ans.

*

fhould be fuppofed altogether a romance, this fentiment, afcribed by the author to the Eastern princes, is at leaft a proof of the prevailing notions of antient times. In the whole politics of GREECE, the anxiety with regard to the balance of power, is moft apparent, and is exprefsly pointed out to us, even by the antient hiftoriTHUCYDIDES reprefents the league which was formed against ATHENS, and which produced the PELOPONNESIAN war, as entirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of ATHENS, when the THEBANS and LACEDEMONIANS difputed for fovereignty, we find, that the ATHENIANS (as well as many other republics) threw themfelves always into the lighter fcale, and endeavored to preferve the balance. They fupported THEBES against SPARTA, till the great victory gained by EPAMINONDAS at LEUCTRA; after which they immediately went over to the conquered, from generofity, as they pretended, but, in reality, from their jealoufy of the conquerors t.

WHOEVER will read DEMOSTHENES's oration for the MEGALOPOLITANS, may fee the utmost refinements on this principle, which ever entered into the head of a VENETIAN or ENGLISH fpeculatift. And upon the firft rife of the MACEDONIAN power, this orator immediately difcovered the danger, founded the alarm. thro' all GREECE, and at laft affembled that confederacy under the banners of ATHENS, which fought the great and decifive battle of CHAERONEA.

'Tis true, the GRECIAN wars are regarded by hiftorians as wars of emulation rather than of politics; and each ftate feems to have had more in view the honor of leading the reft, than any well-grounded hopes of authority and dominion. If we confider, indeed, the fmall number of inhabitants in any one republic, compared to the whole, the great difficulty of forming fieges in thofe times, and the extraordinary bravery and difcipline of every freeman among that noble people; we shall conclude, that the balance of power was of itself fufficiently fecured in GREECE, and needed not to be guarded with that caution which may be requifite in other ages. But whether we afcribe the fhifting fides in all the GRECIAN republics to jealous emulation or cautious politics, the effects were alike, and every prevailing power was fure to meet with a confederacy against it, and that often compofed of its former friends and allies.

THE fame principle, call it envy or prudence, which produced the Oftracifm of ATHENS and Petalifm of SYRACUSE, and expelled every citizen whofe fameor power overtopped the reft; the fame principle, I fay, naturally difcovered itfelf in foreign politics, and foon raised enemies to the leading ftate, however moderate in the exercife of its authority.

THE PERSIAN monarch was really, in his force, a petty prince, compared to the GRECIAN republics; and therefore it behoved him, from views of fafety more than from emulation, to intereft himself in their quarrels, and to fupport the we.ker fide in every conteft. This was the advice given by ALCIBIADES To TISSAPHERN S‡, and it prolonged near a century the date of the PERSIAN empire; til the neglect of it for a moment, after the first appearance of the aspiring genius of PHILIP, brought that lofty and frail edifice to the ground, with a rapidity of which there are few inftances in the hiftory of mankind.

* Lib. I.

XENOPH. Hift. GRAEC. lib. 6 & 7.

THUCYD. lib. 8.

THE

THE fucceffors of ALEXANDER fhowed an infinite jealoufy of the balance of power; a jealoufy founded on true politics and prudence, and which preserved diftinct for feveral ages the partitions made after the death of that famous conqueror. The fortune and ambition of ANTIGONUS* threatened them anew with an univerfal monarchy; but their combination, and their victory at Ipsus faved them. And in after times, we find, that as the Eaftern princes confidered the GREEKS and MACEDONIANS as the only real military force with whom they had any intercourse, they kept always a watchful eye over that part of the world. The PTOLEMIES, in particular, fupported firft ARATUS and the ACHAEANS, and then CLEOMENES king of SPARTA, from no other view than as a counterbalance to the MACEDONIAN monarchs. For this is the account which PoLYEIUS gives of the EGYPTIAN politics +.

THE reafon why 'tis fuppofed, that the antients were entirely ignorant of the balance of power, feems to be drawn from the ROMAN hiftory more than the GRECIAN; and as the transactions of the former are generally the most familiar to us, we have thence formed all our conclufions. It must be owned, that the ROMANS never met with any fuch general combination or confederacy against them, as might naturally be expected from their rapid conquefts and declared ambition; but were allowed peaceably to fubdue their neighbors, one after ano- . ther, till they extended their dominion over the whole known world. Not to mention the fabulous hiftory of their ITALIC wars; there was, upon HANNIBAL'S invafion of the ROMAN ftate, a very remarkable crifis, which ought to have called up the attention of all civilized nations. It appeared afterwards, (nor was it difficult to be obferved at the time), that this was a contest for universal empire; and yet no prince or ftate feems to have been in the least alarmed about the event or iffue of the quarrel. PHILIP of MACEDON remained neuter, till he faw the victories of HANNIBAL; and then most imprudently formed an alliance with the conqueror, upon terms ftill more imprudent. He ftipulated, that he was to affift the CARTHAGINIAN ftate in their conqueft of ITALY; after which they engaged to fend over forces into GREECE, to affift him in fubduing the GRECIAN commonwealths .

