The whole course of their experience taught them the contrary. No: it was because the right honourable gentleman thought himself better qualified to judge of the propriety of the time, and the extent of such assistance, than the House of Commons. I shall not dispute with him at present, whether he was or not. The constitution says, he was not, and under this authority he was bound to act. The constitution says, that the public money is at the disposal, not of the crown, but of parliament, and therefore he had no right to dispose of such a sum without the consent of parliament. I do not argue the point of his superior knowledge, or his superior wisdom. I think it fairer to stand upon authority; and when the constitution speaks precisely, as it does upon this point, neither he, nor any other man, has a right to resist its will, The question now is, not whether the constitution be good or bad, whether this be a wise or unwise arrangement; it has its advantages, and it, no doubt, may have its inconveniences; but it was his duty, as the minister of a free constitution, to adhere to the principles which it has laid down, and to the rules which it has prescribed; the first and most important of which is, that the disposal of the public money is vested, not in the king, but in the people. When he violated this fundamental principle, and infringed this sacred law, what else can I infer than a desire to establish a precedent against the constitution? The circumstances which have accompanied the transaction justify the inference which I draw. I find from the accounts upon the table, that a considerable part of the sum was issued in November last. How, then, does the matter stand? Ministers finding themselves called upon to lend pecuniary aid to the emperor during the recess, the measure, instead of being laid before the parliament immediately upon its meeting, was studiously concealed for the purpose of holding out, as a precedent in the history of the country to be made known to Great Britain and to the world, that the disposal of the public money is no longer in the hands of the House of Commons, but that it is in the hands of the crown. We heard something like an apology yesterday from the right honourable gentleman, which, to me, appeared as unsatisfactory as the conduct which it was brought forward to justify is unconstitutional. It consisted of two parts in the first place, that parliament was not so good a judge of the amount of the assistance to be granted to the emperor as the right honourable gentleman; and, secondly, that from the discussions to which the publicity of the transaction would lead, considerable mischief might have taken place. With respect to the first, it takes the point at issue for granted, by supposing that an absolute is preferable to a limited monarchy; and that our free constitution would be much better were it transformed into a despotism. As to the danger to be apprehended from the publicity of the transaction, the pretence may be used upon other occasions as well as upon this, till at last we come to the old exploded argument, that the money of the people ought to be vested with the king's ministers, and not with their own representatives. In short, the right honourable gentleman tells you, he did not think it worth while to acknowledge you at all in the matter, because you were neither fit judges of the propriety of the quantum, nor of the period for granting the money. He takes care, however, that you shall finally be informed of it. But when? When it comes to be paid. Let us see, also, from what fund this loan has been raised. One part of it has been raised upon a vote of credit, and another part has been taken from the money voted for paying the extraordinaries of the year, and of course certain services of which parliament approved, and for which it made provision, remain unpaid. In what situation, then, is the House of Commons placed? If they refuse to make good the debt, which I hope aud trust they will, a part of the public service will remain in arrears. They are reduced, therefore, to this dilemma, either to discharge a debt, in contracting which they were not acknowledged, and for which they are not responsible, or by refusing to discharge it, to leave services which were sanctioned by their approbation unpaid. When we look back, Sir, one cannot help observing a peculiar train of proceeding. For the first time the budget was opened this season before the extraordinaries of the army were voted. I know the reason that is given for it is, that the budget was opened uncommonly early in the season. I would remind the House, however, that it was opened last year on the 7th of December as well as this year, (with this difference, that last year parliament had not been so long convened;) and yet the extraordinaries of the army were voted previous to the opening of the budget. This season the account was not so much as produced till the day of the opening of the budget, the more strongly to mark the precedent, and that it may be said in future times, that in 1796 the minister of the country, after having, of his own accord, granted a loan to the emperor without the consent of parliament, did not deign even to inform them of it upon their meeting; nay, that he kept back the account of the extraordinaries of the year, lest the House of Commons, by sanctioning or conniving at the measure, might in the least have weakened the precedent. While I am upon this subject, I cannot refrain from re marking also, that last night for the first time, we heard that the country was at war with Spain. Every gentleman who is in the habit of reading the papers, must have seen that it is now some months since it was openly declared, that letters of marque had been issued, and that it had been announced by the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; in short, it is only in their capacity as members of parliament that they did not know it till last night. I am aware that this may be defended upon the score of right, and that the prerogative of declaring war is vested in the crown. But how far it is gracious not to announce the exercise of that right to the House of Commons, is another question, especially when it is rerecollected, that the ministers of the crown are so little scrupulous about entrenching upon the rights of the people. To return, however, to the subject of discussion. Were I to put the question to any man at all acquainted with the constitution of the country, When expences are to be incurred, who are the best judges of the propriety of incurring them? he would answer, the Commons of Great Britain. And were I to add, When the propriety