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the liberation of which from the yoke of France would be most desirable. But have you any hopes of accomplishing such an object? Have you any chance of doing so by the course you are now about to take? No man thinks more highly than I do, of the ability and gallantry of your commanders; no man thinks more highly than I do, of the intrepidity and valour of your soldiers; no man thinks more highly than I do of the immense power, most incomparable skill and invincible spirit of your navy; no man has more earnest wishes than I have to see the power of France reduced by the efforts of Great Britain. Much certainly, in one way, may be done towards this object. You may seize her islands-you may take her colonies and destroy her trade; you have done it before, and, for aught I know, you may distress her even more. Even then, what will you ultimately gain? On the other hand, what may you not ultimately lose? You may be driven to the brink of bankruptcy yourselves. But France, we are told, will have been destroyed first. France may, indeed, be made a beggar, but will that make her a better neighbour to you? Say even that a new revolution should happen to France, as many have happened to her within these ten years What will you be the better for that? "France," you may then exclaim," is now more miserable than ever she was!" To be sure she will be so; and you- how will you be the better for her misery? It is argued, however, that if we are to go to war, it is wiser to commence it now, than to delay it; distinctions are drawn between internal strength and strength for the annoyance of an enemy; it is said that, as to France, another year may extend her commerce, increase her population, and thus give her additional means of annoying us; and that all these means will be diminished by the revolutions she may suffer in another war. If she should suffer in the next war ten revolutions, instead of the five or six through which she struggled in the last, putting all other considerations out of the question, are we justified by experience in expecting that her sufferings will render her a better neighbour to us, or less troublesome to the repose of the world? Was she so wasted by the losses of the late war, was she so enervated by the calamities of her revolutions, as to be rendered incapable of annoying others, or of defending herself? Were not her latest efforts, on the contrary, the most terrible and the most successful?”

From these grounds, which Mr. Fox recapitulated, he drew the conclusion, that we were in a situation, in which, if we were to proceed on our present narrow ground of mere local British interest, we had nothing to gain; absolutely nothing. We could not hope for an ally from any quarter of the world.

But if the House should agree to the amendment moved on the address, it would open to us another and a better course. The amendment contained nothing, which, with the exception of a very few words indeed, they did not all believe to be true. That his majesty's ministers had not done the best that could have been done, in the whole of the negociation, was certainly a very general opinion. That question was by common consent (as it appeared) to be the subject of debate at a future day; the address he thought would prejudge that question; whereas the amendment kept it entirely open for discussion and decision. To attain the greater objects of the amendment, Mr. Fox gave notice, that he should, at no very distant period, move the House to address his majesty to avail himself of the disposition manifested by the Emperor of Russia to bring about a general peace. If that prince should either be unwilling to engage in the meditation, or unable, through the fault of our enemy, to accomplish its purpose, neither of which Mr. Fox could believe, the House would enjoy the satisfaction of reflecting that they had done every thing in their power, which prudence could dictate, to avoid the calamities of war. The alternative would then be inevitable, and they would adopt it without reproach. At present nothing could be said in favour of the policy of war, but that it may be better for us now than it would be four months hence. This advantage would be more than counterbalanced by proving to all Europe, that war was not our choice; that we had applied to one of its first powers to prevent it, and that we were ready to accept the proffered mediation. Mr. Fox concluded his speech with stating the strong sense of duty, and the deep anxiety of mind under which he had been impelled to deliver his opinions so much at length; and with exhorting the House, before they entered on this great contest, not only to pause, to deliberate, and to satisfy themselves, but to do every thing that depended on them to convince their constituents and all Europe that the avoiding it was impossible.

On a division, Mr. Grey's amendment was negatived by 398 against 67. After which the original address was agreed to.

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MR. Fox's MOTION RESPECTING THE MEDIATION OF
RUSSIA.

May 27.

IN pursuance of the notice he had given,

Mr. Fox rose for the purpose of making his promised motion respecting the mediation of the Emperor of Russia to adjust the existing differences between this country and France. He observed, that although, from the time and circumstances under which he brought it forward, it might be considered as one of the most important ever submitted to parliament, it was one which led to no great length of discussion, nor would require him to take any very comprehensive view of the topics naturally connected with it. Into the general question of the propriety of the war, he was not disposed to enter. He had stated his opinions very fully on a former day: a great majority had differed from him; and to the judgment of that majority it was his duty to bow. The country was then actually at war, and being so, he should give the war the best support in his power. But although we were at war, and although many differences prevailed as to the grounds of it, no one would deny the propriety of bringing it as soon as possible to an honourable termination. The proposition which it was his intention, to submit to the House had this object in view. It was understood, that an offer had recently been made by the Emperor of Russia to interpose his mediation, or good, offices, for the settlement of the differences between Great Britain and France. He wished to induce the House of Commons to advise his majesty immediately to avail himself of those friendly dispositions. On the advantages, of mediation, in general, it was not necessary for him to descant; still less on the advantages which must result from the mediation of that powerful, respected, and universally esteemed sovereign, the Emperor of Russia. It was Mr. Fox's opinion, that even where mediation was wholly inactive, where the mediating powers lent only their names to a negociation, the offer of it ought, under almost any circumstances, to be accepted. Even this, which was the lowest species of mediation, was useful for the sake of public opinion. What was now proposed, however, he un

