2. SINCE paffions, however independent, are naturally transfufed into each other, if they are both present at the fame time; it follows, that when good or evil is placed in fuch a fituation as to cause any particular emotion, befiles its direct paffion of defire or averfion, that latter paffion must acquire new force and violence.

3. THIS often happens, when any object excites contrary paffions. For it is obfervable, that an oppofition of paffions commonly caufes a new emotion in the fpirits, and produces more diforder than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force. This new emotion is eafily converted into the predominant paffion, and in many inftances, is obferved to encrease its violence, beyond the pitch, at which it would have arrived, had it met with no oppofition. Hence we naturally defire what is forbid, and often take a pleasure in performing actions, merely because they are unlawful. The notion of duty, when oppofite to the paffions, is not always able to overcome them; and when it fails of that influence, is apt rather to increase and irritate them, by producing an oppofition in our motives and principles.

4. THE fame effect follows, whether the oppofition arifes from internal motives or external obstacles. The paffion commonly acquires new force in both cafes. The efforts, which the mind makes to furmount the obstacle, excite the spirits, and enliven the paffion.

5. UNCERTAINTY has the fame effect as oppofition. The agitation of the thought, the quick turns which it makes from one view to another, the variety of paffions, which fucceed each other, according to the different views: All thefe produce an agitation in the mind; and this agitation transfufes itself into the predominant paffion.

SECURITY, On the contrary, diminishes the paffions. The mind, when left to itself, immediately languishes; and in order to preserve its ardor, must be every moment fupported by a new flow of paffion. For the fame reafon, despair, tho contrary to fecurity, has a like influence.

6. NOTHING more powerfully excites any affection than to conceal fome part of its object, by throwing it into a kind of fhade, which, at the fame time, that it fhows enough to prepoffefs us in favor of the object, leaves ftill fome work for the imagination. Befides, that obfcurity is always attended with a kind of uncertainty; the effort, which the fancy makes to compleat the idea, rouzes the spirits, and gives an additional force to the paffion.

7. As defpair and fecurity, tho' contrary, produce the fame effects; fo abfence is obferved to have contrary effects, and in different circumstances, either encreases or diminishes our affection. ROCHEFOUCAULT has very well remarked, that abfence deftroys weak paffions, but encreases strong; as the wind extinguishes a candle, but blows up a fire. Long abfence naturally weakens our idea, and diminishes the paffion: But where the paffion is so strong and lively as to fupport itfelf, the uneafinefs, arifing from abfence, encreases the paflion, and gives it new force and influence.

8. WHEN the foul applies itself to the performance of any action, or the conception of any object, to which it is not accuftomed, there is a certain unpliablenefs in the faculties, and a difficulty of the fpirits moving in their new direction. As this difficulty excites the fpirits, it is the fource of wonder, furprize, and of Eee

all

all the emotions, which arife from novelty; and is in itself, very agreeable, like every thing, which inlivens the mind to a moderate degree. But tho' surprise be agreeable in itself, yet as it puts the fpirits in agitation, it not only augments our agreeable affections, but alfo our painful, according to the foregoing principle. Hence every thing, that is new, is most affecting, and gives us either more pleasure or pain, than what, ftrictly speaking, fhould naturally follow from it. When it often returns upon us, the novelty wears off; the paffions fubfide; the hurry of the spirits is over; and we furvey the object with greater tranquillity.

9. THE imagination and affections have a clofe union together. The vivacity of the former, gives force to the latter. Hence the prospect of any pleasure, with which we are acquainted, affects us more than any other pleasure, which we may own fuperior, but of whofe nature we are wholly ignorant. Of the one we can form a particular and determinate idea: The other, we conceive under the general notion of pleasure.

ANY fatisfaction, which we lately enjoyed, and of which the memory is fresh and recent, operates on the will with more violence, than another of which the traces are decayed and almoft obliterated.

A PLEASURE, which is fuitable to the way of life, in which we are engaged, excites more our defires and appetites than another, which is foreign to it.

NOTHING is more capable of infufing any paffion into the mind, than eloquence, by which objects are reprefented in the ftrongest and most lively colors. The bare opinion of another, efpecially when inforced with paffion, will cause an idea to have an influence upon us, tho' that idea might otherwise have been entirely neglected.

Ir is remarkable, that lively paffions commonly attend a lively imagination. In this refpect, as well as others, the force of the paffion depends as much on the temper of the perfon, as on the nature and fituation of the object.

WHAT is diftant, either in place or time, has not equal influence with what is near and contiguous.

I PRETEND not here to have exhausted this fubject. It is fufficient for my purpose, if I have made it appear, that, in the production and conduct of the paffions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is fufceptible of as accurate a difquifition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of natural philofophy.

AN

ΑΝ

ENQUIRY

CONCERNING

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.

SECTION I.

OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.

ISPUTES with perfons, pertinaciously obftinate in their principles, are, of all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, thofe with perfons, entirely difingenuous, who really do not believe the opinion they defend, but engage in the controversy, from affectation, from a spirit of oppofition, or from a defire of fhowing wit and ingenuity, fuperior to the rest of mankind. The fame blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both; the fame contempt of their antagonists; and the fame paffionate vehemence, in inforcing fophiftry and falfhood. And as reafoning is not the fource, whence either difputant derives his tenets; 'tis in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace founder principles.

THOSE Who have denied the reality of moral diftinctions, may be ranked among the difingenuous difputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of every one. The difference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is fo wide, and this difference is ftill fo much farther widened, by education, example, and habit, that where the oppofite extremes come at once under our apprehenfion, there is no fcepticism fo fcrupulous, and scarce any affurance fo determined, as abfolutely to deny all diftinction between them. Let a man's infenfibility be ever fo great, he must often be touched with the images of RIGHT and WRONG; and let his prejudices be ever so obftina e, he must observe, that others are fufceptible of like impreffions. The only way, therefore, of converting an antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding that no-body keeps up the controverfy with him, 'tis probable he will, at last, of himself, form mere wearinefs, come over to the fide of common fenfe and reafon.

THERE has been a controversy started of late, much better worth examination, concerning the general foundation of MORALS; whether they are derived from REASON or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain the knowlege of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal fenfe; whether, like all found judgment of truth and falfhood, they should be the fame to every rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, they are founded entirely on the particular fabric and conf itution of the human fpecies.

THE antient philofophers, tho' they often affirm, that virtue is nothing but conformity to reafon, yet, in general, feem to confider morals as deriving thei