contented with merely furveying its objects, as they stand in themselves: It alfo feels a fentiment of delight or uneafinefs, approbation or blame, confequent to that furvey; and this fentiment determines it to pronounce the object beautiful or deformed, defirable or odious. Now, 'tis evident, that this fentiment must depend upon the particular fabric or ftructure of the mind, which enables fuch particular objects to operate in fuch a particular manner, and produces a fympathy or conformity between the mind and the objects. Vary the ftructure of the mind or inward organs, the fentiment no longer follows, tho' the objects remain the fame. The fentiment being different from the object, and arifing from its operation upon the organs of the mind, an alteration upon the latter muft vary the effect, nor can the fame object, prefented to a mind totally different, produce the fame. Sentiment.

THIS Conclufion every one is apt to form of himself, without much philofophy, where the fentiment is evidently diftinguishable from the object. Who is not fenfible, that power, and glory, and vengeance, are not defirable of themfelves, but derive all their value from the ftructure of human paffions, which begets a defire towards fuch particular objects? But with regard to beauty, either natural or moral, the cafe is commonly fuppofed to be different. The agreeable quality is thought to lie in the object, not in the fentiment; and that merely because the fentiment is not fo turbulent and violent as to diftinguifh itself, in an evident manner, from the perception of the object.

BUT a very little reflection fuffices to diftinguish them. A man may know exactly all the circles and ellipfes of the COPERNICAN fyftem, and all the irregular fpirals of the PTOLOMAIC, without perceiving that the former is more beautiful than the latter. EUCLID has very fully explained every quality of the circle, but has not, in any propofition, faid a word of its beauty. The reason is evident. Beauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the line whofe parts are all equally distant from a common center. It is only the effect, which that figure operates upon the mind, whofe particular fabric or structure renders it fufceptible of fuch fentiments. In vain would you look for it in the circle, or feek it, either by your fenfes, or by mathematical reafonings, in all the properties of that figure.

THE mathematician, who took no other pleasure in reading VIRGIL, but that of examining ENEAS'S Voyage by the map, might understand perfectly the meaning of every Latin word, imployed by that divine author; and confequently, might have a diftinct idea of the whole narration. He would even have a more diftinct idea of it, than they could have who had not ftudied fo exactly the geography of the poem. He knew, therefore, every thing in the poem: But he was ignorant of its beauty; because the beauty, properly fpeaking, lies not in the poem, but in the fentiment or tafte of the reader. And where a man has no fuch delicacy of temper, as to make him feel this fentiment, he must be ignorant of the beauty, tho' poffeffed of the fcience and understanding of an angel *.

THE

WERE I not afraid of appearing too philofo- times, "That taftes and colors, and all other phical, I would remind my reader of that famous "fenfible qualities, lie not in the bodies, but doctrine, fuppofed to be fully proved in modern" merely in the fenfes." The cafe is the fame:

THE inference upon the whole is, that it is not from the value or worth of the object, which any perfon purfues, that we can determine his enjoyment, but merely from the paffion with which he purfues it, and the fuccefs which he meets with in his purfuit. Objects have abfolutely no worth or value in themfelves. They derive their worth merely from the paffion. If that be strong, and steady, and fuccefsful, the perfon is happy. It cannot reafonably be doubted, but a little mifs, dreft in a new gown for a dancing-school ball, receives as compleat enjoyment as the greatest orator, who triumphs in the fplendor of his eloquence, while he governs the paffions and refolutions of a numerous affembly.

ALL the difference, therefore, betwixt one man and another, with regard to life, confifts either in the paffion, or in the enjoyment: And thefe differences are fufficient to produce the wide extrémes of happiness and mifery.

To be happy, the passion must neither be too violent nor too remifs. In the first case, the mind is in a perpetual hurry and tumult; in the second, it finks into a difagreeable indolence and lethargy.

To be happy, the paffion must be benign and focial; not rough or fierce. The affections of the latter kind are not near fo agreeable, to the feeling, as thofe of the former. Who will compare rancor and animofity, envy and revenge, to friendship, benignity, clemency and gratitude?

To be happy, the paffion must be chearful and gay, not gloomy and melancholy. A propenfity to hope and joy is real riches: One to fear and forrow, real poverty.

SOME paffions or inclinations, in the enjoyment of their object, are not so steady or conftant as others, nor convey fuch durable pleasure and satisfaction. Philofophical devotion, for inftance, like the enthusiasm of a poet, is the transitory effect of high fpirits, great leifure, a fine genius, and a habit of study and contemplation: But notwithstanding all thefe circumstances, an abstracted, invifible object, like that which natural religion alone presents to us, cannot long actuate the mind, or be of any moment in life. To render the paffion of continuance, we must find fome method of affecting the fenfes and imagination, and muft embrace fome hiStorical as well as philofophical accounts of the divinity. Popular fuperftitions and obfervances are even found to be of ufe in this particular.

