in command there, as soon as he shall deem it expedient, to declare that hostilities against the Indians have ceased, and that they will not be renewed, unless provoked and rendered indispensable by new outrages on their part; but that neither citizens nor troops are to be restrained from any necessary and proper acts of self-defence against any attempts to molest them. He is instructed to open communications with those yet remaining, and endeavor, by all peaceable means, to persuade them to consult their true interests by joining their brethren at the west. And directions have been given for establishing a cordon, or line of protection for the inhabitants, by the necessary number of troops.

But to render this system of protection effectual, it is essential that settlements of our citizens should be made within the line so established, and that they should be armed, so as to be ready to repel any attack. In order to afford inducements to such settlements, I submit to the consideration of Congress the propriety of allowing a reasonable quantity of land to the head of each family that shall permanently occupy it, and of extending the existing provisions on that subject, so as to permit the issue of rations for the subsistence of the settlers for one year. And, as few of them will probably be provided with arms, it would be expedient to authorize the loan of muskets, and the delivery of a proper quantity of cartridges, or of powder and balls. By such means, it is to be hoped that a hardy population will soon occupy the rich soil of the frontiers of Florida, who will be as capable as willing to defend themselves and their houses, and thus relieve the government from further anxiety or expense for their protection.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

JUNE 20, 1842.

To the House of Representatives of the United States :

A RESOLUTION of the house of representatives, of the 13th instant, has been communicated to me, requesting, so far as may be compatible with the public interest, a copy of the quintuple treaty between the five powers of Europe, for the suppression of the African slave-trade; and also copies of any remonstrance or protest addressed by Lewis Cass, envoy extraor dinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States at the court of France, and of all communications from the said Lewis Cass to his own government, and from this government to him, relating thereto."

In answer to this request, I have to say, that the treaty mentioned therein has not been officially communicated to the government of the United States; and no authentic copy of it, therefore, can be furnished. In regard to the other papers requested, although it is my hope and expecta tion that it will be proper and convenient at an early day to lay them before Congress, together with others connected with the same subjects, yet, in my opinion, a communication of them to the house of representatives, at this time, would not be compatible with the public interest.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

JUNE 25, 1842.

To the House of Representatives of the United States :—

I HAVE this day approved and signed an act, which originated in the house of representatives, entitled, "An act for an apportionment of representatives among the several states according to the sixth census," and have caused the same to be deposited in the office of the secretary of state, accompanied by an exposition of my reasons for giving to it my sanction.

REASONS FOR APPROVING THE BILL.

In approving this bill, I feel it due to myself to say, as well that my motives for signing it may be rightly understood as that my opinions may not be liable to be misconstrued, or quoted hereafter erroneously as a precedent, that I have not proceeded so much upon a clear and decided opinion of my own respecting the constitutionality or policy of the entire act, as from respect to the declared will of the two houses of Congress.

In yielding my doubts to the matured opinion of Congress, I have followed the advice of the first secretary of state to the first president of the United States, and the example set by that illustrious citizen upon a memorable occasion.

When I was a member of either house of Congress, I acted under the conviction that, to doubt as to the constitutionality of a law, was sufficient to induce me to give my vote against it; but I have not been able to bring myself to believe that a doubtful opinion of the chief magistrate ought to outweigh the solemnly-pronounced opinion of the representatives of the people and of the states.

One of the prominent features of the bill is that which purports to be mandatory on the states to form districts for the choice of representatives to Congress, in single districts. That Congress itself has power, by law, to alter state regulations respecting the manner of holding elections for representatives, is clear; but its power to command the states to make new regulations, or alter their existing regulations, is the question upon which I have felt deep and strong doubts. I have yielded those doubts, however, to the opinion of the legislature, giving effect to their enactment as far as depends on my approbation, and leaving questions which may arise hereafter, if, unhappily, such should arise, to be settled by full consideration of the several provisions of the constitution and the laws, and the authority of each house to judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members.

Similar considerations have operated with me in regard to the representation of fractions above a moiety of the representative number, and where such moiety exceeds thirty thousand-a question on which a diversity of opinion has existed from the foundation of the government. The provision recommends itself, from its nearer approximation to equality than would be found in the application of a common and simple divisor to the entire population of each state, and corrects, in a great degree, those inequalities which are destined, at the recurrence of each succeeding census, so greatly to augment.

