company with Folly. They were frequent guests of Wealth, and from that moment infeparable. Diffidence, in the mean time, not daring to approach the great houfe, accepted of an invitation from POVERTY, one of the tenants; and entering the cottage, found Wisdom and Virtue, who being repulfed by the landlord, had retired thither. Virtue took compaffion of her, and Wifdom found, from her temper, that fhe would easily improve: So they admitted her into their fociety. Accordingly, by their means, the altered in a little time fomewhat of her manner, and becoming much more amiable and engaging, was now called by the name of Modefty. As ill company has a greater effect than good, Confidence, tho' more refractory to counsel and example, degenerated fo far by the fociety of Vice and Folly, as to pafs by the name of IMPUDENCE. Mankind, who faw thefe focieties as JUPITER first joined them, and know nothing of these mutual desertions, are thereby led into strange mistakes; and wherever they fee Impudence, make account of Virtue and Wisdom, and wherever they obferve Modefty, call her attendants Vice and Folly. ESSAY IV. THAT POLITICS MAY BE REDUCED TO A SCIENCE. T is a great question with feveral, Whether there be any effential difference betwixt one form of government and another? and, whether every form may not become good or bad, according as it is well or ill adminiftred? Were it once admitted, that all governments are alike, and that the only difference confifts in the character and conduct of the governors, most political difputes would be at an end, and all Zeal for one conftitution above another, must be esteemed mere bigotry and folly. But, tho' a friend to Moderation, I cannot forbear condemning this fentiment, and fhould be forry to think, that human affairs admit of no greater stability, than what they receive from the cafual humors and characters of particular men. 'Tis true, those who maintain, that the goodness of all government confists in the goodness of the administration, may cite many particular inftances in hiftory, where the very fame government, in different hands, has varied fuddenly into the two oppofite extremes of good and bad. Compare the FRENCH government under HENRY III. and under HENRY IV. Oppreffion, levity, artifice on the part of the rulers; faction, fedition, treachery, rebellion, difloyalty on the part of the fubjects: Thefe compofe the character of the former miferable æra. But when the patriot and heroic prince, who fucceeded, was once firmly feated on the throne, the government, the people, every thing feemed to be totally changed; and all from the difference of the temper and fentiments of thefe two fovereigns. An equal difference of a contrary kind, may be found on comparing the reigns of *For forms of government let fools conteft : C 2 ESSAY ON MAN, Book 3.1 ELIZABETH and JAMES, at leaft with regard to foreign affairs: and inftances of this kind may be multiplied, almoft without number, from ancient as well as modern hiftory. BUT here I would beg leave to make a diftinction. All abfolute governments (and fuch that of ENGLAND was, in a great measure, till the middle of the laft century, notwithstanding the numerous panegyrics on ancient ENGLISH liberty) must very much depend on the administration; and this is one of the great inconveniences of that form of government. But a republican and free government would be a most obvious abfurdity, if the particular checks and controls, provided by the conftitution, had really no influence, and made it not the intereft, even of bad men, to operate for the public good. Such is the intention of thefe forms of government, and fuch is their real effect, where they are wifely constituted: As, on the other hand, they are the fources of all diforder, and of the blackeft crimes, where either skill or honefty has been wanting in their original frame and inftitution. So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and fo little dependence have they on the humors and temper of men, that confequences almost as general and certain may be deduced from them, on most occafions, as any which the mathematical fciences afford us. THE ROMAN government gave the whole legislative power to the commons, without allowing a negative either to the nobility or confuls. This unbounded power the commons poffeffed in a collective, not in a reprefentative body. The confequences were: When the people, by fuccefs and conqueft, had become very numerous, and had fpred themselves to a great diftance from the capital, the citytribes, tho' the most contemptible, carried almoft every vote: They were, therefore, moft cajoled by every one who affected popularity: they were fupported in idleness by the general diftribution of corn, and by particular bribes, which they received from almoft every candidate: By this means they became every day more licentious, and the CAMPUS MARTIUS was a perpetual fcene of tumult and fedition: armed flaves were introduced among thefe rafcally citizens; fo that the whole government fell into anarchy, and the greatest happiness which the RoMANS could look for, was the defpotic power of the CESARS. Such are the effects of democracy without a reprefentative. A NOBILITY may poffefs the whole, or any part of the legislative power of a ftate, in two different ways. Either every nobleman fhares the power as part of the whole body, or the whole body enjoys the power as compofed of parts, which have each a diftinct power and authority. The VENETIAN nobility are an inftance of the firft kind of government: The POLISH of the fecond. In