THO' the tempers of men be very different, yet we may fafely pronounce in general, that a life of pleasure cannot fupport itself fo long as one of business, but is much more fubject to fatiety and difguft. The amufements, which are the most durable, have all a mixture of application and attention in them; fuch as gaming and hunting. And in general, business and action fill up all the great vacancies of human life.

with beauty and deformity, virtue and vice. This doctrine, however, takes off no more from the reality of the latter qualities, than from that of the former; nor need it give any umbrage either to critics or moralifts. Tho' colors were allowed to lie only in the eye, would dyers or painters ever be lefs regarded or esteemed? There is a fufficient uniformity in the fenfes and feelings of mankind,

to make all these qualities the objects of art and reasoning, and to have the greatest influence on life and manners. And as 'tis certain, that the difcovery above-mentioned in natural philofophy, makes no alteration on action and conduct; why should a like difcovery in moral philofophy make any alteration?

BUT

BUT where the temper is the beft difpofed for any enjoyment, the object is often wanting And in this refpect, the paffions, which purfue external objects, contribute not fo much to happiness, as thofe which reft in ourselves; fince we are neither fo certain of attaining fuch objects, nor fo fecure of poffeffing them. A paffion for learning is preferable, with regard to happinefs, to one for riches.

Some men are poffeffed of great strength of mind; and even when they pursue external objects, are not much affected by a difappointment, but renew their application and induftry with the greatest chearfulness. Nothing contributes more to happiness than this turn of mind.

ACCORDING to this fhort and imperfect sketch of human life, the happieft difpofition of mind is the virtuous; or, in other words, that which leads to action and employment, renders us fenfible to the focial paffions, fteals the heart against the affaults of fortune, reduces the affections to a juft moderation, makes our own thoughts an entertainment to us, and inclines us rather to the pleafures of fociety and converfation, than to thofe of the fenfes. This, in the mean time, must be obvious to the most carelefs reafoner, that all difpofitions of mind are not alike favorable to happiness, and that one paffion or humor may be extremely defirable, while another is equally difagreeable. And indeed, all the difference between the conditions of life depends upon the mind; nor is there any one fituation of affairs, in itself, preferable to another. Good and ill, both natural and moral, are entirely relative to human fentiment and affection. No man would ever be unhappy, could he alter his feelings. PROTEUS-like, he would elude all attacks, by the continual alterations of his fhape and form.

BUT of this refource nature has, in a great measure, deprived us. The fabric and conftitution of our mind no more depends on our choice, than that of our body. The generality of men have not even the fmalleft notion, that any alteration in this respect can ever be defirable. As a ftream neceffarily follows the feveral inclinations of the ground, on which it runs ; fo are the ignorant and thoughtlefs part of mankind actuated by their natural propenfities. Such, are effectually excluded from all pretenfions to philofophy, and the medicine of the mind, fo much boafted. But even upon the wife and thoughtful, nature has a prodigious influence; nor is it always in a man's power, by the utmoft art and industry, to correct his temper, and attain that virtuous character, to which he afpires. The empire of philofophy extends over a few and with regard to these too, her au'thority is very weak and limited. Men may well be fenfible of the value of virtue, and may defire to attain it; but 'tis not always certain, that they will be fuccefsful in their wishes.

WHOEVER Confiders, without prejudice, the courfe of human actions, will find, that mankind are almost entirely guided by conftitution and temper, and that general maxims have little influence, but fo far as they affect our taste or fentiment. If a man have a lively fenfe of honor and virtue, with moderate paffions, his conduct will always be conformable to the rules of morality; or if he depart from them, his return will be eafy and expeditious. But on the other hand, where one is born of fo perverfe, a frame of mind, of fo callous and infenfible a difpofition, as to have no relish for virtue and humanity, no fympathy with his fellow-creatures, no defire of esteem and applaufe; fuch a one must be allowed entirely incurable, nor is there any remedy in philofophy. He reaps no fatisfaction but from low and fenfual

objects

objects, or from the indulgence of malignant paffions: He feels no remorse to controul his vicious inclinations: He has not even that fenfe or tafte, which is requifite to make him defire a better character: For my part, I know not how I fhould addrefs myfelf to fuch a one, or by what arguments I fhould endeavor to reform him. Should I tell him of the inward fatisfaction which refults from laudable and humane actions, the delicate pleasures of difinterested love and friendfhip, the lafting enjoyments of a good name and an established character, he might till reply, that thefe were, perhaps, pleasures to fuch as were fufceptible of them; but that, for his part, he finds himself of a quite different turn and difpofition. I must repeat it; my philofophy affords no remedy in fuch a cafe, nor could I do any thing but lament this perfon's unhappy condition. But then I afk, If any other philofophy can afford a remedy; or if it be poffible, by any fyftem, to ren der all mankind virtuous, however perverfe may be their natural frame of mind? Experience will foon convince us of the contrary; and I will venture to affirm, that, perhaps, the chief benefit, which refults from philofophy, arifes in an indirect manner, and proceeds more from its fecret, infenfible influence, than from its immediate application.

