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ceding night, for the purpose of rousing the powers of Europe by our example, which we could only exhibit in the case of invasion, that put the question on a different footing. He disliked the phrase "to rouse Europe," because the attempt to do so had the effect of producing a disinclination to cooperate with us. Every man knew that the character of the British government in Europe was, that it was actuated by selfish motives in instigating the powers of the continent to war for British interests. He hoped that this opinion was false; but if we should attempt to instigate the powers of the continent to a renewal of hostilities, whilst they wished to remain at peace, whether for the purpose of regaining strength or recruiting their resources, or for whatever other reason, it would alienate the affections of Europe more from us than any inefficiency that could take place in the conduct of the war. If Austria alone were to embark with us in the war, she could not use her exertions with advantage to herself or The interests of both would be identified, could not be separated, and consequently neither could enjoy the full benefit of her exertions. This was a ground for thinking that the result could not be favourable. Austria would be driven to the alternative of concluding a treaty under the same circumstances which obliged her to conclude the treaty of Leoben and Luneville, and to submit to such terms as France should dictate; for it was contrary to all experience and history to suppose, as had been argued, that being engaged to Russia and England, she would be bound to hold out to the last. No country could be obliged by any treaty to hold out to its destruction, and lie down under its ruin. There was another alternative which Austria might adopt, which was, to hold out to the end; and might not that conduct endanger the total extinction of the second power in Europe? If she chose, as he thought she would, the former alternative, we should then be driven, after all our efforts and expence, either to make a separate peace, or to carry on a defensive war. He hoped we should not be reduced to that alternative, and would not discuss what should be our conduct in such a case. It would be highly indiscreet in us to form an alliance for the purpose of a continental war with Russia and Austria, and it would be still more indiscreet in Austria, for Russia and Great Britain would be in a far different situation from that of their ally. If such an alliance could be formed with Russia, Austria, Prussia, and the other powers of the continent, as would gain their good will, without attempting to rouse them before their own interests, in their own view of them, would call for their exertions, such an alliance would afford hopes that we might obtain reasonable terms of peace.

His reason for not voting for the sum proposed was, becaurse no answer had been returned to the propositions of the French government. Time enough had elapsed for obtaining 'the consent of Russia; and the effect of withholding explanation 'from the House on the subject must be, that they would not place any confidence in his majesty's ministers. Was atry reputation gained by not returning an answer? Were they not, until some explanation should be given, in the odious situation of having left a pacific proposition six months unanswered? But it had been said, that a few days after the' proposition, a message had been sent to the French council in terms not very complimentary to the British government. Certainly we should not be the foremost to notice such expressions, for even 'the message under considération contained language not very complimentary to the French government. He was ignoratit what propositions his majesty's ministers intended to make, but he had no doubt that they ought to be kept sécrét till they should be made known at a general congress. If it was their intention to propose terms through Russia to France, he took that opportunity of entreating his majesty's ministers, that they might be reasonable. 'He did not mean that the propositions should be exactly what they would insist upon as their ultimatum, but that the difference between the extremes of what they should at first demand, and what they should afterwards consent to accept, should be as small as may be. If the propositions should be such as 'Europe "should 'think 'unreasonable, or as this government, if in the place of the French government, would think unreasonable, to be accepted; if they should be such only as were to form the grounds of a manifesto on the part of powers' previously determined on war, though you should engage the continent în "a new war, you would alienate the disposition of Europe from 'you more than if no terms should be proposed at all. 'He spoke thus generally, because totally in the dark on the sub'ject, and guided only by conjecture. Whatever we might say "of our disinterestedness, whatever of our moderation and forbearance, Europe had a different opinion, which might possibly be wrong; but we had a character to gain or retrieve on the occasion. Let the answer to be returned contain propositions reasonable in the extreme, if such a contradiction of "terms could be used; the effect would be, that they might be "accepted, and that would be the only mischief that could result from proposing them. We should then make a separate peace, and could any man contend that there was comparatively any great difference as to the object, whether a peace "was to be concluded by Great Britain id Russia, or upon

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terms that would be approved of by all Europe, and which all the powers of Europe would possibly guarantee? But if the terms should not be accepted, as some gentlemen were disposed to think that there was no inclination in the French government, though for himself he had some doubts of it, whilst the leaning of his mind was the other way, this would strengthen the argument of those who urged the necessity of rousing Europe. The more reasonable the terms that should be rejected, the greater would be the indignation of Europe at their rejection. He could not help thinking that Europe had been, through peace and war, against us and with France. France had now given us an opportunity to conciliate all the world, and we should manage it. It was not enough that the indignation of Europe was excited, we should persuade the continent that we had reason on our side, and that the injustice was on the part of France. He was glad of this opportunity of stating his opinion on the general question. As to the particular subject now under discussion, he had nothing to add to what he had stated at the outset, that he could not agree to it. If it was a vote of credit, that would not be novel. When last war a subsidiary treaty had been arranged with Russia, a sum of money had been voted, but then the House knew for what object. In the present case they were told nothing. They did not know whether it was intended for Austria or Russia, or for purposes of enabling us to procure terms of peace, and they had no security that it would not be applied in the manner the House was most apprehensive of. He should therefore give the vote a decided negative.