THE RHODIAN and ACHAEAN republics are much celebrated by antient hiftorians for their wisdom and found policy; yet both of them affifted the ROMANS in their wars against PHILIP and ANTIOCHUS. And what may be efteemed ftill a ftronger proof, that this maxim was not familiarly known in those ages; no antient author has ever remarked the imprudence of these measures, nor has even blamed that abfurd treaty above mentioned, made by PHILIP with the CARTHAGINIANS. Princes and ftatesmen may, in all ages, be blinded in their reafonings with regard tó events, beforehand: But 'tis fomewhat extraordinary, that hiftorians, afterwards, fhould not form a founder judgment of them.

MASSINISSA, ATIALUS, PRUSIAS, in fatisfying their private paffions, were, all of them, the inftruments of the ROMAN greatnefs; and never feem to have fufpected, that they were forging their own chains, while they advanced the

conquests of their ally. A fimple treaty and agreement betwixt MASSINISSA and the CARTHAGINIANS, fo much required by mutual intereft, barred the ROMANS from all entrance into AFRICA, and preferved liberty to mankind.

THE only prince we meet with in the ROMAN hiftory, who feems to have understood the balance of power, is HIERO king of SYRACUSE. Tho' the ally of ROME, he fent affiftance to the CARTHAGINIANS, during the war of the auxiliaries: "Efteeming it requifite," fays POLYBIUS, " both in order to retain his "dominions in SICILY, and to preferve the ROMAN friendship, that CARTHAGE "fhould be fafe; left by its fall the remaining power should be able, without "contraft or oppofition, to execute every purpose and undertaking. And here he "acted with great wisdom and prudence. For that is never, on any account, to "be overlooked; nor ought fuch a force ever to be thrown into one hand, as to incapacitate the neighboring ftates from defending their rights against it." Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in exprefs terms.

IN fhort, the maxim of preferving the balance of power is founded so much on common fenfe and cbvious reafoning, that 'tis impoffible it could altogether have efcaped antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, fo many marks of deep penetration and difcernment. If it was not fo generally known and acknowleged as at prefent, it had, at least, an influence on all the wifer and more experienced princes and politicians. And indeed, even at prefent, however generally known and acknowleged among fpeculative reafoners, it has not, in practice, an authority much more extenfive among those who govern the world.

AFTER the fall of the ROMAN empire, the form of government established by the northern conquerors, incapacitated them, in a great meafure, from farther conquefts, and long maintained each ftate in its proper boundaries. But when vaffalage and the feudal militia were abolished, mankind were anew alarmed by the danger of univerfal monarchy, from the union of fo many kingdoms and principalities in the perfon of the emperor CHARLES. But the power of the house of AUSTRIA, founded on extenfive but divided dominions, and their riches, derived chiefly from mines of gold and filver, were more likely to decay, of themselves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raised against them. In lefs than a century, the force of that violent and haughty race was shattered, their opulence diffipated, their fplendor eclipfed. A new power fucceeded, more formidable to the liberties of EUROPE, poffeffing all the advantages of the former, and laboring under none of its defects; except a fhare of that fpirit of bigotry and perfecution, with which the house of AUSTRIA were fo long, and still are fo much infatuated.

EUROPE has now, for above a century, remained on the defensive against the greateft force that ever, perhaps, was formed by the civil or political combination of mankind. And fuch is the influence of the maxim here treated of, that tho' that ambitious nation, in the five last general wars, have been victorious in fourt, and unfuccefsful only in one, they have not much enlarged their dominions, nor acquired a total afcendant over EUROPE. There remains rather room.

* Lib. 1. Cap. 83.

+ Those concluded by the peace of the PyRENEES, NIMEGUEN, RYSWICK, and AIX-LA

CHAPELLE.

That concluded by the peace of UTRECHT.

to hope, that, by maintaining the refiftance fome time, the natural revolutions of human affairs, together with unforeseen events and accidents, may guard us against univerfal monarchy, and preferve the world from fo great an evil.

IN the three laft of these general wars, BRITAIN has ftood foremost in the glorious ftruggle; and fhe ftill maintains her ftation, as guardian of the general liberties of EUROPE, and patron of mankind. Befide her advantages of riches and fituation, her people are animated with fuch a national fpirit, and are fo fully fenfible of the ineftimable bleffings of their government, that we may hope their vigor never will languifh in fo neceffary and fo juft a caufe. On the contrary, if we may judge by the paft, their paffionate ardor feems rather to require fome moderation; and they have oftener erred from a laudable excefs than from a blameable deficiency.