In approving the bill, I flatter myself that a disposition will be perceived on my part to concede to the opinions of Congress in a matter which may conduce to the good of the country and the stability of its institutions, upon which my own opinion is not clear and decided. But it seemed to me due to the respectability of opinion against the constitutionality of the bill, as well as to the real difficulties of the subject, which no one feels more sensibly than I do, that the reasons which have determined me should be left on record.

FIRST TARIFF VETO.

JUNE 29, 1842.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:—

I RETURN the bill which originated in the house of representatives, entitled, "An act to extend, for a limited period, the present laws for laying and collecting duties on imports," with the following objections :

It suspends in other words, abrogates for the time-the provision of the act of 1833, commonly called "the compromise act." The only ground on which this departure from the solemn adjustment of a great and agitating question seems to have been regarded as expedient, is the alleged necessity of establishing, by legislative enactment, rules and regulations for assessing the duties to be levied on imports after the 30th June, according to the home valuation; and yet the bill expressly provides, that "if, before the first of August, there be no further legislation upon the subject, the laws for laying and collecting duties shall be the same as though this act had not been passed." In other words, that the act of 1833, imperfect as it is considered, shall, in that case, continue to be, and to be executed as law, under such rules and regulations as previous statutes had prescribed, or had enabled the executive department to prescribe for that purpose, leaving the supposed chasm in the revenue laws just as it was before.

I am certainly far from being disposed to deny that additional legislation upon this subject is very desirable. On the contrary, the necessity, as well as difficulty, of establishing uniformity in the appraisements to be made, in conformity with the true intention of that act, was brought to the notice of Congress in my message to Congress at the opening of its present session. But, however sensible I may be of the embarrassments to which the executive, in the absence of all aid from the superior wisdom of the legislature, will be liable, in the enforcement of the existing laws, I have not, with the sincerest wish to acquiesce in its expressed will, been able to persuade myself that the exigency of the occasion is so great as to justify me in signing the bill in question, with my present views of its character and effects. The existing laws, as I am advised, are sufficient to authorize and enable the collecting officers, under the directions of the secretary of the treasury, to levy the duties imposed by the act of 1833.

That act was passed under peculiar circumstances, to which it is not necessary that I should do more than barely allude. Whatever may be, in theory, its character, I have always regarded it as importing the highest moral obligation. It has now existed for nine years, unchanged in any essential particular, with as general acquiescence, it is believed, of the whole country, as that country has ever manifested for any of her wisely

established institutions. It has insured to it the repose which always flows from truly wise and moderate counsels-a repose the more striking, because of the long and angry agitations which preceded it. This salutary law proclaims in express terms the principle which, while it led to the abandonment of a scheme of indirect taxation, founded on a false basis, and pushed to dangerous excess, justifies any enlargement of duties that may be called for by the real exigencies of the public service. It provides" that duties shall be laid for the purpose of raising such revenue as may be necessary to an economical administration of the government." It is, therefore, in the power of Congress to lay duties as high as its discretion may dictate, for the necessary uses of the government, without infringing upon the objects of the act of 1833. I do not doubt that the exigencies of the government do require an increase of the tariff of duties above twenty per cent., and I as little doubt that Congress may, above as well as below that rate, so discriminate as to give incidental protection to manufacturing industry-thus to make the burdens, which it is compelled to impose upon the people for the purposes of government, productive of a double benefit. This, most of the reasonable opponents of protective duties seem willing to concede, and if we may judge from the manifestations of public opinion in all quarters, this is all that the manufacturing interests really require. I am happy in the persuasion, that this double object can be most easily and effectually accomplished at the present juncture, without any departure from the spirit and principle of the statute in question. The manufacturing classes have now an opportunity, which may never occur again, of permanently identifying their interests with those of the whole country, and making them, in the highest sense of the term, a national concern. The moment is propitious to the interests of the whole country, in the introduction of harmony among all its parts and all its several interests. The same rate of imposts, and no more, as will most surely re-establish the public credit, will secure to the manufacturer all the protection he ought to desire, with every prospect of permanence and stability which the hearty acquiescence of the whole country, on a reasonable system, can hold out to him.

