that he would return when peace should be restored to the CHAP. IV. walks of private life, betrayed their fears, that so much power once acquired might not readily be parted with.

Massachussetts manifested more than usual solicitude to demonstrate the respect entertained for their General. A committee of the Congress of that province waited to receive him at Springfield, on the confines of the colony, about one hundred miles from Boston, and to escort him to the army. Immediately after his arrival, an address was presented to him from the representatives, breathing for him the most cordial affection, and testifying for him the most exalted respect. His answer was well calculated to keep up the favourable impressions which had been made, the preservation of which was so essential to the success of that very arduous contest into which the United Colonies had now entered.

*

The first moments after his arrival in camp were employed by

1774.

July.

* The answer given by General Washington to this warm and flattering address commenced in the following terms :

"Gentlemen,

Your kind congratulations on my appointment and arrival demand my warmest acknowledgments, and will be ever retained in grateful remembrance. In exchanging the enjoyments of domestic life for the duties of my present honorable but arduous station, I only emulate the virtue and public spirit of the whole province of Massachussetts, which, with a firmness and patriotism without example, has sacrificed all the comforts of social and political life, in support of the rights of mankind, and the welfare of our common country. My highest ambition is to be the happy instrument of vindicating these rights, and to see this devoted province again restored to peace, liberty, and safety.

VOL. II.

k k

the

CHAP. IV. the Commander in Chief in reconnoitring the enemy, and examining the strength and situation of the American troops.

$774.

Strength and disposition of

The main body of the British army under the immediate command of General Howe, was entrenching itself strongly on Bunker's Hill, about a mile from Charlestown, and about half a mile in advance of the works which had been thrown up by the Americans on Breed's Hill. Three floating batteries lay in Mystic River, near the camp; and a twenty gun ship below the ferry between Boston and Charlestown. There was also on the Boston side of the water, on Cops, or Cope's Hill, a strong battery, which had very much annoyed the provincials while in possession of Breed's Hill, and which now served to cover and strength en the post held by the enemy on Bunker's Hill. The other division of the British army was deeply intrenched, and strongly fortified on Roxbury Neck. These two divisions secured the only avenues leading from the country into the two peninsulas of Boston and Charlestown; and with the facilities given by the entire command of the waters, could very readily communicate with, and support each other. They constituted the whole force of the enemy, except the light horse, and an inconsiderable body of infantry stationed in Boston.

The American army lay on both sides of Charles River. Its the two armies. right occupied the high grounds about Roxbury, from whence it extended towards Dorchester, and its left was covered by Mystic or Medford River, a space of at least twelve miles.

Intrenchments were thrown up on Winter and Prospect Hills, something more than a mile from that division of the enemy which

1774.

which lay on the peninsula of Charlestown, and in full view of CHAP. IV. it. A strong intrenchment was also thrown up at Sewal's farm; in addition to which, such intermediate points on the river as would admit of the landing of troops, were occupied and strengthened. At Roxbury, where General Thomas commanded, a strong work had been erected on the hill, about two hundred yards from the meeting house, which, aided by the difficulties of the ground, was relied on to secure that pass.

The troops from New Hampshire, with a regiment from Rhode Island, amounting in the whole to somewhat less than two thousand men, occupied Winter Hill. About a thousand men commanded by general Putnam, being a part of the Connecticut line, were on Prospect Hill. The residue of the Connecticut troops, and nine regiments from Massachussetts, making in the whole between four and five thousand men, were stationed at Roxbury. The remaining troops of Rhode Island were placed at Sewal's farm, and the residue of the forces of Massachussetts at Cambridge, except about seven hundred men who were dispersed along the coast in several small towns, to prevent the casual depredations of the enemy.

Thus the American lines were extended over a very considerable space, nor could they be contracted without opening to the enemy a communication with the country. The Commander in chief made no other immediate change in the disposition of the troops, than to arrange and organize them more distinctly. For this purpose the army was thrown into three grand divisions. That part of it which lay about Roxbury, constituted the right wing, which was now commanded by Major General Ward:

1774

CHAP. IV. those troops about Mystic, or Medford River, formed the left; which was placed under the command of Major General Lee, who was himself stationed on Prospect Hill: the centre division, including the reserve, was under the immediate command of General Washington, whose head quarters were at Cambridge.

Deficiency of the Americans

in arms and ammunition.

The General found himself at the head of about fourteen thousand five hundred men, with whom he had to defend this extensive camp, and to continue the blockade of the enemy on the land side. This force was by no means so considerable as the common opinion made it, and a variety of circumstances combined to render it still less efficient, than from its numbers alone might have been expected.

So long had the hope of avoiding open hostilities been indulged, that the time for making preparations to meet them had passed away unemployed, and the neglect could not be remedied. No adequate supplies of military stores had been procured, and there was, really, but a very inconsiderable quantity of them in the country. On General Washington's first arrival in camp, he had ordered a return of the ammunition to be made, and the report stated three hundred and three barrels of powder to be in the stores. A few days after this return, on directing a fresh supply to the troops, the alarming discovery was made, that there were in reality on hand, only nine thousand, nine hundred and forty pounds, not more than sufficient to furnish each man with nine cartridges. This mistake in the quantity had been produced by a misapprehension of the committee of supplies (for the magazines were not yet in the possession of military officers) who, instead of returning the actual existing quan

1774.

tity, reported the whole which had been originally furnished by CHAP. IV. the province, thereby including in the estimate what had been already expended. The utmost possible exertions were necessary to relieve this essential want. They were made in every direction. All the colonial governments and committees, as well as Congress, were applied to, and intreated to send every pound of powder, and lead which could be spared. "No quan tity however small," they were assured, "was bencath notice.” In the mean time every saving was practised, and every effort was used to bring these essential articles into the country. This critical state of things continued for about a fortnight, when the danger resulting from it was in some degree diminished by the arrival of a small supply of powder sent from Elizabeth Town in New Jersey. The difficulties to be encountered by those who then conducted the affairs of America, may be, in some degree, conjectured from a circumstance attending this transaction. All essential to the general safety, as it apparently was, to replenish with the utmost possible expedition the magazines of that army, which was encamped in the face of the enemy, the committee of Elizabeth Town were under the necessity of transmitting privately, under other pretexts, this necessary aid, lest the people of the neighbourhood should seize and retain it for their own security.

The utmost address was used to conceal from the enemy the alarming deficiency which has been stated; but when it is recollected in how many various directions, and to what various authorities application for assistance was unavoidably made, it will appear scarcely possible that these efforts at secrecy could have been completely successful. It is more probable that the communications which must have been made to the British

general,