In the first place, we feem to have been more poffeffed with the antient GREEK fpirit of jealous emulation, than actuated with the prudent views of modern poli

Our wars with FRANCE have been begun with juftice, and even, perhaps, from neceffity; but have always been too far pufhed, from obftinacy and paffion. The fame peace which was afterwards made at RYSWICK in 1697, was offered fo early as the ninety-two; that concluded at UTRECHT in 1712 might have been finished on as good conditions at GERTRUYTENBERG in the eight; and we might have given at FRANCFORT, in 1743, the fame terms, which we were glad to accept of at AIX LA-CHAPELLE in the forty-eight. Here then we fee, that above half of our wars with FRANCE, and all our public debts, are owing more to our own imprudent vehemence, than to the ambition of our neighbors.

In the fecond place, we are fo declared in our oppofition to FRENCH power, and fo alert in defence of our allies, that they always reckon upon our force as upon their own; and expecting to carry on war at our expence, refuse all reafonable terms of accommodation. Habent fubje&tos, tanquam fuos; viles, ut alienos. All the world knows, that the factious vote of the Houfe of Commons, in the beginning of the laft parliament, with the profeffed humor of the nation, made the queen of HUNGARY inflexible in her terms, and prevented that agreement with PRUSSIA, which would immediately have reftored the general tranquillity of EUROPE.

In the third place, we are fuch true combatants, that, when once engaged, we lofe all concern for ourselves and our pofterity, and confider only how we may best annoy the enemy. enemy. To mortgage our revenues at fo deep a rate, in wars, where we were only acceffories, was furely the moft fatal delufion, that a nation, who had any pretenfion to politics and prudence, has ever yet been guilty of. That remedy of funding, if it be a remedy, and not rather a poifon, ought, in all reafon, to be referved to the last extremity; and no evil, but the greatest and most urgent, fhould ever induce us to embrace fo dangerous an expedient.

THESE exceffes, to which we have been carried, are prejudicial; and may, perhaps, in time, become ftill more prejudicial another way, by begetting, as is ufual, the oppofite extreme, and rendering us totally careless and fupine with regard to the fate of EUROPE. The ATHENIANS, from the most bustling, intriguing, warlike people of GREECE, finding their error in thrufting themselves into every quarrel, abandoned all attention to foreign affairs; and in no conteft

ever

ever took party on either fide, except by their flatteries and complaisance to the victor.

ENORMOUS monarchies, fuch as EUROPE at prefent is threatened with, are, probably, deftructive to human nature; in their progrefs, in their continuance * and even in their downfal, which never can be very diftant from their eftablishment. The military genius which aggrandized the monarchy, foon leaves the court, the capital, and the center of fuch a government; while the wars are carried on at a great diftance, and intereft fo fmall a part of the state. The antient nobility, whofe affections attach them to their fovereign, live all at court; and never will accept of military employments, which would carry them to remote and barbarous frontiers, where they are diftant both from their pleasure and their fortune. The arms of the ftate muft, therefore, be trufted to mercenary ftrangers, without zeal, without attachment, without honour; ready on every occafion to turn them against the prince, and join each defperate malecontent, who offers pay and plunder. This is the neceffary progrefs of human affairs: Thus human nature checks itfelf in its airy elevations: Thus ambition blindly labors for the destruction of the conqueror, of his family, and of every thing near and dear to him. The BOURBONS, trusting to the fupport of their brave, faithful, and affectionate nobility, would push their advantage, without referve or limitation. Thefe, while fired with glory and emulation, can bear the fatigues and dangers of war; but never would fubmit to languish in the garrisons of HUNGARY or LITHUANIA, forgot at court, and facrificed to the intrigues of every minion or mistress, who approaches the prince. The troops are filled with CRAVATES and TARTARS, HUSSARS and COSSACS; intermingled, perhaps, with a few foldiers of fortune from the better provinces: And the melancholy fate of the ROMAN emperors, from the fame cause, is renewed over and over again, till the final diffolution of the monarchy.

ESS A

Y

VII.

T

OFTA X E S.

HERE is a maxim, that prevails among those whom in this country we call ways and means men, and who are denominated Financiers and Maltotiers in FRANCE, That every new tax creates a new ability in the fubject to bear it, and that each increase of public burthens increases proportionably the industry of the people. This maxim is of fuch a nature as is most likely to be extremely abufed; and is fo much the more dangerous, that its truth cannot be altogether denied; but it must be owned, when kept within certain bounds, to have fome foundation in reafon and experience.

* If the ROMAN empire was of advantage, it could only proceed from this, that mankind were

generally in a very diforderly, uncivilized condition, before its establishment.

WHEN