IN foreign politics the intereft of the fenate can scarce ever be divided from that of the people; and therefore 'tis fit to make the fenate abfolute with regard to them; otherwife there could be no fecrecy nor refined policy. Befides, without money no alliance can be executed; and the fenate is ftill fufficiently dependent. Not to mention, that the legislative power being always fuperior to the executive, the magiftrates or reprefentatives may interpofe, whenever they think proper. THE chief fupport of the BRITISH government is the oppofition of interefts; but that, tho' in the main ferviceable, breeds endless factions. In the foregoing plan, it does all the good without any of the harm. The competitors have no power of controlling the fenate: They have only the power of accufing, and appealing to the people. 'Tis neceffary, likewife, to prevent both combination and divifion in the thousand magiftrates. This is done fufficiently by the feparation of places and interefts. BUT left that fhould not be enough, their dependence on the 10,000 for their elections, ferves to the fame purpose. NOR is that all For the 10,000 may refume the power, whenever they please; and not only when they all pleafe, but when any five of a hundred please, which will happen upon the very firft fufpicion of a feparate interest. THE 10,COO are too large a body either to unite or divide, except when they meet in one place, and fall under the guidance of ambitious leaders. Not to mention their annual election, by almost the whole body of the people. A SMALL Commonwealth is the happiest government in the world, within itself; because every thing lies under the eye of the rulers: But it may be fubdued by great force from without. This fcheme seems to have all the advantages both of a great and a little commonwealth. EVERY County-law may be annulled either by the fenate or another county; because that shows an oppofition of interefts: In which cafe, no part ought to decide for itself. The matter must be referred to the whole, which will beft determine what agrees with general intereft. As to the clergy and militia, the reasons of these orders are obvious. Without the dependence of the clergy on the civil magiftrate, and without a militia, 'tis folly to think any free government will ever have security or stability. In many governments, the inferior magiftrates have no rewards but what arife from their ambition, vanity, or public fpirit. The falaries of the FRENCH judges amount not to the intereft of the fums they pay for their offices. The DUTCH burgo-masters have little more immediate profit than the ENGLISH juftices of peace, or the members of the house of commons formerly. But left any fhould fufpect, that this would beget negligence in the adminiftration, (which is little to be feared, confidering the natural ambition of mankind) let the magiftrates have competent falaries. The fenators have access to fo many honorable and lucrative offices, that their attendance needs not be bought. There is little attendance required of the reprefentatives. THAT the foregoing plan of government is practicable, no one can doubt, who confiders the resemblance it bears to the commonwealth of the United Provinces, formerly one of the wifest and most renowned governments that ever was in the world. The alterations in the present scheme are all evidently to the better. 1.The I representation representation is more equal. 2. The unlimited power of the burgo-masters in the towns, which forms a perfect aristocracy in the DUTCH Commonwealth, is corrected by a well-tempered democracy, in giving to the people the annual election of the county reprefentatives. 3. The negative, which every province and town has upon the whole body of the DUTCH republic, with regard to alliances, peace and war, and the impofition of taxes, is here removed. 4. The counties, in the prefent plan, are not fo independent of each other, nor do they form feparate bodies fo much as the seven provinces; where the jealoufy and envy of the fmaller provinces and towns against the greater, particularly HOLLAND and AMSTERDAM, have frequently disturbed the government. 5. Larger powers, tho' of the fafeft kind, are intrufted to the fenate than the States-General poffefs; by which means, the former may become more expeditious, and fecret in their refolutions, than 'tis poffible for the latter. THE chief alterations that could be made on the BRITISH government, in order to bring it to the most perfect model of limited monarchy, feem to be the following. First, The plan of the republican parliament ought to be restored, by making the reprefentation equal, and by allowing none to vote in the county-elections who poffefs not a property of 200 pounds value. Secondly, As fuch a house of Commons would be too weighty for a frail houfe of Lords, like the prefent, the Bishops and SCOTCH Peers ought to be removed, whofe behavior, in former parliaments, destroyed entirely the