FUNERAL HONOURS TO THE MEMORY OF MR. PITT. January 27. 1806.

ON

N the 23d of January 1806, died the right honourable William Pitt. On the 27th of the same month Mr. Henry Lascelles moved, "That an humble address be presented to his majesty that his majesty will be graciously pleased to give directions, that the remains of the right honourable William Pitt be interred at the public charge; and that a monument be erected in the collegiate church of St. Peter, Westminster, to the memory of that excellent statesman, with an inscription expressive of the public sense of so great and irreparable a loss; and to assure his majesty that this House will make good the expences attending the same." The motion was seconded by the Marquis of Titchfield, and supported

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by Lord Louvaine, Mr. J. H. Browne, Mr. H. Addington, Sir R. Buxton, General Tarleton, Earl Temple, Mr. Ryder, Mr. Rose, Lord Castlereagh, and Mr. Wilberforce. It was opposed by Lord Folkestone, Mr. William Smith, the Marquis of Douglas, Mr. Windham, Mr. Ponsonby, and Mr. Fox.

Mr. Fox rose and spoke as follows:- I do not know, Sir, that I ever rose to address the House in the performance of my public duty with more pain than I do at this moment. I therefore hope that I shall experience some indulgence, if, before I give my vote on this question, I should shortly state the reasons which compel me to oppose the motion now proposed by the honourable gentleman under the gallery. The honourable gentleman says, that all party feelings and political animosities should be laid aside on the present occasion. I assure him, that I do lay aside all party feelings. If I had any such at this time, they would lead me to vote with the honourable gentleman and not against him. At the same time I do not pretend to undervalue party feelings. When a person is convinced that the opinions which he holds, if acted upon, would be productive of benefit to his country, but finds that the only chance of having them acted upon depends upon his connection with a party, and the support which by this means he may acquire, it is his duty to have rècourse to a party. He may consider this fairly and justly as the best mode of effectually carrying into execution those measures which, in his estimation, are the most calculated to promote the public prosperity and happiness. But at present it is obvious to every one, that all the motives which are likely to influence me, as far as party is concerned, are on the side of the honourable gentleman, and would lead me to vote with him. The honourable gentleman must see, that if the gratification of party feelings, if ambition, if private interest, were my objects, the most proper course for me to pursue, would be to give an immediate assent to this motion. Upon such a supposition, every one must be sensible how much it would be my interest to conciliate, as much as possible, all those who had the greatest respect and value for Mr. Pitt, to drown, if it could be done, the very remembrance of our political contests, and endeavour to gain, by every means that could be imagined, their support and favour. This would be the line of conduct which party views would suggest, as the most proper to follow. But this is not all: there are other motives of no less weight, that strongly recommend the same mode of proceeding. For many of the supporters of the present motion I have a personal friendship, which would make me reluctant to oppose them on such au

occasion; but, most of all would it be my interest, as well as my inclination, not to cross, in this instance, the views of the noble lord near me (Earl Temple) and other near relations of the deceased minister, with whom I am now likely to be, for the remainder of my life, inseparably connected. The vote, therefore, may be considered as one not given to gratify any feeling of private animosity, or of public ambition, but extorted by a most painful but imperious sense of duty. In every party point of view then, whether my object should be to conciliate those who have the warmest attachment to the memory of Mr. Pitt, or to join with those who are already my political friends, my plan would be to support the honourable gentleman's motion. I will go farther, and say that if feelings were to be allowed to direct our conduct on this occasion, the right honourable gentleman opposite (Mr. Rose) might address to our feelings arguments much more powerful than those which he has just now addressed to our reasons. I, Sir, have been engaged in a long course of opposition to the person for whom public honours are now claimed. I may say that I have been considered, and perhaps it may be called an honour, as his rival. But I do assure the right honourable gentleman and his most zealous admirers, that, during all that time, I never opposed him from a personal motive.

I will go still farther, and say, that another motive would lead me to support the motion, and that is the respect which I entertain for many of Mr. Pitt's personal qualities. Great qualities he certainly had, in no ordinary degree, in private life; and great qualities also in points connected with his administration. I do not think this a proper time to enter upon the particular acts of that administration; but in the measure for the establishment of a real sinking fund, he had always my warmest support, and I freely declare my opinion, that this has done a great deal of good to the nation, and, that for this, therefore, the country is highly obliged to him. There is another quality for which he deserves great praise. No minister was ever more disinterested, as far as related to pecuniary matters. His integrity and moderation, in this respect, are confirmed by the state of his affairs when he died. I allow that a minister is not to be considered as moderate and disinterested, merely because he is poor during his life, or et his death. But when I see a minister, who has been in office above twenty years, with the full command of places and public money, without any peculiar extravagance and waste, except what might be expected from the carelessness that perhaps necessarily arose from the multiplicity of duties, to which the attention of a man, in such a situation, must be directed; when I see a minister, under such circumstances,

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