fall within the comprehenfion of every human creature; and the finer and more philofophical distinctions are no lefs real and certain, tho' more difficult to be comprehended. Some inftances, especially late ones, of fuccefs in these enquiries, may give us a jufter notion of the certainty and folidity of this branch of learning. And fhall we esteem it worthy the labor of a philofopher to give us a true system of the planets, and adjust the pofition and order of those remote bodies; while we affect to overlook thofe, who, with fo much fuccefs, delineate the parts of the mind in which we are fo intimately concerned?

BUT may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its researches ftill farther, and difcover, at leaft in fome degree, the fecret fprings and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations? Aftronomers had long contented themfelves with proving, from the phænomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philofopher, at laft, arofe, who seems from the happiest reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason to despair of equal fuccefs in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and oeconomy, if profecuted with equal capacity and caution. 'Tis probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another; which, again, may be refolved into one more general and univerfal: And how far these researches may poffibly be carried, it will be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to determine. This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day made even by those who philofophize the most negligently; and nothing can be more requifite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorow care and attention; that, if it lie within the compafs of human understanding, it may at laft be happily atchieved, if not, it may, however, be rejected with fome confidence and security. This last conclufion, furely, is not defireable, nor ought it to be embraced too rafhly. For how much muft we diminish from the beauty and value of this fpecies of philofophy, upon fuch a fuppofition? Moralifts have hitherto been accustomed, when they confidered the vast multitude and diversity of actions that excite our approbation or dislike, to search for fome common principle, on which this variety of fentiments might depend. And tho' they have fometimes carried the matter too far, by their paffion for fome one general principle; it muft, however, be confeffed, that they are excufable, in expecting to find fome general principles, into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be refolved. The like has been the endeavor of critics, logicians, and even politicians: Nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful; tho' perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring thefe sciences ftill nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all pretenfions of this kind may juftly be deemed more rafh, precipitate, and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most affirmative philofophy, which has ever attempted to impofe its crude dictates and principles on mankind.

WHAT tho' these reafonings concerning human nature feem abftract, and of difficult comprehenfion? This affords no prefumption of their falfhood. On the contrary, it seems impoffible, that what has hitherto escaped fo many wife and profound philofophers can be very obvious and eafy. And whatever pains these refearches may coft us, we may think ourselves fufficiently rewarded, not only in

point of profit but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our ftock of knowlege, in fubjects of such unspeakable importance.

BUT as, after all, the abftractednefs of thefe fpeculations is no recommendation, but rather a difadvantage to them, and as this difficulty may perhaps be furmounted by care and art, and the avoiding all unneceffary detail, we have, in the following enquiry, attempted to throw fome light upon fubjects, from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred the wife, and obfcurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite the boundaries of the different fpecies of philofophy, by reconciling profound enquiry with clearnefs, and truth with novelty! And ftill more happy, if, reafoning in this eafy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an abftrufe philofophy, which feems to have ferved hitherto only as a fhelter to fuperftition, and a cover to abfurdity and error !

SECTION II.

OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS.

VERY one will readily allow, that there is a confiderable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of exceffive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this fenfation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the fenfes; but they never can reach entirely the force and vivacity of the original fentiment. The utmoft we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigor, is, that they represent their object in fo lively a manner, that we could almoft fay we feel or fee it: But except the mind be difordered by disease or madnefs, they never can arrive at fuch a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions altogether undiftinguishable. All the colors of poetry, however fplendid, can never paint natural objects in fuch a manner as to make the defcription be taken for a real landfkip. The most lively thought is ftill inferior to the dullest sensation.

WE may observe a like diftinction to run thro' all the other perceptions of the mind. A man, in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any perfon is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a juft conception of his fituation; but' never can mistake that conception for the real diforders and agitations of the paffion. When we reflect on our past fentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colors which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of thofe in which our original perceptions were clothed. It requires no nice difcernment nor metaphyfical head to mark the diftinction between them.

HERE therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two claffes or fpecies, which are diftinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. THE lefs forcible and lively are commonly denominated THOUGHTS OF IDEAS.. The other fpecies want a name in our language, and in most others; I suppose, because

Pp

because it was not requifite for any, but philofophical purpofes, to rank them un der a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, ufe a little freedom, and call them IMPRESSIONS; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the ufual. By the term impreffion, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or fee, or feel, or love, or hate, or defire, or will. And impreffions are diftinguished from ideas, which are the lefs lively perceptions of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those fenfations or movements above mentioned.

NOTHING, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not even reftrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monsters, and join incongruous fhapes and appearances, cofts no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an inftant tranfport us into the most diftant regions of the univerfe; or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is fuppofed to lie in total confufion, What never was feen, nor heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what implies an abfolute contradiction.

A

BUT tho' thought feems to poffefs this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the compounding, tranfpofing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the fenfes and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two confiftent ideas, gold, and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. virtuous horfe, we can conceive; becaufe, from our own feeling, we can. conceive virtue, and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In fhort, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward fentiment: The mixture and compofition of thefe belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to exprefs myself in. philofophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impreffions or more lively

ones.