the VENETIAN government the whole body of nobility poffeffes the whole power, and no nobleman has any authority which he receives not from the whole. In the POLISH government every nobleman, by means of his fiefs, has a peculiar hereditary authority over his vaffals, and the whole body has no authority but what it receives from the concurrence of its parts. The diftinct operations and tendencies of these two fpecies of government might be made most apparant even a priori. A VENETIAN nobility is infinitely preferable to a POLISH, let the humors and education of men be ever so much varied. A nobility, who poffefs their power in common, will preferve peace and order, both among themfelves, and their fubjects; and no no member can have authority enough to control the laws for a moment. The nobles will preferve their authority over the people, but without any grievous tyranny, or any breach of private property; because fuch a tyrannical government promotes not the intereft of the whole body, however it may that of fome individuals. There will be a diftinction of rank between the nobility and people, but this will be the only diftinction in the ftate. The whole nobility will form one body, and the whole people another, without any of those private feuds and animofities, which spread ruin and defolation every where. 'Tis easy to see the difadvantages of a POLISH nobility in every one of these particulars. 'Tis poffible fo to conftitute a free government, as that a fingle perfon, call him duke, prince, or king, fhall poffefs a very large fhare of power, and shall form a proper balance or counterpoife to the other parts of the legislature. This chief magiftrate may be either elective or hereditary; and tho' the former inftitution may, to a fuperficial view, appear the most advantageous; yet a more accurate infpection will discover in it greater inconveniencies than in the latter, and fuch as are founded on caufes and principles eternal and immutable. The filling of the throne, in fuch a government, is a point of too great and too general intereft, not to divide the whole people into factions: From whence a civil war, the greatest of ills, may be apprehended, almoft with certainty, upon every vacancy. The prince elected must be either a Foreigner or a Native: The former will be ignorant of the people whom he is to govern; fufpicious of his new fubjects, and fufpected by them; giving his confidence entirely to ftrangers, who will have no other care but of enriching themfelves in the quickest manner, while their master's favor and authority are able to fupport them. A native will carry into the throne all his private animofities and friendships, and will never be regarded, in his elevation, without exciting the fentiments of envy in thofe, who formerly confidered him as their equal. Not to mention, that a crown is too high a reward ever to be given to merit alone, and will always induce the candidates to employ force, or money, or intrigue, to procure the votes of the electors: So that fuch an election will give no better chance for fuperior merit in the prince, than if the state had trusted to birth alone for determining their fovereign. It may therefore be pronounced as an univerfal axiom in politics, That an hereditary prince, a nobility without vaffals, and a people voting by their reprefentatives, form the best MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, and DEMOCRACY. But in order to prove more fully, that politics admit of general truths, which are invariable by the humor or education either of fubject or fovereign, it may not be amifs to obferve fome other principles of this fcience, which may feem to deferve that character. Ir may eafily be obferved, that tho' free governments have been commonly the most happy for thofe who partake of their freedom; yet are they the most ruinous and oppreffive for their provinces: And this obfervation may, I believe, be fixed as a maxim of the kind we are here fpeaking of. When a monarch extends his dominions by conqueft, he foon learns to confider his old and his new fubjects as on the fame footing; becaufe, in reality, all his fubjects are to him the fame, except the few friends and favorites, with whom he is perfonally acquainted. He does not, therefore, make any diftinction betwixt them in his general laws; and, at the fame time, is no lefs careful to prevent all particular acts of oppreffion on the one as on the other. But a free ftate neceffarily makes a great diftinc tion, and must always do fo, till men learn to love their neighbors as well as them-felves. The conquerors, in fuch a government, are all legiflators, and will be fure fo to contrive matters, by reftrictions of trade, and by taxes, as to draw fome private, as well as public, advantage from their conquefts. Provincial governors have also a better chance in a republic, to escape with their plunder, by means of bribery or intereft; and their fellow-citizens, who find their own state to be inriched by the fpoils of the fubject-provinces, will be the more inclined to tolerate fuch abuses. Not to mention, that it is a neceffary precaution in a free state to change the governors frequently; which obliges thefe temporary tyrants to be more expeditious and rapacious, that they may accumulate fufficient wealth before they give place to their fucceffors. What cruel tyrants were the ROMANS Over the world during the time of their commonwealth! 