of each court, and each order; and, if we find, that, by the fkilful divifion of the power, the private intereft muft neceffarily, in its operation, concur with the public, we may pronounce that government to be wife and happy. If, on the contrary, the private intereft of each order be not checked, and be not directed to public intereft, we ought to look for nothing but faction, diforder, and tyranny from fuch a government. In this opinion I am justified by experience, as well as by the authority of all philofophers and politicians both antient and

modern.

How much, therefore, would it have furprized fuch a genius as CICERO, or TACITUS, to have been told, That, in a future age, there fhould arise a very regular fyftem of mixt government, where the authority was fo diftributed, that one rank, whenever it pleased, might swallow up all the reft, and engross the whole power of the conftitution. Such a government, they would fay, will not be a mixed government. For fo great is the natural ambition of men, that they are never fatisfied with power; and if one order of men, by purfuing its own intereft, can ufurp upon every other order, it will certainly do fo, and render itself, as far as poffible, abfolute and uncontrolable.

BUT, in this opinion, experience fhews they would have been mistaken. For this is actually the cafe with the BRITISH Conftitution. The fhare of power allotted by our conftitution to the house of commons is fo great, that it abfolutely commands all the other parts of the government. The king's legiflative power is plainly no proper check to it. For tho' the king has a negative in the paffing of laws; yet this, in fact, is efteemed of fo little moment, that whatever is voted by the two houses, is always fure to be paffed into a law, and the royal affent is little better than a mere form. The principal weight of the crown lies in the executive power. But befides that the executive power, in every government, is altogether fubordinate to the legislative; befides this, I fay, the exercife of this power requires an immenfe expence, and the commons have affumed to themfelves the fole power of difpofing of public money. How eafy, therefore, would it be for that houfe to wreft from the crown all these powers, one after another, by making every grant of money conditional, and choofing their time fo well, that their refufal of fubfidies fhould only diftrefs the government; without giving foreign powers any advantage over us? Did the houfe of commons depend in the fame manner on the king, and had none of the members any property but from his gift, would not he command all their refolutions, and be from that moment abfolute? As to the house of lords, they are a very powerful fupport to the crown fo long as they are, in their turn, fupported by it; but both experience and reafon fhew us, that they have no force nor authority fufficient to maintain themfelves alone, without fuch support.

How, therefore, fhall we folve this paradox? And by what means is this member of our conftitution confined within the proper limits; fince, from our very conftitution, it must neceffarily have as much power as it demands, and can only be confined by itfelf? How is this confiftent with our experience of human nature? I anfwer, That the intereft of the body is here reftrained by the intereft of the individuals, and that the houfe of commons ftretches not its power, becaufe fuch an ufurpation would be contrary to the intereft of the majority of its members. The crown has fo many offices at its difpofal, that, when affifted by the

honeft

honeft and difinterested part of the house, it will always command the refolutions of the whole; fo far at least, as to preserve the ancient conftitution from danger. We may, therefore, give to this influence what name we pleafe; we may call it by the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence; but fome degree and fome kind of it are infeparable from the very nature of the constitution, and necefiary to the prefervation of our mixed government.

INSTEAD then of aflerting abfolutely, that the dependence of parliament, in every degree, is an infringement of BRITISH liberty, the country-party had better have made fome conceffions to their adverfaries, and have only examined what was the proper degree of this dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to liberty. But fuch a moderation is not to be expected of party-men of any kind. After a conceffion of this nature, all declamation must be abandoned; and a ferious calm enquiry into the proper degree of court-influence, and parliamentary dependence would have been expected by the readers. And tho' the advantage, in fuch a controverfy, might poffibly remain to the country-party; yet the victory would not have been fo compleat as they wish for, nor would a true patriot have given an entire loofe to his zeal, for fear of running matters into a contrary extreme, by diminishing too far the influence of the crown. It was, therefore, thought beft to deny, that this extreme could ever be dangerous to the conftitution, or that the crown could ever have too little influence over members of parliament.

ALL questions concerning the proper medium between any two extremes are very difficult to be decided, both because it is difficult to find words proper to fix this medium, and becaufe the good and ill, in fuch cafes, run fo gradually into each other, as even to render our fentiments doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar difficulty in the prefent cafe, which would embarrass the most knowing and moft impartial examiner. The power of the crown is always lodged in a fingle perfon, either king or minifter; and as this perfon may have either a greater or lefs degree of ambition, capacity, courage, popularity or fortune, the power, which is too great in one hand, may become too little in another. In pure republics, where the power is diftributed among feveral affemblies or fenates, the checks and controls are more regular in their operation; because the members of fuch numerous affemblies may be prefumed to be always nearly equal in capacity and virtue; and 'tis only their number, riches, or authority, which enter into confideration. But a limited monarchy admits not of any fuch ftability; nor is it poffible to affign to the crown fuch a determinate degree of power, as will, in every hand, form a proper counter-balance to the other parts of the conftitution. This is an unavoidable difadvantage, among the many advantages, attending that species of government.