of incurring certain expences is decided, who are the best judges of the extent to which they ought to be incurred? he would not hesitate also to reply, the Commons of Great Britain. When we give up these two strong holds, the constitution is lost. What, then, are we to think of the minister who wrests them out of our possession? Or what will be said by future historians of that parliament which tamely gave them up without one syllable of remonstrance, or one threat of defiance? It is true, that the House have so far relaxed from the rigorous exercise of their privilege as to give a vote of credit to the minister that he may be enabled to meet unforeseen emergencies. This, however, has always been to a limited extent; but, in the present instance, the right honourable gentleman thought that we were as little qualified to judge of the extent of the assistance to be given to the emperor as of the propriety of giving it. He cannot surely pretend, that by twisting any vote of the last parliament he was at liberty to send pecuniary succours to the emperor. Notwithstanding the obsequiousness of that parliament, notwithstanding all the wounds which it gave the constitution, and notwithstanding all the evils which it has entailed upon the country, I much doubt whether it would have sanctioned a proposal for giving another loan to the emperor. But with regard to this parliament, I hope that it will vindicate its own dignity and importance at the outset, and shew the ministers of the country, that if they are advisers of the measures of the crown, the House of Commons are the guardians of the public purse. If, on the other hand, they patiently acquiesce in the most daring encroachments upon their rights, what figure will they make in history, or how will they answer to their country for those liberties which they have wantonly sacrificed at the shrine of unprincipled ambition? . The right honourable gentleman last night expressed a hope that parliament would continue their confidence; but I trust he did not mean by this, that they will allow him to go on disposing of the property of the country without their consent; or if he does, I hope that in this, at least, they will disappoint his expectations. On the present evening I shall think it my duty to take the sense of the House upon every question, whether of supply or of ways and means; and if I succeed, I shall move on an early day, that his majesty's ministers, in granting a loan to the emperor without the consent of parliament, have been guilty of a high crime and misdemeanor. If, however, the House shall not think proper to agree with me on this evening, I shall defer that motion, conceiving that it would not be attended with success. hope, however, that in this case the subject will be taken up out of doors; that the people will, in every part of the coun try, express their abhorrence of the doctrince last night de livered by the right honourable gentleman, and that the House of Commons will be obliged (I do not mean by force, but by the voice of the country,) to assert those rights which they have tamely and pusillanimously surrendered. For my own part, Sir, I consider this as a more serious attack upon the constitution of the country, than any that has been conveyed through the writings of Paine, or of any man whatever. The nature of a libel is explained by its tendency, to bring into hatred and contempt the constitution. Were I, said Mr. Fox, upon a jury, deciding upon any composition containing the speech of the right honourable gentleman last night, I would not hesitate a moment to pronounce it a libel upon the con stitution: for if the doctrines laid down in it are constitutional, ours is a most vile and detestable constitution. Even after all the attacks which have been made upon it, and all the wounds which it has received, we would still have shed our blood in its defence; but, if this new defalcation is to be added to what we were formerly robbed of, I would wish to know what there is left to interest our feelings, or to stimulate our exertions. This will, indeed, be an incalculable addition to all the woes and calamities which the war has produced; and if, after what we have lost in money, in reputation, and in blood, we are also to submit to this oppression, the House of Commons is no longer to be considered as a branch of the constitution; and there will be little in our government to distinguish it from that of an absolute monarchy. MR. Fox's MOTION OF CENSURE ON MINISTERS FOR ADVANCING MONEY TO THE EMPEROR, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT. December 14. IN pursuance of the notice he had given, Mr. Fox rose and said: - Notwithstanding, Sir, the importance of the subject of this evening's discussion; the apparent sense which the House entertains of its magnitude, from the general attendance which is given; the conversation which it has excited out of doors; and the decision which has been this day passed by a respectable public body * upon the measure to which it refers; notwithstanding, I say, all these considerations, I shall deliver the observations which I mean to make, by way of preface to the motion that I shall have the honour to propose, without trespassing for any length of time upon the patience of the House. And the reason is shortly this, that much of the argument has been anticipated in the two debates to which the subject has already given rise. Besides, upon the fundamental point, or the principle which the question involves, I shall think it much more becoming in me as a British subject, and as a member of parliament, to assert rather than to argue, studious not to weaken the constitution, by stating as doubtful what it has recognized as one of its leading features. The grand principle to which I refer, Sir, is, that this is a limited and not an absolute monarchy, and that it is the peculiar privilege of the House of Commons, not only to levy taxes and impose burdens upon the people, but to judge of the whole expences of the state; as well of the mode in which they ought to be applied, as of the manner in which they ought to be raised. I trust that this general principle is so universally acknowledged, that I shall not be called upon to come forward in its defence. I trust that in these times, and in this House, I shall not hear a doctrine, which was received at an earlier period, and which I have since seen revived in writings lately published; that I shall not, I say, hear it contended, that the disposal of the public money is a secret which ought not to be entrusted to a public assembly, but that one or a few individuals are * The Common Hall of the City of London. |