he would not cease to say, that ministers were the aggressors. It was their eternal answer to this charge, that France had declared the war. Their incessant recurrence to this feeble subterfuge proceeded from a conscious qualm that the accusation was well founded. In his opinion, even in a case of actual insult, it was the duty of statesmen to attempt to procure redress by negociation before they recurred to the argument of war. Had ministers taken this course? The pretexts were, that the French had threatened to deprive our allies, the Dutch, of the free navigation of the Scheldt, and that they had made a declaration, threatening all the world with the dangers of fraternity. Grant that these were legitimate grounds upon which it was the duty of this country to demand satisfaction, was it not the duty of ministers to negociate for that satisfaction? The French had a minister at this court. Why did they not express to that minister the terms upon which they would continue their amity? In every correspondence of the sort, it was incumbent on both parties to state explicitly what they desired to be done, and what they would do in return. Let gentlemen look at the correspondence which had been published, and they would see that there was no declaration on the part of ministers upon what terms they were disposed to continue their amity. But grant even to government their demand, that the French were the aggressors, and that this was merely a defensive war: then it was the nature of a defensive war that it should be pursued on the motives of defence, and that every moment should be seized upon when it might be possible to obtain the security for which it was undertaken. He appealed to the House and to the country if this had been their conduct. He demanded whether, after the defeat of Dumourier, when Belgium was recovered, and when French Flanders was over-run, a peace upon the terms of security, and upon such terms as we had not now either reason or right to expect, might not have been obtained? If the war had been really defensive, if it had been undertaken only to resist encroachments, terms ought then to have been offered upon which we might have procured reparation, security and indemnity. Terms were offered by the French: Maret was sent here commissioned to offer terms. But they were rejected. Upon what principle? Not because we were fighting about a limit, about a boundary; but for that security which could only be obtained by the destruction of their government. He would not say that it was expressly stated that the ancient monarchy should be reinstated, though, by the by, Lord Hood, in his declaration at Toulon, had impressed that opinion upon every part of France; but both then, and at every time since, it had been

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A PEACE WITH FRANCE.

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GENERAL Diversity of MICHIGAN

the avowed object of ministers in the war, to destroy the jacobin government. Was the jacobin government destroyed? Was the government founded on the rights of man at an end? Had the declaration of the 19th of November 1792, been any otherwise abandoned than it had been two years ago? Why had they not then treated before? Because they had objected to treat expressly with any government founded on the rights of man. He would not say that the right honourable gentleman had gone the length of asserting that it would be a bellum ad internecionem; he had said there might be a case of extremity, but he made use of a quotation which had this effect, that it left an impression of his meaning on the memory, and the words were not liable to misconstruction. His quotation was,

Esse, fuit.

"Potuit quæ plurima virtus
Toto certatum est corpore regni."

Such was the right honourable gentleman's declaration. But
now we were come to a government when we might surrender
all our former assertions, and safely treat for peace. Had
we then obtained the objects of the war? The first was our
obligation to defend our ally, the States-General. He had
always lamented the fate of that unhappy people. They
were entangled in a situation, from which, whoever were
conquerors, they could not escape; whoever gained, their
ruin was inevitable. Had we saved our ally? It was the
boast that we had taken the Cape of Good Hope. Good
God! was this safety for Holland? We had abandoned their
possessions in Europe to France, while we had marked out
their dependencies in the East for our share of the plunder.
Our protection was like that of our allies toward Poland; we
divided it for its safety; and it was an argument for having
abandoned all its European possessions to France, that we
had seized, or were about to seize, on all its Asiatic territo
ries for ourselves.

He could not help again digressing to one of the attacks which had been made upon himself. What, it had been said, would you be so dastardly as to negociate for a peace with France, and leave Holland in their hands? Now even from this attack he was delivered, ministers had agreed to become the dastards, and to treat with France, possessed of Holland. This they must acknowledge, or agree with him that there was nothing dastardly in the proposition last year. He wished to God it were as probable now as it was then, that it might be recovered by negociation. He still trusted it would be so. But there were other reasons that now induced them to negociate for peace. The domestic state of this

country was changed. He could not avoid remarking how the arguments varied. If they were speaking upon the sedition bills, and he were to assert that there were no excesses in the country, that called for such unconstitutional restraints, he should instantly hear a set of pamphlets and hand-bills read, to prove that Great Britain was almost in a state of rebellion; but if he were to demand, why the present was a more fit time than any other to negociate for peace, he should instantly be answered, because we were happily safe at home against all danger of jacobin principles. If he should say, that by the increase of our debt, and the growing load of na tional burdens, there was much discontent in the country, it would be answered, No such thing; the example of France has checked every symptom of discontent with the present order of things. Then why pass the abominable bills? Why? it would on the other side be answered, because there was something so perverse and obstinate in the seditious multitude, that nothing but depriving us of our constitution could make us safe. In this way did they reason. measure had its own stile of argument; and it was thought necessary to insult the understanding, as well as to impose chains upon the person.

