E S S A Y XI.

OF THE PARTIES OF GREAT BRITAIN.

WE

ERE the BRITISH government propofed as a fubject of speculation to a ftudious man, he would immediately perceive in it a fource of divifion and party, which it would be almost impoffible for it, under any administration, to avoid. The juft balance between the republican and monarchical part of our conftitution is really, in itself, fo extremely delicate and uncertain, that when joined to mens paffions and prejudices, 'tis impoffible but different opinions must arise concerning it, even among perfons of the best understanding. Thofe of mild tempers, who love peace and order, and deteft fedition and civil wars, will always entertain more favourable fentiments of monarchy, than men of bold and generous fpirits, who are paffionate lovers of liberty, and think no evil comparable to fubjection and flavery. And tho' all reasonable men agree in general to preferve our mixed government; yet when they come to particulars, fome will incline to truft larger powers to the crown, to bestow on it more influence, and to guard against its encroachments with lefs caution, than others who are terrified at the moft diftant approaches of tyranny and defpotic power. Thus are there parties of PRINCIPLE involved in the very nature of our conftitution, which may properly enough be denominated thofe of † COURT and COUNTRY. The strength and violence of each of these parties will much depend upon the particular administration. An adminiftration may be fo bad, as to throw a great majority into the oppofition; as a good administration will reconcile to the court many of the most paffionate lovers of liberty. But, however the nation may fluctuate betwixt them, the parties themselves will always fubfift, so long as we are governed by a limited monarchy.

BUT, befides this difference of Principle, thofe parties are very much fomented by a difference of INTEREST, without which they could fcarce ever be dangerous or violent. The crown will naturally beftow all its truft and power upon those, whofe principles, real or pretended, are moft favorable to monarchical government; and this temptation will naturally engage them to go greater lengths than their principles would otherwise carry them. Their antagonists, who are difappointed in their ambitious aims, throw themselves into the party whose principles incline them to be moft jealous of royal power, and naturally carry those principles to a greater length than found politics will juftify. Thus, the Court and Country-parties, which are the genuine offspring of the BRITISH government, are a kind of mixt parties, and are influenced both by principle and by

+ Thefe words have become of general ufe, and therefore I fhall employ them, without intend ing to express by them an univerfal blame of the one party, or approbation of the other. The court-party may, no doubt, on fome occafions confult beft the interest of the country, and the country-party oppose it. In like manner, the ROMAN parties were denominated Optimates and Populares; and CICERO, like a true party-man, defines the

Optimates to be fuch as, in all their public conduct, regulated themselves by the fentiments of the best and worthieft of the ROMANS: Pro Sextio, cap. 45. The term of Country-party may afford a favorable definition or etymology of the fame kind: But it would be folly to draw any argument from that head, and I have no regard to it in employing these terms.

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interest.

interest. The heads of the factions are commonly moft governed by the latter motive; the inferior members of them by the former. I must be understood to mean this of perfons who have motives for taking party on any fide. For, to tell the truth, the greatest part are commonly men who affociate themfelves they know not why; from example, from paffion, from idleness. But ftill it is requifite, that there be fome fource of divifion, either in principle or interest; otherwife fuch perfons would not find parties, to which they could affociate themfelves.

As to ecclefiaftical parties; we may obferve, that, in all ages of the world, priests have been enemies to liberty, and 'tis certain, that this fteady conduct of theirs must have been founded on fixt reafons of interest and ambition. Liberty of thinking, and of expreffing our thoughts, is always fatal to prieftly power, and to thofe pious frauds, on which it is commonly founded; and, by an infal lible connexion, which prevails among every fpecies of liberty, this privilege can never be enjoyed, at leaft, has never yet been enjoyed, but in a free government. Hence it must happen, in fuch a government as that of BRITAIN, that the eftablifhed clergy, while things are in their natural fituation, will always be of the Court-part; as, on the contrary, diffenters of all kinds will be of the Countryparty; fince they can never hope for that toleration, which they ftand in need of, but by means of our free government. All princes, who have aimed at defpotic power, have known of what importance it was to gain the established clergy: As the clergy, on their fide, have fhewn a great facility of entering into the views of fuch princes t. GUSTAVUS VAZA was, perhaps, the only ambitious monarch, that ever depreffed the church, at the fame time, that he difcouraged liberty. But the exorbitant power of the bifhops in SWEDEN, who, at that time, overtopped. the crown, together with their attachment to a foreign family, was the reafon of his embracing fuch an unusual system of politics.

