While the tendency of modern adjudication is to treat corporations as natural persons, the courts have not recognized that a corporation has a personal character independent of its trade or business. Trenton, etc., Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402. A corporation has been refused recovery for an injury to its reputation by a false accusation of corrupt practices. Mayor, etc., of Manchester v. Williams, [1891] 1 Q. B. 94. But a corporation has a business character, and it is well settled that it may recover for libel without proof of special damage where its business reputation is concerned. Metropolitan, etc., Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 87; Union Assoc. Press v. Heath, 49 N. Y. App. Div. 249. It has also been held that a corporation cannot maintain an action for slander when the words were spoken of one of its officers, if the slander be not in direct relation to the business of the corporation. Brayton v. Cleveland, etc., Co., 63 Oh. St. 83; see 14 HARV. L. REV. 289. But in the present case the defamation does relate to the business of the corporation. Moreover the inference is that the officer's connection with the company still continues. Consequently the article directly concerns the present business reputation of the plaintiff, and the result reached seems correct.

MORTGAGES FORECLOSURE MORTGAGOR'S RIGHT TO SURPLUS IN HANDS OF FIRST MORTGAGEE. - After a foreclosure sale the representative of the deceased mortgagor sued the first mortgagee, who had notice of the rights of the second mortgagee, to recover the surplus. Held, that the plaintiff may recover. Noar v. Bosse, Sup. Ct. of Hawaii, June 20, 1907.

The decision is in accord with the existing authorities. American Mortgage Co. v. Inzer, 98 Ala. 608; Itasca Investment Co. v. Dean, 84 Minn. 388. Nevertheless it cannot be supported on principle. At common law the second mortgagee becomes entitled to the rights remaining in the mortgagor after making the first mortgage. One of these rights is that of receiving from the first mortgagee any surplus from the sale of the mortgaged premises. Buttrick v. Wentworth, 88 Mass. 79. It has been held that if the surplus is paid the mortgagor after notice of the claim of the second mortgagee, the person making such payment is still liable to the second mortgagee. Fuller v. Langum, 37 Minn. 74. Since the mortgagor has assigned his rights to the second mortgagee, it is difficult to see on what grounds he can base his claim against the first mortgagee, who is bound to hold the surplus for the second mortgagee if he has notice of the latter's claim. Furthermore, the surplus is what remains to secure the mortgagor's debt to the second mortgagee. To allow the mortgagor to recover, therefore, is to allow a debtor to recover his security without payment.

PLEDGES TRANSFER OF POSSESSION - GOODS STORED ON PLEDGOR'S PREMISES. A warehouse company of New York obtained floor-room in a knitting company's mills in Wisconsin by a nominal lease. The place was used, not as a public storehouse, but solely to store property of the knitting company. The keys of this storage-room were kept by employees of the knitting company, and the articles stored were changed without the warehouse company's knowledge. The storage receipts given for such property were transferred to several parties as security for loans. Upon the bankruptcy of the knitting company, their trustee in bankruptcy took possession of the property represented by the receipts. Held, that there is no pledge of the property such as to bind the trustee in bankruptcy. Security Warehousing Company v. Hand, 206 U. S. 415.

The law concerning the necessity of delivery for a valid pledge is in a somewhat unsettled state. Since bailment is essential to any valid pledge, it is a violation of legal principles to leave the pledgor in control, for the anomalous condition then arises that the same person is both bailor and bailee. See 14 HARV. L. REV. 303. A pledge without sufficient delivery may give the pledgee rights when the question lies solely between pledgor and pledgee. See Adams v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 2 Fed. 174. But the rights of other creditors of the pledgor, even as represented by trustees in bankruptcy, should never be prejudiced by enforcing a pledge where the delivery was incomplete.

Young v. Kimball, 59 N. H. 446; contra, Macomber v. Parker, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 497. Delivery to third persons as agents of the pledgee is universally held to create a lien for the pledgee; and this rule has been applied even when such agent was the pledgor's employee. Sumner v. Hamlet, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 76. The principal case properly refused to allow an extension of this doctrine which would permit nominal possession by an employee to be a shield for actual control by the pledgor, enabling him fraudulently to obtain additional credit upon encumbered assets.

POLICE POWER REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND OCCUPATIONS PROHIBITION OF NIGHT WORK BY WOMEN IN FACTORIES. — A New York statute provided that no female should be employed or permitted to work in any factory before six o'clock in the morning or after nine o'clock in the evening. Held, that the statute is unconstitutional. People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131.

