SECTION

VIII.

OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

PART I.

I T might reasonably be expected, in queftions, which have been canvaffed and difputed with great eagerness fince the firft origin of fcience and philofophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, should have been agreed upon among the difputants; and our enquiries, in the courfe of two thousand years, been able to. pafs from words to the true and real fubject of the controverfy. For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reafoning, and make thefe definitions, not the mere found of words, the object of future fcrutiny and examination? But if we confider the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a quite oppofite conclufion. From that circumstance alone, that a controverfy has been long kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may prefume, that there is some ambiguity in the expreffion, and that the difputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy. For as the faculties of the foul are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reafon or difpute together; it were impoffible, if men affix the fame ideas to their terms, that they could fo long form different opinions of the fame fubject; especially when they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all fides, in fearch of arguments, which may give them the victory over their antagonists. 'Tis true; if men attempt the difcuffion of queftions, which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, fuch as those Concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual fyftem or region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclufion. But if the queftion regard any fubject of common life and experience; nothing, one would think, could preferve the difpute fo long undecided, but fome ambiguous expreffions, which keep the antagonifts ftill at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other.

THIS has been the cafe in the long difputed queftion concerning liberty and neceffity; and to fo remarkable a degree, that, if I be not much mistaken, we fhall find all mankind, both learned and ignorant, to have been always of the fame opinion with regard to that subject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controverfy. I own, that this difpute has been fo much canvaffed on all hands, and has led philofophers into fuch a labyrinth of obfcure fophiftry, that 'tis no wonder, if a fenfible and polite reader indulge his eafe fo far as to turn a deaf ear to the propofal of fuch a question, from which he can expect neither inftruction nor entertainment. But the state of the argument here propofed may, perhaps, ferve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty, promifes at least fome decifion of the controversy, and will not much disturb his eafe, by any intricate or obfcure reasoning.

I HOPE, therefore, to make it appear, that all men have ever agreed in the doctrines both of neceffity and of liberty, according to any reasonable sense, which can be put on thefe terms; and that the whole controverfy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We fhall begin with examining the doctrine of neceffity.

'Tis univerfally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a neceffary force, and that every natural effect is fo precifely determined by the energy of its caufe, that no other effect, in fuch particular circumftances, could poffibly have refulted from the operation of that caufe. The degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature, prescribed with fuch exactness, that a living creature may as soon arife from the fhock of two bodies, as motion in any other degree or direction, than what is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a just and precise idea of neceffity, we must confider, whence that idea arifes, when we apply it to the operation of bodies.

IT seems evident, that, if all the fcenes of nature were fhifted continually in fuch a manner, that no two events bore any resemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any fimilitude to whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that cafe, have attained the leaft idea of neceffity, or of a connexion among these objects. We might say, upon such a fuppofition, that one object or event has followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The relation of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and fenfes remain the only canals, by which the knowlege of any real exiftence could poffibly have access to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of neceffity and caufation arifes entirely from that uniformity, obfervable in the operations of nature; where fimilar objects are conftantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by cuftom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. These two circumftances form the whole of that neceffity, which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant conjunction of fimilar objects, and the consequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any neceffity, or connexion.

If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed, without any doubt or hesitation, that these two circumftances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of the mind; it must follow, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of neceffity, and that they have hitherto difputed, merely for not understanding each other.

As to the first circumftance, the conftant and regular conjunction of fimilar events; we may poffibly fatisfy ourselves by the following confiderations. It is univerfally acknowleged, that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains ftill the fame, in its principles and operations. The fame motives produce always the fame actions : The fame events follow from the fame causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generofity, public fpirit; these paffions, mixed in various degrees, and diftributed thro' fociety, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the fources of all the actions and enterprizes, which have ever been obferved among mankind. Would you know the fentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the GREEKS and ROMANS? Study well the temper and actions of U u the

the FRENCH and ENGLISH. You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former m ft of the obfervations, which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are fo much the fame, in all times and places, that hiftory informs us of nothing new or ftrange in this particular. Its chief ufe is only to difcover the conftant and univerfal principles of human nature, by fhewing men in all varieties of circumftances and fituations, and furnifhing us with materials, from which we may form our obfervations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behavior. Thefe records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are fo many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philofopher fixes the principles of his fcience; in the fame manner as the phyfician or natural philofopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments, which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, water, and other elements, examined by ARISTOTLE, and HIPPOCRATES, more like to thofe, which at prefent lie under our observation, than the men, described by POLYBIUS and TACITUS, are to those who now govern the world.

SHOULD a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of men, entirely different from any, with whom we were ever acquainted; men, who were entirely divefted of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but friendship, generofity, and public fpirit; we fhould immediately, from these circumstances, detect the falfhood, and prove him a liar, with the fame certainty as if he had ftuffed his narration with ftories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies. And if we would explode any forgery in hiftory, we cannot make ufe of a more convincing argument, than to prove, that the actions, afcribed to any perfon, are directly contrary to the courfe of nature, and that no human motives, in fuch circumstances, could ever induce him to fuch a conduct. The veracity of QUINTUS CURTIUS is as fufpicious, when he defcribes the fupernatural courage of ALEXANDER, by which he was hurried on fingly to attack multitudes, as when he defcribes his fupernatural force and activity, by which he was able to refift them. So readily and univerfally do we acknowlege a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body.