See Differtation on Parties, throughout. + By that influence of the crown, which I would juftify, I mean only, that arifing from the offices and honours which are at the difpofal of the crown. As to private bribery, it may be confidered in the fame light as the practice of employing fpies, which is fcarce juftifiable in a good minifter, and is infamous in a bad one: But to be a spy, or to

be corrupted, is always infamous under all miniftries, and is to be regarded as a fhameless proftitution. POLYBIUS juftly esteems the pecuniary influence of the fenate and cenfors to be one of the regular and conftitutional weights, which preferved the balance of the ROMAN government. Lib. 6. cap. 15.

ESSAY

ESSAY IX.

WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INCLINES MORE TO ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, OR TO A REPUBLIC.

T affords a violent prejudice against almost every fcience, that no prudent man, however fure of his principles, dares prophefy concerning any event, or foretell the remote confequences of things. A phyfician will not venture to pronounce concerning the condition of his patient a fortnight or month after : And still lefs dares a politician foretell the fituation of public affairs a few years hence. HARRINGTON thought himfelf fo fure of his general principle, That the balance of power depends on that of property, that he ventured to pronounce it impoffible ever to re-establish monarchy in ENGLAND: But his book was scarce published when the king was reftored; and we fee that monarchy has ever fince fubfifted upon the fame footing as before. Notwithstanding this unlucky example, I will venture to examine a very important question, viz. Whether the BRITISH government inclines more to abfolute monarchy, or to a republic; and in which of thefe two fpecies of government it will most probably terminate? As there feems not to be any great danger of a fudden revolution either way, I fhall at least escape the fhame attending my temerity, if I should be found to have been mistaken.

THOSE who affert, That the balance of our government inclines towards abfolute monarchy, may support their opinion by the following reasons. That property has a great influence on power cannot poffibly be denied; but yet the general maxim, That the balance of the one depends upon the balance of the other, must be received with several limitations. 'Tis evident, that much lefs property in a fingle hand will be able to counter-balance a greater property in feveral hands; not only because it is difficult to make many perfons combine in the fame views and measures; but also because property, when united, caufes much greater dependence, than the fame property when difperfed. An hundred persons, of 1000 l. a year a-piece, can confume all their income, and no body shall ever be the better for them, except their fervants and tradefmen, who justly regard their profits as the product of their own labour. But a man poffeffed of 100,000l. a year, if he has either any generofity, or any cunning, may create a great dependence by obligations, and ftill a greater by expectations. Hence we may obferve, that in all free governments any fubject exorbitantly rich has always created a jealoufy, even tho' his riches bore no manner of proportion to the riches of the ftate. CRASSUS's fortune, if I remember well, amounted only to about fixteen hundred thoufand pounds in our money; and yet we find, that, tho' his genius was nothing extraordinary, he was able, by means of his riches alone, to counter-balance, during his life-time, the power of POMPEY as well as that of CÆSAR, who afterwards became mafter of the world. The wealth of the MEDICIS made them mafters of FLORENCE; tho', 'tis probable, it was very inconfiderable, compared to the unit ed property of that opulent republic.

* As intereft in ROME was higher than with us, this might yield above 100,cool. a year.

F

THESE

THESE Confiderations are apt to make one entertain a very magnificent idea of the BRITISH fpirit and love of liberty; fince we could maintain our free government, during fo many centuries, against our fovereigns, who, befides the power and dignity and majefty of the crown, have always been poffeffed of much more property than any fubject has ever enjoyed in any commonwealth. But it may be faid, that this fpirit, however great, will never be able to fupport itself against that immenfe property, which is now lodged in the king, and which is ftill increafing. Upon a moderate computation, there are near three millions at the difpofal of the crown. The civil lift amounts to near a million; the collection of all taxes to another million; and the employments in the army and navy, together with ecclefiaftical preferments, to above a third million: An enormous fum, and what may fairly be computed to be more than a thirtieth part of the whole income and labour of the kingdom. When we add to this immenfe property, the increafing luxury of the nation, our proneness to corruption, together with the great power and prerogatives of the crown, and the command of fuch numerous military forces, there is no one but muft defpair of being able, without extraordinary efforts, to fupport our free government much longer under all these difadvantages.

ments.