This decision affirms the decision of the lower court, commented upon in 20 HARV. L. REV. 653.

POLICE POWER REGULATION OF PROPERTY AND USE THEREOF. STATUTE INVALIDATING LICENSE CONTRACTS OF PATENTEES. 6.- - Proposed legislation declared criminal and void the sale or rental of tools or machinery on terms which forbade the vendee or lessee to obtain another article for the same operation, or for other steps in the same process, or materials to be used in the process, from any other than the vendor or lessor. Held, that the application of such legislation to the sale or rental of patented articles is constitutional. Opinion of the Justices, 193 Mass. 604.

The right of a patentee to dictate the terms on which the patented article may be used by a public service company, is subject to state legislation regulating such companies. State v. Bell Tel. Co., 36 Oh. St. 296; contra, Am. Rapid Tel. Co. v. Conn. Tel. Co., 49 Conn. 352. The application of state legislation prohibiting monopolistic contracts to restrictions imposed by a patentee upon his licensee appears to be without precedent, but not unconstitutional as infringing on federal authority. For the secondary monopolies contemplated by the prohibited contracts are not logically incident to the principal monopoly and within the protection of the federal grant. Contra, HeatonPeninsular, etc., Co. v. Eureka, etc., Co., 77 Fed. 288. But legislative interference with contracts must be clearly for the public welfare. Commonwealth v. Strauss, 191 Mass. 545. License-contracts more or less similar to those in question, have been held not to be opposed to public policy, or within the intended scope of federal anti-trust laws. Bement v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70; Ú. S., etc., Co. v. Griffin, etc., Co., 126 Fed. 364. Moreover, the practical benefit of prohibiting the secondary monopolies would be confined to a few rival manufacturers, since the patentee would still control the price of the principal article. This application of the proposed legislation does not clearly advance the public welfare, and therefore is a doubtful exercise of the police power.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANIES RIGHTS AND DUTIES TRACT.

EXCLUSIVE CON

- The defendant, a hotel-keeper, contracted with the plaintiff telephone and telegraph company that it should have an exclusive right to install telephones in the hotel. Held, that the contract is void. Central N. Y. Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Averill, 105 N. Y. Supp. 378 (Sup. Ct.).

The reasoning of the court is that this contract tends to suppress competition so as to threaten the public welfare. The validity of such contracts is said to be based primarily on public policy. Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396. Contracts similar to the one under discussion, when between private individuals who are not competitors, are held valid. Ferris v. American Brewing Co., 155 Ind. 539. But where there is any tendency to stifle competition between parties engaged in a public service, they are void. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Am. Union Tel. Co., 65 Ga. 160. Telephone and telegraph companies are public institutions, deeply involving the public interest, and consequently

the authorities hold any restraint on their service to be against public policy. Cumberland, etc., Co. v. Morgan's Louisiana, etc., R. R. Co., 51 La. Ann. 29. A South Carolina case identical with the present case reached the same result. Gwynn v. Citizens' Telephone Co., 69 S. C. 434. It might well be argued, however, that, had the contract been for a telephone in a private house, the public welfare is not involved, since the contracting party is the only person directly deprived of the benefits of competition. But granting this argument, the present contract might be held void as a violation of an innkeeper's duty to his guests.

RIGHT OF PRIVACY INFRINGEMENT - UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NAME AND PICTURE FOR PURPOSES OF TRADE. A famous inventor sought to restrain a drug manufacturer from using his name, picture, and pretended certificate without his consent. Held, that the plaintiff, though not a trade competitor, is entitled to relief. Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 Atl. 392 (N. J., Ct. of Ch.).

A man has no right of property in his name. Dockrell v. Dougall, 80 L. T. Rep. (N. s.) 556. But it has been said that he may invoke equity to protect him from exposure to litigation or liability caused by its unauthorized use. Walter v. Ashton, [1902] 2 Ch. 282. Protection has also been granted where the plaintiff's professional reputation is endangered. Mackenzie v. Soden, etc., Co., 27 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 402. In the case under discussion, however, the risk of pecuniary loss seems, at the most, shadowy; nor does there clearly appear here any damage to the plaintiff's professional reputation. The relief granted to this plaintiff of world-wide repute, who suffers no actual or prospective damage, must therefore be based on the broad ground of his right to be free from unjustifiable commercial exploitation of his non-corporeal personality. As to the picture, this case turns the scale of American authority in what is probably the right direction. See Pavesich v. New England, etc., Co., 122 Ga. 190; contra, Roberson v. Rochester, etc., Co., 171 N. Y. 538; Corelli v. Wall, 22 T. L. R. 532. As to the name and non-libellous misrepresentation, an important advance is marked in the establishment and definition of the right of privacy.