THIS obfervation concerning the propenfity of priests to defpotic power, and to the government of a fingle perfon, is not true with regard to one fect only. The Prefbyterian and Calvinistic clergy in HoLLAND were always profeffed friends to the family of ORANGE; as the Arminians, who were esteemed heretics, were always of the LOUVESTEIN faction, and zealous for liberty. But if a prince has the choice of both, 'tis easy to fee, that he will prefer the epifcopal to the prefbyterian form of government, both because of the greater affinity between monarchy and epifcopacy, and because of the facility which a prince finds, in fuch a government, of ruling the clergy, by means of their ecclefiaftical fupe riors t

If we confider the firft rife of parties in ENGLAND, during the civil wars, we fhall find, that it was exactly conformable to this general theory, and that the

*This propofition is true, notwithstanding, that in the early times of the ENGLISH government, the clergy were the great and principal oppofers of the crown: But, at that time, their poffeffions were o immenfely great, that they compofed a confi derable part of the proprietors of ENGLAND, and in many contests were direct rivals of the crown.

+ Judæi fibi ipfi reges impofuere ; qui mobilitate vulgi expulfi, refumpta per arma dominatione;

fugas civium, urbium everfiones, fratrum, conjugum, parentum neces, aliaque folita regibus aufi, fuperftitionem fovebant; quia honor facerdotii firmamentum potentiæ affumebatur. TACIT. bft. lib. 5.

Populi imperium juxta libertatem: paucorum dominatio regia libidini propior eft. TACIT. Ann. lib. 6.

fpecies

fpecies of government gave birth to these parties, by a regular and infallible operation. The ENGLISH Conftitution, before that time, had lain in a kind of confufion; yet fo, as that the fubjects poffeffed many noble privileges, which, tho' not, perhaps, exactly bounded and fecured by law, were univerfally deemed, from long poffeffion, to belong to them as their birth-right. An ambitious, or rather an ignorant, prince arofe, who efteemed all these privileges to be conceffions of his predeceffors, revocable at pleasure; and, in profecution of this principle, he openly acted in violation of liberty, during the courfe of feveral years. Neceffity, at laft, conftrained him to call a parliament: the fpirit of liberty arose and fpred itself: The prince, being without any fupport, was obliged to grant every thing required of him: And his enemies, jealous and implacable, fet no bounds to their pretenfions. Here then began thofe contefts, in which it was no wonder, that men of that age were divided into different parties; fince, even at this day, the impartial are at a lofs to decide concerning the juftice of the quarrel. The pretenfions of the parliament, if yielded to, broke the balance of our conftitution, by rendering the government almoft intirely republican. If not yielded to, we were, perhaps, ftill in danger of defpotic power, from the fettled principles and inveterate habits of the king, which had plainly appeared in every conceffion that he had been conftrained to make to his people. In this queftion, so delicate and uncertain, men naturally fell to the fide which was moft conformable to their ufual principles; and thofe, who were the moft paffionate favorers of monarchy, declared for the king, as the zealous friends of liberty fided with the parliament. The hopes of fuccefs being nearly equal on both fides, interest had no general influence in this conteft: So that ROUND-HEAD and CAVALIER were merely parties of principle; neither of which difowned either monarchy or liberty; but the former party inclined moft to the republican part of our government, and the latter to the monarchical. In this refpect they may be confidered as court and country-party enflamed into a civil war, by an unhappy concurrence of circumftances, and by the turbulent fpirit of the age. The commonwealth's men, and the partizans of defpotic power, lay concealed in both parties, and formed but an inconfiderable part of them.