On the other hand, those who maintain, that the byafs of the BRITISH government leans towards a republic, may fupport their opinion by very fpecious arguIt may be faid, that tho' this immenfe property in the crown, be joined to the dignity of firft magiftrate, and to many other legal powers and prerogatives, which fhould naturally give it a greater influence; yet it really becomes lefs dangerous to liberty upon that very account. Were BRITAIN a republic, and were any private man poffeffed of a revenue, a third, or even a tenth part as large as that of the crown, he would very juftly excite jealoufy; because he would infallibly have great authority in the government: And fuch an irregular authority, not avowed by the laws, is always more dangerous than a much greater authority, which is derived from them. A man poffeffed of ufurped power, can fet no bounds to his pretenfions: His partizans have liberty to hope for every thing in his favor: His enemies provoke his ambition, with his fears, by the violence of their oppofition: And the government being thrown into a ferment, every corrupted humor in the ftate naturally gathers to him. On the contrary, a legal authority, tho' very great, has always fome bounds, which terminate both the hopes and pretenfions of the perfon poffeffed of it: the laws must have provided a remedy against its exceffes: Such an eminent magiftrate has much to fear, and little to hope from his ufurpations: And as his legal authority is quietly fubmitted to, he has fmall temptation and fmall opportunity of extending it farther. Befides, it happens, with regard to ambitious aims and projects, what may be obferved with regard to fects of philofophy and religion. A new fect excites fuch a ferment, and is both oppofed and defended with fuch vehemence, that it spreads always fafter, and multiplies its partizans with greater rapidity, than any old established opinion, recommended by the fanction of the laws and of antiquity. Such is the nature of novelty, that where any thing pleases, it becomes doubly agreeable, if new; but if it displeases, it is doubly difpleafing, upon that very * On ne monte jamais fi haut que quand on ne fçait pas ou on va, faid CROMWELL to the prefident De BELLIEVRE. 8

DE RETZ'S Memoirs.

account.

account. And, in most cases, the violence of enemies is favorable to ambitious projects, as well as the zeal of partizans.

Ir may farther be faid, that tho' men be very much governed by intereft; yet even intereft itself, and all human affairs are entirely governed by opinion. Now, there has been a very fudden and a very fenfible change in the opinions of men within thefe laft fifty years by the progrefs of learning and of liberty. Most people, in this ifland, have divefted themfelves of all fuperftitious reverence to names and authority: The clergy have much loft their credit: their pretenfions and doctrines have been ridiculed; and even religion can fcarce fupport itself in the world. The mere name of king commands little refpect; and to talk of a king as GOD's vicegerent upon earth, or to give him any of thofe magnificent titles, which formerly dazzled mankind, would but excite laughter in every one. Tho' the crown, by means of its large revenue, may maintain its authority in times of tranquillity, upon private intereft and influence; yet as the leaft fhock or convulfion muft break all thefe interefts to pieces, the kingly power, being no longer fupported by the fettled principles and opinions of men, will immediately diffolve. Had men been in the fame difpofition at the revolution, as they are at prefent, monarchy would have run a great rifque of being entirely loft in this island. DURST I venture to deliver my own fentiments amidst thefe oppofite arguments, I would affert, that unless there happen fome extraordinary convulfion, the power of the crown, by means of its large revenue, is rather upon the increafe; tho', at the fame time I own, that its progrefs feems very flow, and almost infenfible. The tide has run long, and with fome rapidity, to the fide of popular government, and is just beginning to turn towards monarchy.

'Tis well known that every government must come to a period, and that death is unavoidable to the political as well as to the animal body. But, as one kind of death may be preferable to another, it may be enquired, whether it be more defirable for the BRITISH Conftitution to terminate in a popular government, or in abfolute monarchy? Here I would declare frankly, that tho' liberty be infinitely preferable to flavery, in almost every cafe; yet I should much rather wish to fee an abfolute monarch than a republic in this ifland. For, let us confider, what kind of republic we have reafon to expect. The question is not concerning any fine imaginary republic, of which a man may form a plan in his closet. There is no doubt, but a popular government may be imagined more perfect than abfolute monarchy, or even than our prefent conftitution. But what reafon have we to expect that any fuch a government will ever be established in BRITAIN, upon the diffolution of our monarchy? If any fingle perfon acquire power enough to take our constitution to pieces, and put it up a-new, he is really an absolute monarch; and we have had already an inftance of this kind, fufficient to convince ús, that fuch a perfon will never refign his power, or establish any free government. Matters, therefore, must be trufted to their natural progrefs and operation; and the house of commons, according to its prefent conftitution, must be the only legislature in fuch a popular government. The inconveniences, attending fuch a fituation of affairs, prefent themselves by thousands. If the house of commons, in fuch a cafe, ever diffolves itfelf, which is not to be expecte, we may look for a civil war every election. If it continues itfelf, we shall fufier all the tyranny of a faction, fubdivided into new factions. And as fuch a violent govern

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