But of the universal acquiescence, and the harmony and confidence, and the many other benefits that will certainly result from it, I regard the suspension of the law for distributing the proceeds of the sales of the public lands as an indispensable condition. This measure is, in my judgment, called for by a large number, if not a great majority, of the people of the United States, by the state of public credit and finances, by the critical posture of our various foreign relations, and above all, by that most sacred of all duties, public faith. The act of September last, which provides for the distribution, couples it inseparably with the condition that it shall cease-1st, in case of war; 2d, as soon and so long as the rate of duties shall, for any reason whatever, be raised above twenty per cent. Nothing can be more clear, express, or imperative, than this language. It is in vain to allege that a deficit in the treasury was known to exist, and means taken to supply it by loan when the act was passed. It is true that a loan was authorized at the same session during which the distribution law was passed, but the most sanguine of the friends of the two measures entertained no doubt but that the loan would be eagerly sought after and taken up by capitalists, and speedily reimbursed by a country destined, as they hoped, soon to enjoy an overflowing prosperity. The very terms of the loan, making it redeemable in three years, demonstrate this beyond all cavil. Who, at the time,

foresaw or imagined the possibility of the present real state of things, when a nation that has paid off her whole debt since the last peace, while all the other great powers have been increasing theirs, and whose resources, already so great, are yet but in the infancy of their development, should be compelled to haggle in the money-market for a paltry sum, not equal to one year's revenue, upon her economical system? If the distribution law is to be indefinitely suspended, according, not only to its own terms, but by universal consent, in case of war, wherein are the actual exigencies of the country, or the moral obligation to provide for them, less under present circumstances than they could be, were we actually involved in war? It appears to me to be the indispensable duty of all concerned in the administration of public affairs, to see that a state of things so humiliating, and so perilous, should not last a moment longer than is absolutely unavoidable. Much less excusable should we be in parting with any portion of our available means, at least until the demands of the treasury are fully sup plied. But, besides the urgency of such considerations, the fact is undeniable, that the distribution act could not have become a law without the guarantee in the proviso of the act itself.

This connexion, thus meant to be inseparable, is severed by the bill presented to me. The bill violates the principle of the acts of 1833, and September, 1841, by suspending the first, and rendering, for a time, the last inoperative. Duties, above 20 per cent., are proposed to be levied, and yet the proviso in the distribution act is disregarded; the proceeds of the sales are to be distributed on the first of August, so that while the duties proposed to be enacted exceed 20 per cent., no suspension of the distribution to the states is permitted to take place. To abandon the principle for a month, is to open the way for its total abandonment. If such is not meant, why postpone at all? Why not let the distribution take place on the 1st of July, if the law so directs?-which, however, is regarded as questionable. But why not have limited the provision to that effect? Is it for the accommodation of the treasury? I see no reason to believe that the treasury will be in a better condition to meet the payment on the 1st of August than on the 1st of July.

next.

The bill assumes that a distribution of the proceeds of the public lands is, by existing laws, to be made on the first day of July, 1842, notwithstanding there has been an imposition of duties on imports exceeding 20 per cent. up to that day; and directs it to be made on the 1st of August It seems to me very clear that this conclusion is equally erroneous and dangerous, as it would divert from the treasury a fund sacredly pledged for the general purposes of the government, in the event of a rate of duty above 20 per cent., being found necessary for an economical administration of the government.

The bill under consideration is designed only as a temporary measure; and thus a temporary measure, passed merely for the convenience of Congress, is made to affect the vital principle of an important act. If the proviso of the act of September, 1841, can be suspended for the whole period of a temporary law, why not for the whole period of a permanent law? In fact, a doubt may be well entertained, according to strict legal rules, whether the condition having been thus expressly suspended by this bill, and rendered inapplicable to a case where it would otherwise have clearly applied, will not be considered as ever after satisfied and gone. Without expressing any decided opinion on this point, I see enough in it to justify me in adhering to the law as it stands, in preference to subjecting a condi