notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers and principles, we always prefume, where we fee like fenfible qualities, that they have like fecret powers, and lay our account, that effects, fimilar to thofe, which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like color and confiftence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be prefented to us, we make no fcruple of repeating the experiment, and expect, with certainty, like nourishment and fupport. Now this is a procefs of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation. 'Tis allowed on all hands, that there is no known connection between the fenfible qualities and the fecret powers; and confequently, that the mind is not led to form fuch a conclufion concerning their conftant and regular conjunction, by any thing which it knows of their nature. As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information only of thofe precife objects, and that precife period of time, which fell under its cognizance: But why this experience fhould be extended to future times, and to other objects, which, for aught we know, may be only in appearance fimilar; this is the main queftion on which I would infift. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body, of fuch fenfible qualities, was, at that time, endued with fuch fecret powers: But does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like fenfible qualities must always be attended with like fecret powers? The confequence feems no way neceffary. At least, it must be acknowleged, that thereis here a conféquence drawn by the mind; that there is a certain ftep taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. Thefe two propofitions are far from being the fame, I have found that fuch an object has always been attended with fuch an effect, and, I forefee, that other objects, which are, to appearance, fimilar, wil be attended with fimilar effects. I fhall allow, if you pleafe, that the one propofition may juftly be inferred from the other: I know in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you infift, that the inference is made by a chain of reafoning, I defire you to produce that reafoning. The connection between these propofitions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw fuch an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reafoning and argument. What that medium is, I muft confefs, paffes my comprehenfion; and 'tis incumbent on thofe to produce it, who affert, that it really exifts, and is the origin of all our conclufions concerning matter of fact.

THIS negative argument must certainly, in procefs of time, become altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able philofophers fhall turn their inquiries this way; and no one be ever able to difcover any connecting propofition or intermediate ftep, which fupports the understanding in this conclufion. But as the queftion is yet new, every reader may not truft fo far to his own penetration, as to conclude, because an argument escapes his refearch and enquiry, that therefore it does not really exift. For this reafon it may be requifite to venture upon a more difficult tafk; and enumerating all the branches of human knowlege, endeavor to fhew, that none of them can afford fuch an argument.

ALL reafonings may be divided into two kinds, viz. demonftrative reafonings, or thofe concerning relations of ideas, and moral reafonings or thofe concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no demonftrative arguments in the cafe, feems evident; fince it implies no contradiction, that the courfe of nature The word, Power, is here used in a loose and it would give additional evidence to this argupopular fenfe. The more accurate explication of ment. See Sect-7

may

may change, and that an object feemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and diftinctly conceive, that a body falling from the clouds, and which, in all other refpects, resembles fnow, has yet the tafte of falt or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible propofition than to affirm, that all the trees will florifh in DECEMBER and JANUARY, and decay in MAY and JUNE? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be diftinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved falfe by any demonstrative arguments or abstract reasonings à priori.

If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put truft in paft experience, and make it the standard of our future judgment, thefe arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence, according to the divifion above-mentioned. But that there are no arguments of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that fpecies of reafoning be admitted as folid and fatisfactory. We have faid, that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowlege of that relation is derived entirely from experience, and that all our experimental conclufions proceed upon the fuppofition, that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavor, therefore, the proof of this laft fuppofition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in queftion.

In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the fimilarity, which we difcover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects fimilar to thofe, which we have found to follow from fuch objects. And tho' none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life; it may furely be allowed a philofopher to have fo much curiofity at least, as to examine the principle of human nature which gives this mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw advantage from that fimilarity, which nature has placed among different objects. From caufes, which appear fimilar, we expect fimilar efe&is. This is the fum of all our experimental conclufions. Now it feems evident, that if this conclufion were formed by reason, it would be as perfect at firft. and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course of experience. But the cafe is far otherwise. Nothing fo like as eggs; yet no one, on account of this apparent fimilarity, expects the fame taste and relish in all of them. 'I is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and fecurity with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of reafoning, which from one instance draws a conclufion, fo different from that which it infers from a hundred inftances, that are no way different from that single inftance? This question I propofe as much for the fake of information, as with an intention of raifing difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any fuch reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to inftruction, if any one will vouchfafe to bestow it on me.

SHOULD it be faid, that from a number of uniform experiments, we infer a connection between the fenfible qualities and the fecret powers; this, I muft confefs, seems the fame difficulty, couched in different terms. The question ftill recurs, On what procefs of argument this inference is founded? Where is the medium, the interpofing ideas, which join propofitions fo very wide of each other? 'Tis confeffed, that the color, confiftence, and other fenfible qualities of bread

appear

appear not, of themselves, to have any connexion with the fecret powers of nourifhment and fupport. For otherwife we could infer these fecret powers from the firft appearance of thefe fenfible qualities, without the aid of experience; contrary to the fentiment of all philofophers, and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here then is our natural ftate of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedied by experience? It only fhews us a number of uniform effects, refulting from certain objects, and teaches us, that those particular objects, at that particular time, were endowed with fuch powers and forces. When a new object, endowed with fimilar fenfible qualities is produced, we expect fimilar powers and forces, and lay our account with a like effect. From a body of like color and confiftence with bread, we look for like nourifhment and fupport. But this furely is a ftep or progrefs of the mind, which wants to be explained. When a man fays, I have found, in all paft inftances, fuch fenfible qualities, conjoined with fuch fecret powers: And when he fays, fimilar fenfible qualities will always be conjoined with fimilar fecret powers; he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are thefe propofitions in any refpect the fame. You fay that the one propofition is an inference from another. But you must confefs, that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonftrative: Of what nature is it then? To say it is experimental is begging the queftion. For all inferences from experience fuppofe, as their foundation, that the future will refemble the past, and that fimilar powers will be conjoined with fimilar fenfible qualities. If there be any fufpicion, that the course of nature may change, and that the paft may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes ufelefs, and can give rife to no inference or conclufion. 'Tis impoffible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the paft to the future; fince all thefe arguments are founded on the fuppofition of that refemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever fo regular; that alone, without fome new argument or inference, proves not, that, for the future, it will continue fo. In vain do you pretend to have learnt the nature of bodies from your paft experience. Their fecret nature, and confequently, all their effects and influence may change, without any change in their fenfible qualities. This happens fometimes, and with regard to fome objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what procefs of argument fecures you against this fuppofition? My practice, you fay, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite fatisfied in the point; but as a philofopher, who has fome fhare of curiofity, I will not fay fcepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me fatisfaction in a matter of fuch vast importance. Can I do better than propofe the difficulty to the public, even tho', perhaps, I have fmall hopes of obtaining a folution? We fhall at least, by this means, be fenfible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowlege.