THE clergy had concurred with the king's arbitrary defigns, according to their ufual maxims in fuch cafes: And, in return, were allowed to perfecute their adversaries, whom they called heretics and fchifmatics. The established clergy were epifcopal; the non-conformists prefbyterian: So that all things concurred to throw the former, without referve, into the king's party; and the latter into that of the parliament. The Cavaliers being the court-party, and the Roundbeads the country-party, the union was infallible between the former and the established prelacy, and between the latter and prefbyterian non-conformifts. This union is fo natural, according to the general principles of politics, that it requires fome very extraordinary fituation of affairs to break it.

EVERY one knows the event of this quarrel; fatal to the king firft, and to the parliament afterwards. After many confufions and revolutions, the royal family was at last restored, and the government established on the fame footing as before. CHARLES II. was not made wifer by the example of his father; but profecuted the fame measures, tho' at firft, with more fecrecy and caution. New parties arose, under the appellations of Whig and Tory, which have continued ever fince to G 2 confound

confound and diftract our government. What the nature is of these parties, is, perhaps, one of the most difficult queftions, which can be met with, and is a proof, that history may contain problems, as uncertain as any, which are to be found in the most abstract sciences. We have feen the conduct of these two parties, during the course of seventy years, in a vast variety of circumstances, poffeffed of power, and deprived of it, during peace and during war: Perfons, who profefs themselves of one fide or other, we meet every hour, in company, in our pleasures, in our ferious occupations: We ourselves are constrained, in a manner, to take party; and living in a country of the highest liberty, every one may openly declare all his fentiments and opinions: And yet we are at a lofs to tell the nature, pretenfions, and principles of the two parties. The question is, perhaps, in itself, fomewhat difficult; but has been rendered more fo, by the prejudice and violence of party.

When we compare the parties of WHIG and TORY, to thofe of ROUND-HEAD and CAVALIER, the moft obvious difference, which appears betwixt them, confifts in the principles of paffive obedience, and indefeasible right, which were but little heard of among the CAVALIERS, but became the univerfal doctrine, and were efteemed the true characteristic of a TORY. Were these principles pushed into their most obvious confequences, they imply a formal renunciation of all our liberties, and an avowal of abfolute monarchy; fince nothing can be a greater abfurdity than a limited power, which must not be refifted, even when it exceeds its limitations. But as the most rational principles are often but a weak counterpoife to paffion; 'tis no wonder, that these abfurd principles, fufficient, according to a celebrated author, to fhock the common fenfe of a HOTTENTOT or SAMOIEDE, were found too weak for that effect. The TORIES, as men, were enemies to oppreffion; and alfo, as ENGLISHMEN, they were enemies to defpotic power. Their zeal for liberty, was, perhaps, lefs fervent than that of their antagonists; but was fufficient to make them forget all their general principles, when they faw themselves openly threatened with a fubverfion of the antient government. From thefe fentiments arofe the revolution; an event of mighty confequence, and the firmeft foundation of BRITISH liberty. The conduct of the TORIES, during that event, and after it, will affords us a true infight into the nature of that party.

*

IN the first place, They appear to have had the fentiments of true BRITONS in their affection to liberty, and in their determined refolution not to facrifice it to any abstract principles whatsoever, or to any imaginary rights of princes. This part of their character might juftly have been doubted of before the revolution, from the obvious tendency of their avowed principles, and from their great compliances with a court, which made little fecret of its arbitrary defigns. The revolution fhewed them to have been, in this refpect, nothing but a genuine court-party, fuch as might be expected in a BRITISH government: That is, Lovers of liberty, but greater lovers of monarchy. It must, however, be confeffed, that they carried their monarchical principles further, even in practice, but more fo in theory, than was, in any degree, confiftent with a limited government.

