted obligation to it, and to enquire, whether every man, who has any regard to his own happiness and welfare, will not beft find his account in the practice of every moral duty. If this can be clearly afcertained from the foregoing theory, we fhall have the fatisfaction to reflect, that we have advanced principles, which not only, 'tis hoped, will stand the test of reafoning and enquiry, but may contribute to the amendment of men's lives,, and their improvement in morality and focial virtue. And tho' the philofophical truth of any propofition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interefts of fociety; yet a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however true, which, he muft confefs, leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious.. Why rake into thofe corners of nature, which fpread a nuifance all around?' Why dig up the peftilence from the pit, in which it is buried? The ingenuity of your refearches may be admired; but your fyftems will be detefted: And mankind will agree, if they cannot refute them, to fink them, at least, in eternal filence and oblivion. Truths, which are pernicious to fociety, if any fuch there be,. will yield to errors, which are falutary and advantageous.

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BUT what philofophical truths can be more advantageous to fociety, than those here delivered, which reprefent virtue in all her genuine and moft engaging charms, and make us approach her with eafe, familiarity, and affection? The difmal drefs. falls off, with which many divines, and fome philofophers had covered her; and nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; nay even, at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks not of ufelefs aufterities. and rigors, fuffering and felf-denial. She declares, that her fole purpofe is, to make her votaries and all mankind, during every inftant of their existence, if poffible, cheerful and happy; nor does the ever willingly part with any pleasure but in hopes of ample compenfation in fome other period of their lives. The fole trouble which the demands is that of juft calculation, and a fteddy preference of the greater happiness. And if any auftere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and pleafure, fhe either rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers; or if fhe admits them in her train, they are ranked, however, among the leaft favored of her votaries.

AND indeed, to drop all figurative expreffion, what hopes can we ever have of engaging mankind to a practice, which we confefs full of aufterity and rigor? Or what morality can ever ferve any ufeful purpofe, unless it can fhow, by a particular detail, that all the duties, which it recommends, are alfo the true intereft of each individual? The peculiar advantage of the foregoing theory, seems to be, that it furnishes proper mediums for that purpose.

THAT the virtues which are immediately useful or agreeable to the perfon poffeffed of them, are defireable in a view to felf-intereft, it would furely be fuperfluous to prove. Moralifts, indeed, may fpare themselves all the pains, which they often take in recommending thefe duties. To what purpofe collect arguments to evince, that temperance is advantageous, and the exceffes of pleasure hurtful? When it appears, that thefe exceffes are only denominated fuch, be

cause

caufe they are hurtful; and that, if the unlimited ufe of ftrong liquors, for inftance, no more impaired health or the faculties of the mind and body than the ufe of air or water, it would not be a whit more vicious or blameable.

Ir feems equally fuperfluous to prove, that the companionable virtues of goodmanners and wit, decency and genteelnefs, are more defirable than the contrary qualities. Vanity alone, without other confiderations, is a fufficient motive to make us with the poffeffion of thefe accomplishments. No man was ever willingly deficient in this particular. All our failures here proceed from bad education, want of capacity, or a perverfe and unpliable difpofition. Would you have your company coveted, admired, followed; rather than hated, defpifed, avoided? Can any one seriously deliberate in the cafe? As no enjoyment is fincere, without fome reference to company and fociety; fo no fociety can be agreeable or even tolerable, where a man feels his prefence unwelcome, and discovers all around him fymptoms of difguft and averfion.

BUT why, in the greater fociety or confederacy of mankind, fhould not the cafe be the fame as in particular clubs and companies? Why is it more doubtful, that the enlarged virtues of humanity, generofity, beneficence, are defirable with a view to happiness and self-intereft, than the limited endowments of ingenuity and politeness? Are we apprehenfive, left those focial affections have a greater and more immediate interference, than any other pursuits, with private utility, and cannot be gratified, without fome important facrifices of honor and advantage? If so, we are but ill inftructed in the nature of the human paffions, and are more influenced by verbal diftinctions than by real differences.

WHATEVER Contradiction may vulgarly be fuppofed betwixt the selfish and social fentiments or difpofitions, they are really no more oppofite than selfish and ambitious, selfish and revengeful, selfish and vain. 'Tis requifite, that there be an original propenfity of fome kind, in order to be a bafis to felf-love, by giving a relish to the objects of its purfuit; and none more fit for this pu pofe than benevolence or humanity. The goods of fortune are spent in one gratification or other: The mifer, who accumulates his annual income, and lends it out at intereft, has really spent it in the gratification of his avarice. And it would be difficult to fhow, why a man is more a lofer by a generous action, than by any other method of expence; fince the utmost which he can attain, by the most elaborate felfifhnefs, is the indulgence of fome affection.