I MUST confess, that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance, who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confefs, that tho' all the learned, for feveral ages, fhould have employed their time in fruitless fearch upon any fubject, it may ftill, perhaps, be rash to conclude pofitively, that the fubject muft, therefore, pass all human comprehenfion. Even tho' we examine all the fources of our knowlege, and

Rr

conclude

conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may ftill remain a fufpicion, that the enumeration is not compleat, or the examination not accurate. But with regard to the present subject, there are some confiderations, which seem to remove all this accufation of arrogance or fufpicion of mistake.

'Tis certain, that the most ignorant and ftupid peasants, nay infants, nay even brute beafts improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by obferving the effects, which refult from them. When a child has felt the fenfation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a fimilar effect from a cause, which is fimilar in its fenfible qualities and appearance. If you affert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclufion by any procefs of argument or ratiocination, I may juftly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretext to refufe fo equitable a demand. You cannot fay, that the argument is abftrufe, and may poffibly escape your enquiry; fince you confefs, that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the queftion, and confefs, that it is not reasoning, which engages us to fuppofe the past resembling the future, and to expect fimilar effects from causes, which are, to appearance, fimilar. This is the propofition, which I intended to enforce in the prefent fection. If I be right, I pretend to have made no mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowlege myself to be indeed a very backward fcholar; fince I cannot now discover an argument, which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me, long before I was out of my cradle.

TH

HE paffion for philofophy, like that for religion, feems liable to this inconvenience, that, tho' it aims at the correction of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only ferve, by imprudent management, to fofter a predominant inclination, and push the mind, with more determined refolution, towards that fide, which already draws too much, by the byafs and propensity of the natural temper. 'Tis certain, that, while we afpire to the magnanimous firmnefs of the philofophic fage, and endeavor to confine our pleafures altogether within our own minds, we may, at laft, render our philofophy, like that of EPICTETUS, and other Stoics, only a more refined fyftem of selfishness, and reason ourfelves out of all virtue, as well as focial enjoyment. While we ftudy with attention the vanity of human life, and turn all our thoughts on the empty and tranfitory nature of riches and honors, we are, perhaps, all the while flattering our natural indolence, which, hating the bustle of the world and drudgery of bufinefs, feeks a pretext of reafon, to give itfelf a full and uncontroled indulgence. There is, however, one fpecies of philofophy, which seems little liable to this incon

venience,

venience, and that because it strikes in with no diforderly paffion of the human mind, nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or propenfity; and that is the ACADEMIC or SCEPTICAL philofophy. The academics talk always of doubts, and fufpenfe of judgment, of danger in hafty determinations, of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding, and of renouncing all fpeculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice. Nothing, therefore, can be more contrary than fuch a philofophy to the fupine indolence of the mind, its rash arrogance, its lofty pretenfions, and its fuperftitious credulity. Every paffion is mortified by it, except the love of truth; and that paffion never is, nor can be carried to too high a degree. 'Tis furprizing, therefore, that this philofophy, which, in almost every instance, must be harmless and innocent, fhould be the fubject of fo much groundless reproach and obloquy. But, perhaps, the very circumstance which renders it fo innocent, is what chiefly expofes it to the public hatred, and refentment. By flattering no irregular paffion, it gains few partizans: By oppofing fo many vices and follies, it raifes to itself abundance of enemies, who ftigmatize it as libertine, profane, and irreligious.

NOR need we fear, that this philofophy, while it endeavors to limit our enquiries to common life, fhould ever undermine the reafonings of common life, and carry its doubts fo far as to deftroy all action, as well as fpeculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abftract reasoning whatsoever. Tho' we should conclude, for inftance, as in the foregoing fection, that, in all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind, which is not fupported by any argument or procefs of the understanding; there is no danger, that these reafonings, on which almost all knowlege depends, will ever be affected by fuch a difcovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by fome other principle of equal weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the fame. What that principle is, may well be worth the pains of enquiry. SUPPOSE a perfon, tho' endowed with the strongest faculties of reafon and reflection, to be brought on a fudden into this world; he would, indeed, immediately obferve a continual fucceffion of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover any thing farther. He would not, at first, by any reasoning, be able to reach the idea of caufe and effect; fince the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the fenfes; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one inftarce, precedes another, that therefore the one is the caufe, and the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and cafual. There may be no reafon to infer the existence of the one from the appearance of the other. And in a word, such a perfon without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reafoning concerning any matter or fact, or be affured of any thing beyond what was immediately prefent to his memory and fenfes.

SUPPOSE again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived fo long in the world as to have obferved fimilar objects or events to be conftantly conjoined together; what is the confequence of this experience? He immediately infers the existence of the one object from the appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowlege of the fecret power, by which the one object produces the other; nor is it, by any procefs of reafoning,