'Tis true, they had laws to prevent oppreffion in their provincial magiftrates; but CICERO informs us, that the ROMANS could not better confult the intereft of the provinces than by repealing thefe very laws. For, fays he, in that cafe, our magiftrates, having entire impunity, would plunder no more than would fatisfy their own rapaciousness : Whereas, at prefent, they must also fatisfy that of their judges, and of all the great men of ROME, whofe protection they stand in need of. Who can read of the cruelties and oppreffions of VERRES without horror and astonishment? And, who is not touched with indignation to hear, that after CICERO had exhausted on that abandoned criminal all the thunders of his eloquence, and had prevailed fo far as to get him condemned to the utmost extent of the laws; yet that cruel tyrant lived pe ceably to old age, in opulence and ease, and, thirty years afterward, was put into the profcription by MARK ANTHONY, on account of his exorbitant wealth, where he fell, with CICERO himself, and all the most virtuous men of ROME? After the diffolution of the commonwealth, the ROMAN yoke became eafier upon the provinces, as TACITUS informs us *; and it may be obferved, that many of the worst emperors, DOMITIAN †, for inftance, were very careful to prevent all oppreffion of the provinces. In TIBERIUS's time, GAUL was efteemed richer than ITALY itself: Nor, do I find, during the whole time of the ROMAN monarchy, that the empire became lefs rich or populous in any of its provinces ; though indeed its valor and military discipline were always upon the decline. The oppreffion and tyranny of the CARTHAGINIANS Over their fubject states in AFRICA went fo far, as we learn from POLYBIUS, that not contented with exacting the half of all the product of the ground, which of itself was a very high rent, they alfo loaded them with many other taxes. If we pass from antient to modern times, we fhall find the fame obfervation to hold. The provinces of abfolute monarchies are always better treated than those of free ftates. Compare the Païs conquis of FRANCE with IRELAND, and you will be convinced of this truth; tho' this latter kingdom being, in a good measure, peopled from ENGLAND, poffeffes fo many rights and privileges as fhould naturally make it challenge better treatment than that of a conquered province. CORSICA is also an obvious instance to the fame purpose. * Ann. lib 1. cap. 2. Egregium refumenda libertati tempus, fi itfi florentes, quam inops ITALIA, quam imvellis ubana plebs, nihil validum in exercitibus, nifi quod externum cogitarent. TACIT. Ann. lib. 3. || Lib. 1. cap. 72. THERE THERE is an obfervation of MACHIAVEL, with regard to the conquefts of ALEXANDER the Great, which, I think, may be regarded as one of thofe eternal political truths which no time nor accidents can vary. It may feem ftrange, fays that politician, that fuch fudden conquefts, as thofe of ALEXANDER, fhould be poffeffed fo peaceably by his fucceffors, and that the PERSIANS, during all the confufions and civil wars of the GREEKS, never made the fmalleft efforts towards the recovery of their former independent government. To fatisfy us concerning the cause of this remarkable event, we may confider, that a monarch may govern his fubjects in two different ways. He may either follow the maxims of the eaftern princes, and stretch his power fo far as to leave no diftinction of ranks among his fubjects, but what proceeds immediately from himself; no advantages of birth; no hereditary honors and poffeffions; and, in a word, no credit among the people, except from his commiffion alone. Or a monarch may exert his power after a milder manner, like our EUROPEAN princes; and leave other fources of honor, befide his fmile and favor: Birth, titles, poffeffions, valor, integrity, knowlege, or great and fortunate atchievements. In the former fpecies of government, after a conqueft, 'tis impoffible ever to shake off the yoke; fince no one poffeffes, among the people, fo much perfonal credit and authority as to begin fuch an enterprize: Whereas, in the latter, the leaft misfortune, or difcord of the victors, will encourage the vanquished to take arms, who have leaders ready to prompt and conduct them in every undertaking *. * I HAVE taken it for granted, according to the fuppofition of MACHIAVEL, that the antient PERSIANS had no nobility; tho' there is reason to fufpect, that the FLORENTINE fecretary, who seems to have been better acquainted with the RoMAN than the GREEK authors, was mistaken in this particular. The more antient PERSIANS, whofe manners are defcribed by XENOPHON, were a free people, and had nobility. Their op were preferved even after the extending of their conquefts and the confequent change of their government. ARIAN mentions them in DARIUS'S tine, De exped. ALEX. lib. 2. Hiftorians alfo fpeak often of the perfons in command as men of family. TYGRANES, who was general of the MEDES under XERXES, was of the race of ACHEMENES, HEROD. lib. 7. cap. 62. ARTACHES, who directed the cutting of the canal about mount ATHOS, was of the fame family. Id. cap. 117. MEGABYZUS was one of the feven eminent PERSIANS who confpired against the MAGI. His fon, ZOPYRUS, was in the higheft command under DARIUS, and delivered BABYLON to him. His grandfon, MEGABYZUS, commanded the army, defeated at MARATHON. His great grandfon ZOPYRUS, was alfo eminent, and was banished PERSIA. HEROD. lib. 3. THUC. lib. 1. RoSACES, who commanded an army in EGYPT under ARTAXERXES, was alfo defcended from one of the feven confpirators, DIOD. SIC. lib. 16. ACESILAUS, in XENOPHON, Hift. GRÆC. lib. 4. being defirous of making a marriage betwixt king Corys his ally, and the daughter of SPITHRI- |