SURETYSHIP SURETY'S DEfenses — VarIATION FROM CONTRACT. By an agreement between the principal and the obligee for a variation in the construction of a two-story building, the cost was increased $700. The principal defaulted. Held, that the surety is not released. Prescott Nat'l Bank v. Head, 90 Pac. 328 (Ariz.).

Much of the confusion in the authorities on this question of change of an assured contract has arisen from failure to keep clear the distinction between an alteration of the original document and a mere variation from it. Any alteration or substitution of a new document for the old, whether detrimental to the surety or not, gives him a legal defense. Ziegler v. Hallahan, 126 Fed. 788. But if the parties, without the surety's consent, make a parol collateral agreement varying the actual performance of the original contract, the surety's defense, if any, is equitable, since a written contract cannot be varied by a parol agreement. See 16 HARV. L. REV. 511. It follows that the variation must threaten substantial harm to the surety to give him equitable relief. Dunn v. Parsons, 40 Hun. (N. Y.) 77. A change in the construction of a building whereby the cost is only slightly increased is not sufficient. Hohn v. Shideler, 164 Ind. 242. But it has been held in a similar case that a change in the construction at an increased cost of eighty-eight dollars released the surety. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Gates, 89 Mo. App. 201. In the present case the increase seems substantial and to justify equitable relief, and the decision is opposed to the weight of authority.

TAXATION WHERE PROPERTY MAY BE TAXED SITUS OF PROMISSORY NOTES. A New York creditor loaned large sums to Ohio debtors. The notes evidencing these debts were kept with an agent of the creditor in

Indiana. Held, that the notes have not a taxable situs in Indiana. Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392. See NOTES, p. 50.

TITLE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION - POSSESSION OF CONTENTS OF RECEPTACLE. After seizure of his goods under a writ of fieri facias the judgment debtor, without the knowledge of the sheriff, placed a sum of money in a piece of the furniture seized. Shortly afterwards he died insolvent. The sheriff having exercised no control over the money, the official receiver claimed it for the estate. Held, that the money has been placed in possession of the sheriff so that he is entitled to it. Johnson v. Pickering, [1907] 2 K. B. 437.

To constitute a valid levy on personal property, the American courts are not so strict as the English in demanding actual seizure by the sheriff, yet both agree that the chattel must be reduced to the legal possession of the officer Blades v. Arundale, 1 M. & S. 711; Minor v. Herriford, 25 Ill. 344. Posses sion of a chattel is not necessarily identical with possession of its receptacle. To possess the contents a man must know of its existence, or at least consent to assume control of whatever the receptacle may contain. Merry v. Green, 7 M. & W. 623; Durfee v. Jones, 11 R. I. 588. And if the possessor of the receptacle exercises no control over the chattel, possession depends on the intent of the person placing the chattel in the receptacle. Commonwealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523. In the principal case it seems difficult to work out possession of the money in the sheriff. He was wholly unaware of its existence, and he certainly did not consent to accept responsibility for everything the debtor might place in the furniture. Furthermore, the debtor placed the money in the receptacle with intent to keep control, and its possession, therefore, remained in him notwithstanding the sheriff's possession of the furniture.

TREASON-RESIDENT ALIEN'S DUTY OF ALLEGIANCE.

The petitioner,

a citizen of the South African Republic, was domiciled in Natal. When that portion of Natal had been evacuated by the British army and occupied by the Boer forces for some months, he joined the latter. Held, that he is guilty of high treason. De Jager v. Attorney-General of Natal, [1907] A. C. 326.