Secondly, NEITHER their principles nor affections concurred, entirely or heartily, with the fettlement made at the revolution, or with that which has fince taken • Differtation on parties, Letter zd.

place. This part of their character may feem contradictory to the former; fince any other fettlement, in thofe circumftances of the nation, must probably have been dangerous, if not fatal to liberty. But the heart of man is made to reconcile contradictions; and this contradiction is not greater than that betwixt paffive obedience, and the refiftance employed at the revolution. A TORY, therefore, fince the revolution, may be defined in a few words, to be a lover of monarchy, tho' without abandoning liberty; and a partizan of the family of STUART. As a WHIG May be defined to be a lover of liberty, tho' without renouncing monarchy; and a friend to the fettlement in the PROTESTANT line*.

THESE different views, with regard to the fettlement of the crown, were accidental, but natural additions to the principles of the court and country parties, which are the genuine parties of the BRITISH government. A paffionate lover of monarchy is apt to be difpleafed at any change of the fucceffion; as favoring too much of a commonwealth: A paffionate lover of liberty, is apt to think that every part of the government ought to be fubordinate to the interefts of liberty. 'Tis however remarkable, that tho' the principles of WHIG and TORY were both of them of a compound nature; yet the ingredients, which predominated in both, were not correfpondent to each other. A TORY loved monarchy, and bore an affection to the family of STUART; but the latter affection was the predominant inclination of the party. A WHIG loved liberty, and was a friend to the fettlement in the PROTESTANT line; but the love of liberty was profeffedly his predominant inclination. The TORIES have frequently acted as republicans, where either policy or revenge has engaged them to that conduct; and there was no one of

* The author above cited has afferted, that the REAL diftinction betwixt WHIG and TORY was loft at the revolution, and that ever fince they have continued to be mere perfonal parties, like the GUELFS and GIBBELINES, after the emperors had loft all authority in ITALY. Such an opinion, were it received, would turn our whole history into an ænigma.

I shall first mention, as a proof of a real diftinction betwixt these parties, what every one may have obferved or heard concerning the conduct and converfation of all his friends and acquaintance on both fides. Have not the TORIES always bore an avowed affection to the family of STUART, and have not their adverfaries always oppofed with vigor the fucceffion of that family?

The TORY principles are confeffedly the most favorable to monarchy. Yet the tories have almoft always oppofed the court thefe fifty years; nor where they cordial friends to king WILLIAM, even when employed by him. Their quarrel, therefore, cannot be fuppofed to have lain with the throne, but with the perfon who fat on it.

They concurred heartily with the court during the four last years of queen ANNE. But is any one at a lofs to find the reafon ?

The fucceffion of the crown in the BRITISH go. vernment is a point of too great confequence to be

abfolutely indifferent to perfons, who concern themfelves, in any degree, about the fortune of the public; much less can it be fupposed, that the TORY party, who never valued themselves upon moderation, could maintain a ftoical indifference in a point of fuch importance. Were they, therefore, zealous for the house of HANOVER? Ör was there any thing, that kept an opposite zeal from openly appearing, if it did not openly appear, but prudence, and a fenfe of decency?

'Tis monstrous to fee an established epifcopal clergy in declared oppofition to the court, and a non-conformist prefbyterian clergy in conjunction with it. What could have produced fuch an unnatural conduct in both? Nothing, but that the former efpoufed monarchical principles too high for the prefent fettlement, which is founded on principles of liberty: And the latter, being afraid of the prevalence of thofe high principles, adhered to that party, from whom they had reason to expect liberty and toleration.

The different conduct of the two parties, with regard to foreign politics, is alfo a proof to the fame purpofe. HOLLAND has always been moft favoured by one, and FRANCE by the other. In fhort, the proofs of this kind feem fo palpable and evident, that 'tis almost needless to collect them.

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