'Tis certain, that a ferious attention to the sciences and liberal arts, foftens and humanizes the temper, and cherishes thofe fine emotions, in which true virtue and honor confifts. It rarely, very rarely happens, that a man of taste and learning is not, at least, an honeft man, whatever frailties may attend him. The bent of his mind to fpeculative ftudies muft mortify in him the paffions of intereft and ambition, and must, at the fame time, give him a greater fenfibility of all the decencies and duties of life. He feels more fully a moral diftinction in characters and manners; nor is his fenfe of this kind diminished, but, on the contrary, it is much encreased, by his fpeculations.

BESIDES fuch infenfible changes upon the temper and difpofition, 'tis highly probable, that others may be produced by study and application. The prodigious effects of education may convince us, that the mind is not altogether ftubborn and inflexible, but will admit of many alterations from its original make and structure. Let a man propofe to himself the model of a character, which he approves of; let him be well acquainted with thofe particulars, in which his own character deviates from this model: Let him keep a conftant watch over himself, and bend his mind, by a continual effort, from the vices, towards the virtues; and I doubt not but, in time, he will find, in his temper, an alteration, to the better.

HABIT is another powerful means of reforming the mind, and implanting in it good difpofitions and inclinations. A man who continues in a courfe of fobriety and temperance, will hate riot and diforder: If he engage in business or study, indolence will seem a punishment to him: If he constrain himself to practise beneficence and affability, he will foon abhor all inftances of pride and violence. Where one is thorowly convinced, that the virtuous courfe of life is preferable; if he has but refolution enough, for fome time, to impofe a violence on himself; his reformation need not be defpaired of. The misfortune is, that this conviction and this refolution never can have place, unless a man be, before-hand, tolerably virtuous.

HERE

HERE then is the chief triumph of art and philofophy: It infenfibly refines the temper, and it points out to us thofe difpofitions which we fhould endeavor to attain, by a conftant bent of mind, and by repeated habit. Beyond this I cannot acknowlege it to have great influence; and I muft entertain doubts concerning all thofe exhortations and confolations, which are in fuch vogue among all fpeculative reafoners.

We have already obferved, that no objects are, of themselves, defirable or odious, valuable or defpicable; but that objects acquire thefe qualities from the particular character and conftitution of the mind, which furveys them. To diminifh therefore, or augment any perfon's value for an object, to excite or moderate his paffions, there are no direct arguments or reafons, which can be employed with any force or influence. The catching flies, like DOMITIAN, if it give more pleafure, is preferable to the hunting wild beafts, like WILLIAM RUFUS, or conquering kingdoms, like ALEXANDER.

BUT tho' the value of every object can be determined only by the fentiments or paffions of every individual, we may obferve, that the paffions, in pronouncing their verdict, confider not the object fimply, as it is in itfelf, but furvey it with all the circumstances, which attend it. A man tranfported with joy, on account of his poffeffing a diamond, confines not his view to the glistering ftone before him: He alfo confiders its rarity, and from thence chiefly arifes his pleasure and exultation. Here therefore a philofopher may step in, and fuggeft particular views and confiderations, and circumftances, which otherwife would have escaped us; and, by that means, he may either moderate or excite any particular paffion.

It may feem unreafonable abfolutely to deny the authority of philofophy in this refpect: But it must be confeffed, that there lies this ftrong prefumption against it, that if these views be natural and obvious, they would have occurred of themselves, without the affiftance of philofophy; if they be not natural, they never can have any influence on the affections. Thefe are of a very delicate nature, and cannot be forced or constrained by the utmost art and industry. A confideration, which we feek for on purpose, which we enter into with difficulty, which we retain with care and attention, can never produce thofe genuine and durable movements of paffion, which are the result of nature, and the conftitution of the mind. A man may as well pretend to cure himself of love, by viewing his mistress thro' the artificial medium of a microscope, or profpect, and beholding there the coarseness of her skin, and monftrous difproportion of her features, as hope to excite or moderate any paffion by the artificial arguments of a SENECA or an EPICTETUS. The remembrance of the natural afpect and fituation of the objects will, in both cafes, ftill return upon him. The reflections of philofophy are too fubtile and diftant to take place in common life, or eradicate any affection. The air is too fine to breathe in, where it is above the winds and clouds of the atmosphere.

ANOTHER defect of thofe refined reflections, which philofophy presents to us, is, that commonly they cannot diminish or extinguifh our vicious paffions, without diminishing or extinguishing fuch as are virtuous, and rendering the mind totally indifferent and inactive. They are for the most part, general, and are applicable to all our affections. In vain do we hope to direct their influence only to one fide. If by inceffant study and meditation we have rendered them very intimate and present to us, they will operate thro'out, and fpred an univerfal infenfiР bility