derstood to be of the higher species, and to amount to an offer, by the Emperor of Russia, of an effectual interposition of his good offices; which, among other advantages, included this, that if it should fail, through our enemy's advancing unjust claims and pretensions, and if we should be compelled by such failure to prosecute the war for objects which, in that case, must be approved by the mediating sovereign, we should secure his support, and the sanction of his great and powerful name. And what was equally material, we should have in our favour the public opinion of Europe and the world. This, let gentleman be assured, was no trifling matter; it was a consideration of sufficient importance by itself, even if there existed no other motive, to determine in favour of the propriety of the step he was about to recommend.

It was not, however, merely for the sake of adjusting present differences that he thought the acceptance of this mediation so desirable. To that power to which ministers looked as the principal and only fit guarantee for Malta, they might naturally look for mediation on other matters; they might look for an extension of his guarantee to all the points now at issue between the governments of Great Britain and France. Thoroughly impressed with the feasibility of this plan, Mr. Fox most anxiously conjured ministers, as they valued the interests of their country and the permanent peace of Europe, not to suffer the present opportunity to escape them; not to overlook means so obvious and so practicable for the accomplishment of all their objects, whether of security, honour, or satisfaction.

In his hopes of benefit from this measure, Mr. Fox said, that he carried his views very far. The power, the character, and the rank of the Emperor of Russia, rendered him, of all sovereigns, not only the very fittest mediator on the points in dispute between Great Britain and France, but the fittest protector and guarantee of the rights of independent nations, and of the general interests of Europe. The personal character of this prince stood on the highest ground; nor could his own praise of him, Mr. Fox said, add any thing to the estimation in which he was every where held. He spoke not of his private character alone, but of his princely qualities, of his justice to the people committed to his care, of his love of peace, and of his ardent desire for its maintenance in Europe; and particularly of his wish to see peace restored between Great Britain and France, although he was not likely to be a loser by their quarrels.

The leading feature of his character, therefore, was that which most fitted him for a mediator. There was another part in it which peculiarly pointed him out as the mediator to

This

whom we should most choose to refer our differences. prince was understood to be very sensibly affected by many changes which had taken place in Europe since the peace of Amiens; and to have highly disapproved, and in many instances to have been disgusted with the conduct of France towards other powers since that period. It was impossible, therefore, to imagine a sovereign, whose interposition could be more consonant to what ought to be our wishes. In looking for a mediator, the two points concerning which it would most import us to be satisfied, were, his character and his opinions. The first qualification, as he had already stated, was a love of peace; the second, a dislike and disapprobation of those acts which either directly or remotely constituted the cause of the dispute on which he was to mediate. Both these were eminently conspicuous in the illustrious sovereign of whom he was then speaking.

With respect to the beneficial consequences which would attend the acceptance of his mediation on a more extended scale, Mr. Fox was very sanguine. He would state no certainty, indeed, of its producing peace, but a strong and reasonable hope. At all events, he looked forward through it to the most advantageous connection which this country could form under the present circumstances of Europe. In the actual state of affairs, what was more probable than that France, taking advantage of her condition of preparation and power, would abuse it, for the purpose of further acquisitions at the expence of the smaller and more defenceless states? This was the great evil to be apprehended from the present war; and against this evil a connection with Russia would be the surest guard, as well as afford the best hope of settling at last some solid system of peace for Europe. What other means, he would ask, had we of preventing the oppression of the smaller states by France, if she should be disposed to attempt it? What means had we of our own? And after France had testified a disposition to accept the mediation, how would it appear to Europe were we to decline the offer?

No expression implying the superiority of any other power was fit to be used in speaking of Great Britain and its interests; but he would ask, was there ever a sovereign who, from his situation, was so fit to prescribe peace as the Emperor of Russia? What was the language which he was enabled to hold both to this country and to France? We had a dispute with the late emperor, which, although settled, was settled upon conditions to which the court of St. Petersburgh might still continue to except, as being in a great degree harsh and disadvantageous. On the other hand, that court objected to part of an article in the treaty of Amiens,

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