Now if life, without paffion, must be altogether infipid and tirefome; let a man suppose that he has full power of modelling his own difpofition, and let him deliberate what appetite or defire he would choofe for the foundation of his happinefs and enjoyment. Every affection, he would obferve, when gratified by fuccefs, gives a fatisfaction proportioned to its force and violence; but befides this advantage, common to all, the immediate feeling of benevolence and friendship, humanity and kindness, is fweet, fmooth, tender, and agreeable, independent of all fortune and accidents. Thefe virtues are befides attended with a pleasing consciousness or remembrance, and keep us in humor with ourselves as well as others; while we retain the agreeable reflection of having done our part towards mankind and fociety. And tho' all men show a jealoufy of our fuccefs in the pursuits of avarice or ambition; yet are we almoft fure of their good-will and good-wifhes, fo long as we persevere in the paths of virtue, and employ ourselves in the execu

tion

tion of generous plans and purposes. What other paffion is there where we shall find fo many advantages united; an agreeable fentiment, a pleafing consciousnefs, a good reputation? But of thefe truths, we may obferve, men are, of themselves, pretty much convinced; nor are they deficient in their duty to fociety, because they would not wish to be generous, friendly, and humane; but because they do not feel themfelves fuch.

TREATING Vice with the greatest candor, and making it all poffible conceffions, we must acknowlege, that there is not, in any inftance, the smallest pretext for giving it the preference above virtue, with a view to felf-intereft; except, perhaps, in the cafe of juftice, where a man, taking things in a certain light, may often feem to be a lofer by his integrity. And tho' it is allowed, that, without a regard to property, no fociety could fubfift; yet according to the imperfect way, in which human affairs are conducted, a fenfible knave, in particular incidents, may think, that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a confiderable addition to his fortune, without caufing any confiderable breach in the focial union and confederacy. That bonefty is the best policy, may be a good general rule; but is liable to many exceptions: And he, it may, perhaps, be judged, conducts himself with moft wifdom, who obferves the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions.

I MUST confefs, that if a man thinks, that this reafoning much requires an anfwer, it will be a little difficult to find any, which will to him appear fatisfactory and convincing. If his heart rebels not against fuch pernicious maxims, if he feels no reluctance to the thoughts of villany or bafenefs, he has indeed loft a confiderable motive to virtue; and we may expect, that his practice will be answerable to his fpeculation. But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too ftrong to be counterballanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, confcioufnefs of integrity, a fatisfactory review of our own conduct; thefe are circumftances very requifite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by every honeft man, who feels the importance of them.

SUCH a one has, befides, the frequent fatisfaction of feeing knaves, with all their pretended cunning and ability, betrayed by their own maxims; and while they purpose to cheat with moderation and fecrecy, a tempting incident occurs, nature is frail, and they give into the fnare; whence they can never extricate themfelves, without a total lofs of reputation, and the forfeiture of all future truft and confidence with mankind.

BUT were they ever fo fecret and fuccefsful, the honeft man, if he has any tincture of philofophy, or even common obfervation and reflection, will discover, that they themselves are, in the end, the greateft dupes, and have facrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character, with themselves at leaft, for the acquifition of worthlefs toys and gewgaws. How little is requifite to fupply the neceffities of nature? And in a view to pleasure, what comparison between the unbought fatisfactions of converfation, fociety, study, even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful reflection on one's own conduct: What comparison, I fay, between these, and the feverish, empty amufements of luxury and expence? Thefe natural pleafures, indeed, are really without price; both because they are below all price in their attainment, and above it in their enjoy

ment.

APPEN

3

IF

APPENDIX I

CONCERNING MORAL SENTIMENT.

F the foregoing hypothefis be received, it will now be eafy for us to determine the question firft started, concerning the general principles of morals; and tho' we postponed the decifion of that question, left it fhould then involve us in intricate fpeculations, which are unfit for moral difcourfes, we may resume it at prefent, and examine how far either reafon or fentiment enters into all determinations of praise or cenfure.

THE chief foundation of moral praise being fuppofed to lie in the usefulness of any quality or action; 'tis evident, that reafon mult enter for a confiderable share in all determinations of this kind; fince nothing but that faculty can instruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions, and point out their beneficial confequences to fociety and to their poffeffors. In many cafes, this is an affair liable to great controverfy: Doubts may arife; oppofite interests occur; and a preference must be given to one fide, from very nice views, and a small overballance of utility. This is particularly remarkable in questions with regard to justice; as is, indeed, natural to fuppofe from that fpecies of utility, which attends this virtue *. Were every fingle inftance of juftice, like that of benevolence, ufeful to fociety; this would be a more fimple ftate of the cafe, and seldom liable to great controverfy. But as fingle inftances of juftice are often pernicious in their first and immediate tendency, and as the advantage to fociety refults only from the obferv. ance of the general rule, and from the concurrence and combination of feveral perfons in the fame equitable conduct; the cafe here becomes more intricate and involved. The various circumstances of fociety; the various confequences of any practice; the various interefts, which may be proposed: These on many occafions are doubtful, and fubject to great difcuffion and enquiry. The object of municipal laws is to fix all queftions with regard to juftice: The debates of civilians; the reflections of politicians; the precedents of hiftories and public records, are all directed to the fame purpofe. And a very accurate reafon or judgment is often requifite, to give the true determination, amidst such intricate doubts arising from obfcure or oppofite utilities.

BUT tho' reafon, when fully affifted and improved, be fufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendencies of qualities and actions; it is not alone fufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we fhould feel the fame indifference towards the means. 'Tis requifite a fentiment should here display itfelf, in order to give a preference to the ufeful above the pernicious tendencies. This fentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and