See

A citizen who renounces his allegiance and joins the enemy during war is guilty of high treason. Rex v. Lynch, [1903] 1 K. B. 444. An alien also owes a special allegiance to the state and may be guilty of high treason. Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 147; Rex v. De la Motte, 1 East P. C. 53. The present case extends the rule applied to citizens to an alien so long as he remains domiciled, even during his natural sovereign's temporary occupancy of the place of domicile. However strong the decision may appear, there seems no authority for the petitioner's contention that, with the temporary withdrawal of the state's forces, its sovereignty ceases. A belligerent's authority in occupied territory is a manifestation of the stress he puts on his enemy, and the sovereign's rights remain intact. HALL, INTERNAT. LAW, 3 ed., 468. Hence it would seem that wrongs done during the foreign occupation are afterwards cognizable by the ordinary courts. Furthermore, the consideration suggested by the court, that an opposite decision would permit aliens to take such an intolerable advantage of the hospitality extended to them as to swell a small invading force to a large army, seems unanswerable.

TRUSTS RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THIRD PARTIES CESTUI ESTOPPED BY TRUSTEE'S MISREPRESENTATION. - A trustee with power of sale gave a deed of trust property containing a recital of full payment of the purchase price, as security for a personal debt. The creditor, with notice of the trust, deposited the deed by way of equitable mortgage with the defendant, who had no notice of the trust or of non-payment. cestui qui trust and the equitable mortgagee are that of the cestui being prior in time prevails. 376. See NOTES, p. 53.

WITNESSES - PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

Held, that the equities of the equal in all other respects, and Capell v. Winter, [1907] 2 Ch.

WAIVER BY COMMISSION

TO TAKE TESTIMONY. - The plaintiff caused a commission to be issued for the examination of her physician. On the defendant's offering the deposition

in evidence the plaintiff objected on the ground that the communication was privileged. Held, that the privilege is waived. Clifford v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 188 N. Y. 349.

The object of the statutes making communications to a physician_privileged unless the privilege is waived by the patient, is "to save the patient from possible humiliation; not to enable him to win a lawsuit." See Schlotterer v. Brooklyn, etc., Ferry Co., 89 N. Y. App. Div. 508. And the better opinion is that where the patient has voluntarily destroyed the privacy of the testimony, he has shown there is no need of the privilege; its object has then been defeated, and therefore he can no longer object. Accordingly waiving the privilege at one trial precludes setting it up at retrial. Schlotterer v. Brooklyn, etc., Ferry Co., supra. And the privilege is also lost by the patient presenting evidence of the communication which is ruled incompetent. Kemp v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 94 N. Y. App. Div. 322. Moreover, the similar privilege concerning transactions with an attorney is waived by making a sworn statement of the communication before a justice and publishing it in a newspaper. Burnette, 73 Kan. 609. In the present case the communication was revealed, hence the obect of the privilege, the preservation of privacy, could not be attained, and the objection was properly overruled. 4 WIGMore, Evidence, § 2380, et seq.

In Re

BOOKS AND PERIODICALS.

I. LEADING LEGAL ARTICLES.

TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN WIDE BAYS. - The extent to which a littoral state may claim the right of territoriality over its bays was recently considered in two articles. Territorial Jurisdiction in Wide Bays, by A. H. Charteris, 16 Yale L. J. 471 (May, 1907); and The Recent Controversy as to the British Jurisdiction over Foreign Fishermen more than Three Miles from Shore, by Charles Noble Gregory, 1 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 410 (May, 1907). The occasion for this discussion was the holding in a recent Scottish case 1 that a statutory by-law prohibiting trawling in Moray Firth, a triangular sheet of water with an entrance eighty miles wide, applied to foreign fishermen. The decision is right, as the learned authors point out, for though the courts of a state may follow international law in so far as it is the common law of the land, yet the former law, like the latter, may be changed for those courts by a competent act of the legislature. But aside from the local decision there is the broader question whether other nations will recognize this act and whether by such recognition it will become a rule of international policy. Upon this question the articles assemble all the precedents.

In the time of James I, as they point out, by the doctrine of "king's chambers," England asserted jurisdiction over all waters within lines drawn around Britain from headland to headland. In fact, about that time most of the waters surrounding Europe were claimed as the territory of some power. Venice asserted her dominion over the Adriatic, Genoa over the Ligurian Sea, and Sweden and Denmark over the Baltic. Such claims, however, necessarily became more and more untenable, and early in the nineteenth century the freedom of the high seas became a principle of international law. But this principle has not given us at this time any arbitrary rules as to the territorial rights of a state in its bays or as to what constitutes a bay. Mr. Charteris shows that there is only an increasing tendency to some uniformity. Thus he points out that in 1882 in the North Sea Convention, as between themselves, England,

1 Mortensen v. Peters, 14 Scots. L. T. 227.

2 Hall, Internat. Law, 5 ed., 140 et seq.