HENCE likewife the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and a variety of business and company, in order to inftruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as fpeculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowlege of mens inclinations and motives, from their actions, expreffions, and even geftures; and again, defcend to the interpretation of their actions from the knowlege of their motives and inclinations. The general obfervations, treasured up by a course of experience, give us the clue of human nature, and teaches us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us. Public declarations pafs for the fpecious coloring of a caufe. And tho' virtue and honor be allowed their proper weight and authority, that perfect difinterestedness, so often pretended, is never expected in multitudes and parties; feldom in their leaders; and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or ftation. But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomolous, it were impoffible to collect any general obfervations concerning mankind; and no experience, however accurately digested by reflection, would ever serve to any purpose. Why

is the antient husbandman more fkilful in his calling than the young beginner, but because there is a certain uniformity in the operation of the fun, rain, and earth, towards the production of vegetables; and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules, by which this operation is governed and directed?

WE must not, however, expect, that this uniformity of human actions should be carried to such a length, as that all men in the fame circumstances, should always act precifely in the fame manner, without any allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices, and opinions. Such a uniformity, in every particular is found in no part of nature. On the contrary, from obferving the variety of conduct in different men, we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims, which ftill fuppofe a degree of uniformity and regularity.

ARE the manners of men different in different ages and countries? We learn thence the great force of cuftom and education, which mould the human mind from its infancy, and form it into a fixed and established character. Is the beha vior and conduct of the one fex very unlike that of the other? 'Tis from thence we' become acquainted with the different characters, which nature has impreffed upon the fexes, and which she preferves with conftancy and regularity. Are the actions of the fame perfon much diverfified in the different periods of his life, from infancy to old age? This affords room for many general obfervations concerning the gradual change of our fentiments and inclinations, and the different maxims, which prevail in the different ages of human creatures. Even the characters which are peculiar to each individual, have a uniformity in their influence, otherwife our acquaintance with the perfons, and our obfervation of their conduct could never teach us their difpofitions, nor ferve to direct our behavior with regard to them.

I GRANT it poffible to find some actions, which feem to have no regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all the measures of conduct, which have ever been established for the government of men. But if we would willingly know, what judgment fhould be formed of fuch irregular and extraordinary actions; we may confider the fentiments that are commonly entertained with regard to thofe irregular events, which appear in the course of nature, and the operations of external objects. All caufes are not conjoined to their usual effects, with like uniformity. An artificer, who handles only dead matter, may be disappointed of his aim as well as the politician, who directs the conduct of fenfible and intelligent agents.

THE vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to fuch an uncertainty in the causes as makes the latter often fail of their ufual influence; tho' they meet with no impediment in their operation. But philofophers, obferving, that almost in every part of nature there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find, that 'tis at least poffible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the caufe, but from the fecret operation of contrary caufes. This poffibility is converted into certainty by farther obfervation, when they remark, that, upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of caufes, and proceeds from their mutual oppofition. A peafant can give no better reason for the ftopping of any clock or watch than to say that it commonly does not go right: But an artizan eafily perU u 2

ceives,

ceives, that the fame force in the fpring or pendulum has always the fame influence on the wheels; but fails of its ufual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of duft, which puts a ftop to the whole movement. From the obfervation of feveral parallel inftances, philofophers form a maxim, that the connexion between all caufes and effects is equally neceffary, and that its feeming uncertainty in fome inftances proceeds from the fecret oppofition of contrary causes.

THUS for inftance, in the human body, when the ufual fymptoms of health or fickness disappoint our expectation; when medicines operate not with their wonted powers; when irregular events follow from any particular caufes; the philofopher and phyfician are not furprized at the matter, nor are ever tempted to deny, in general, the neceffity and uniformity of thofe principles, by which the animal economy is conducted. They know, that a human body is a mighty complicated machine : That many fecret powers lurk in it, which are altogether beyond our comprehenfion: That to us it muft often appear very uncertain in its operations: And that therefore the irregular events, which outwardly difcover themselves, can be no proof, that the laws of nature are not observed with the greatest regularity in its internal operations and government.

THE philofopher, if he be confiftent, muft apply the fame reasonings to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents. The moft irregular and unexpected refolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by thofe who know every particular circumstance of their character and fituation. A perfon of an obliging difpofition gives a peevish answer: But he has the tooth-ake, or has not dined. A ftupid fellow difcovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage: But he has met with a fudden piece of good-fortune. Or even when an action, as fometimes happens, cannot be particularly accounted for, either by the perfon himself or by others; we know, in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain degree, inconftant and irregular. This is, in a manner, the conftant character of human nature; tho' it be applicable, in a more particular manner, to fome perfons, who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconftancy. The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities; in the fame manner as the winds, rain, clouds, and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by fteady principles; tho' not easily discoverable by human fagacity and enquiry.

THUS it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform, as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature; but also that this regular conjunction has been univerfally acknowleged among mankind, and has never been the subject of difpute, either in philofophy or common life. Now as it is from paft experience, that we draw all inferences concerning the future, and as we conclude, that objects will always be conjoined together, which we find always to have been conjoined; it may feem fuperfluous to prove, that this experienced uniformity in human actions is the fource of all the inferences, which we form concerning them. But in order to throw the argument into a greater variety of lights, we shall also infift, tho' briefly, on this latter topic.

THE mutual dependance of men is fo great, in all focieties, that scarce any human action is intirely compleat in itself, or is performed without fome reference to the actions of others, which are requifite to make it anfwer fully the intention

of