authority of that houfe: The number of the upper houfe ought to be raised to three or four hundred: Their feats not hereditary, but during life: They ought to have the election of their own members; and no commoner should be allowed to refuse a feat that was offered him. By this means, the houfe of Lords would confift entirely of the men of chief credit, ability, and intereft of the nation; and every turbulent leader in the house of Commons might be taken off, and connected in intereft with the house of Peers. Such an ariftocracy would be an excellent barrier both to the monarchy and against it. At prefent, the balance of our government depends in fome measure on the ability and behavior of the fovereign; which are variable and uncertain circumstances. I ALLOW, that this plan of limited monarchy, however corrected, is ftill liable to three great inconveniencies. First, It removes not entirely, tho' it may soften, the parties of court and country. Secondly, The King's perfonal character must still have a great influence on the government. Thirdly, The fword is in the hands of a fingle perfon, who will always neglect to difcipline the militia, in order to have a pretext for keeping up a standing army. 'Tis evident, that this is a mortal diftemper in the BRITISH government, of which it must at last inevitably perish. I muft, however, confefs, that SWEDEN feems, in fome measure, to have remedied this inconvenience, and to have a militia, with its limited monarchy, as well as a ftanding army, which is lefs dangerous than the BRITISH. WE fhall conclude this fubject, with obferving the falfehood of the common opinion, that no large ftate, fuch as FRANCE or BRITAIN, could ever be modelled into a commonwealth, but that fuch a form of government can only take place in a city or small territory. The contrary feems evident. Tho' 'tis more difficult. to form a republican government in an extenfive country than in a city; there is more facility, when once it is formed, of preferving it steady and uniform, without tumult and faction. Tis not eafy, for the diftant parts of a large ftate, to combine combine in any plan of free government, but they eafily confpire in the esteem and reverence for a fingle perfon, who, by means of this popular favor, may feize the power, and forcing the more obftinate to fubmit, they eftablish a monarchical government. On the other hand, a city readily concurs in the fame notions of government, the natural equality of property favors liberty, and the nearnefs of habitation enables the citizens mutually to affift each other. Even under absolute princes, the fubordinate government of cities is commonly republican; while that of counties and provinces is monarchical. But these fame circumstances, which facilitate the erection of commonwealths in cities, render their conftitution more frail and uncertain. Democracies are turbulent. For however the people may be separated or divided into small parties, either in their votes or elections; their near habitation in a city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very fenfible. Ariftocracies are better adapted for peace and order, and accordingly were moft admired by antient writers; but they are jealous and oppreffive. In a large government, which is modelled with masterly fkill, there is compafs and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magiftrates, who direct all the movements. At the fame time, the parts are fo diftant and remote, that 'tis very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or paffion, to hurry them into any measures against the public interest. 'Tis needless to inquire, whether fuch a government would be immortal. I allow the juftness of the poet's exclamation on the endless projects of human race, Man and for ever! The world itfelf probably is not immortal. Such confuming plagues may arife as would leave even a perfect government a weak prey to its neighbors. We know not to what lengths enthusiasm, or other extraordinary motions of the human mind, may tranfport men, to the neglect of all order and public good. Where difference of intereft is removed, whimfical and unaccountable factions often arife, from perfonal favor or enmity. Perhaps, ruft may grow to the fprings of the most accurate political machine, and diforder its motions. Laftly, extenfive conquefts, when purfued, must be the ruin of every free govern ment; and of the more perfect governments fooner than of the imperfect; because of the very advantages which the former poffefs above the latter. And tho' fuch a ftate ought to establish a fundamental law against conquefts; yet republics have ambition as well as individuals, and prefent intereft makes men forgetful of their pofterity. 'Tis a fufficient incitement to human endeavors, that fuch a govern ment would florifh for many ages; without pretending to bestow on any work of man, that immortality, which the Almighty feems to have refufed to his own productions. AN |