To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be fufficient. First, When we analyfe our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or fublime, we always find, that they refolve themfelves into fuch fimple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or fentiment. Even thofe ideas, which, at firft view, feem the most wide of this origin, are found, upon a narrower fcrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wife, and good Being, arifes from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, thofe qualities of goodnefs and wifdom. We may profecute this. enquiry to what length we pleafe; where we fhall always find, that every idea we examine is copied from a fimilar impreffion. Those who would affert, that this position is not abfolutely univerfal and without exception, have only one, and that an eafy method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, intheir opinion, is not derived from this fource. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impreffion or lively perception, which correfponds to it.

SECONDLY.

SECONDLY. If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is not fufceptible of any fpecies of fenfation, we always find, that he is as little fufceptible of the correfpondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colors; a deaf man of founds. Reftore either of them that fenfe, in which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his fenfations, you also open an inlet for the ideas, and he finds no difficulty of conceiving thefe objects. The cafe is the fame, if the object, proper for exciting any fenfation, has never been applied to the organ. A LAPLANDER or NEGROE has no notion of the relifh of wine. And tho' there are few or no inftances of a like deficiency in the mind, where a perfon has never felt or is wholly incapable of a fentiment or paffion, that belongs to his fpecies; yet we find the fame obfervation to take place in a lefs degree. A man of mild manners can form no notion of inveterate revenge or cruelty; nor can a felfish heart easily conceive the heights of friendship and generofity. 'Tis readily allowed, that other beings may poffefs many fenfes, of which we can have no conception; because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us in the only manner by which an idea can have access to the mind, viz. by the actual feeling and fenfation.

THERE is, however, one contradictory phænomenon, which may prove, that 'tis not abfolutely impoffible for ideas to go before their correfpondent impreffions. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the feveral diftinct ideas of colors, which enter by the eyes, or thofe of founds, which are conveyed by the hearing, are really different from each other; tho', at the fame time, refembling. Now if this be true of different colors, it must be no lefs fo, of the different fhades of the fame color; and each fhade produces a diftinct idea, independent of the reft. For if this fhould be denied, 'tis poffible, by the continual gradation of fhades, to run a color infenfibly into what is molt remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot, without abfurdity, deny the extremes to be the fame. Suppofe, therefore, a perfon to have enjoyed his fight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colors of all kinds, except one particular shade of blue, for inftance, which it never has been his fortuné to meet with. Let all the different fhades of that color, except that fingle one, be placed before him, defcending gradually from the deepest to the lighteft; 'tis plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that fhade is wanting, and will be fenfible, that there is a greater diftance in that place betwixt the contiguous colors than in any other. Now I afk, whether 'tis poffible for him, from his own imagination, to fupply this deficiency, and raife up to himself the idea of that particular fhade, tho' it had never been conveyed to him by his fenfes? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can; and this may ferve as a proof, that the fimple ideas are not always, in every inftance, derived from the correfpondent impreffions; tho' this inftance is fo fingular, that 'tis fcarce worth our obferving, and does not merit, that for it alone we fhould alter our general maxim.

HERE, therefore, is a propofition, which not only feems, in itfelf, fimple and intelligible; but, if a proper ufe were made of it, might render every difpute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has fo long taken poffeffion of metaphyfical reasonings, and drawn fuch difgrace upon them. All ideas, efpecially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obfcure; the mind has but a flender hold of them: They are apt to be confounded with other refembling ideas: and when Pp 2

we

we have often employed any term, tho' without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine that it has a determinate idea, annexed to it. On the contrary, all impreffions, that is, all fenfations, either outward or inward, are strong and fenfible: The limits between them are more exactly determined: Nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them. When we entertain therefore any fufpicion, that a philofophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent) we need but enquire, from what impreffion is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impoffible to affign any, this will ferve to confirm our fufpicion. By bringing ideas into fo clear a light, we may reasonably hope to remove all difpute, which may arife, concerning their nature and reality a.

'TIS evident, that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more ferious thinking or difcourfe, this is fo obfervable, that any particular thought, which breaks in upon this regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we fhall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which fucceeded each other. Were the loofest and freest converfation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed fomething, which connected it in all its tranfitions. Or where this is wanting, the perfon, who broke the thread of discourse, might still inform you, that there had

a "Tis probable, that no more was meant by thofe, who denied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impreffions; tho' it must be confeffed, that the terms which they employed were not chofen with fuch caution, nor fo exactly defined as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by innate? If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be in nate or natural, in whatever fense we take the latter word, whether in oppofition to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, cotemporary to our birth, the difpute feems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word, 'ca, feems to be commonly taken in a very loose fenfe, even by Mr. Lock himself, as ftanding for any of our perceptions, our fenfations and pas

fions, as well as thoughts. Now in this fenfe, I fhould defire to know, what can be meant by afferting, that felf-love, or refentment of injuries, or the paffion betwixt the sexes is not innate?

But admitting these terms, impressions and ideas, in the fenfe above explained, and understanding by innate what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we affert, that all our impreffions are innate, and our ideas not innate.

To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that Mr. LOCKE was betrayed into this queftion by the fchoolmen, who making use of undefined terms, draw out their difputes to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in queftion. A like ambiguity and circumlocution feem to run thro' all that great philofopher's reafonings on this fubject.

fecretly