Each

We had failed, then, in Holland; and we had failed at home. What had we done for the rest of Europe? What for Prussia, for Spain, for Austria? What had been the fate of the war in general? His honourable friend had spoken generally of our disasters, with the exception of our naval exploits. The right honourable gentleman, with that peculiar cast of candour which belonged to himself, had thrown out an insinuation that his honourable friend had forgotten the achievements of his illustrious father. What fortunate impression his candid sneer had made upon the House, he would not inquire. His honourable friend had spoken generally of the disasters of the war, without thinking it necessary to enumerate the particular instances in which, under the conduct of great and gallant officers, even the incapacity of ministers had not deprived the British arms of glory. But what great advantages had we obtained in the West Indies, except the glory of Sir Charles Grey's achievements? Would any man say that the manner of the loss of Guadaloupe and St. Lucie did not make us lament their previous conquest? Again, therefore, he asserted, that the war had been disastrous, inasmuch as we had failed in every object. We had lost Holland, which was one object of the war; and we had settled and rivetted discontent on the minds of the people of England, not merely by the calamities arising from the war,

but from the measures we had taken, and were now taking, to stifle that discontent.

Peace, however, was now said to be near. Perhaps he thought it was near, but he did not think so on account of the message from the throne. He thought so because ministers felt the sense of the country to be declared against the war; because, however they might affect to misrepresent the feeling of the country in their speeches, they felt in their hearts, that there was not one man in the kingdom, the race of money-jobbers, contractors, and interested persons only excepted, who was not sick of the war, as well as of the miserable pretexts for carrying it on. He thought, therefore, that to fix ministers to the point, they should adopt the amendment, which contained a much more clear and specific declaration than that contained in the address. He knew that it was a vulgar opinion, and surely it was the most vulgar of all vulgar opinions, that the proposers of a negociation, always stood the worst chance in that negociation. He wished to know one instance in which this had ever been the case. In the present circumstances of Great Britain and France, he thought the advantage was evidently on the side of the proposers. For in both countries there was an evident desire for peace in the great body of the people; so that it would be impossible for the executive government of either country to reject any proposals which might be made, if they were not altogether unreasonable. If, therefore, at this moment, we were to make proposals to France, if they were not grossly dishonourable, their committee of directory and council of ancients, would not dare to refuse them, because, by refusing them, they know that they would lose the confidence and respect of the people.

The right honourable gentleman had not thought it necessary to open his motion for the address, with any exposition of the reasons why the message had been brought down at this very remarkable conjuncture. The speech from the throne was made on the 29th of October, and then no such intimation was given; but the right honourable gentleman had said, that a declaration tantamount to the present was made in the king's speech, and that the people from that speech would have been justified in expecting the present message. They must judge of the impression by the effects. The speech from the throne had produced no sensation on the funds. What had the message produced? A rise in the funds that day of 5 or 6 per cent. He came therefore now to a material part of the present inquiry. Why had not the right honourable gentleman made known the substance of this message before, or at least why not stated his reasons in justi

fication of doing it at this most suspicious moment? It had been the good practice till his time, of closing the loan only the day before it was opened to parliament. If the right honourable gentleman had made his loan in that way, he must acknowledge that with the words of this message in his pocket, he ought to have made terms materially different. If he had this message in his mind, and felt himself bound not to make an open loan, in what predicament did he stand? Messrs. Boyd and Co. very handsomely left it to him to propose the terms; then, with the knowledge of this intention, ought he not to have made a bargain upon the ground of the impression which this message was calculated to make? Were the circumstances of the country such, that he was bound to make the bargain a week before he opened it? Perhaps the suspicion was well founded, that his secret contract with the gentlemen, on account of bills coming due on the 10th of December, stipulated that the bargain should be made before that day. But he called upon every gentleman who heard him to say, if he could believe it possible, that any change could have happened so material as to justify the concealment of this intimation until after he had made his bargain, and then to bring it forth to swell the bonus to such a height; or, if any circumstances had arisen to justify the concealment then, and the intimation now, to say why the right honourable gentleman should not be called upon to state them. A loss had been suffered by the public of not less, on the meanest computation, than one hundred and fifty thousand pounds. This had been put into the pockets of persons who talked loudly of their independence, and of the disinterested support they gave to ministers. It was not his practice to impute any thing personally corrupt to the right honourable gentleman, and he did not impute to him any thing of the kind now; but he did think that, in decency and in duty, in regard to himself as well as to the country, he was called upon to explain this extraordinary transaction. It was a direct robbery upon the public of 5 or 6 per cent. upon the whole loan, if with the knowledge of his intention he made his bargain without a public declaration of the change that had taken place; and he must prove that he did not know of this change but a week before he declared it. The change however was now announced. He trusted the declaration would not have the fate of former declarations. He should rejoice in the day of peace, come when it would. When it did come, he should certainly be thankful; but he should by no means consider the restoration of peace as superseding the necessity of an inquiry into the origin, principle, and conduct of the war. For if this were neglected, it might establish a precedent upon which any minister might under