abolished the Protectorate, which it had exercised over the Valley of the Nile, it did so "with reservations". But this string attached to the gift was not the only obstacle in the way of independence, as the West understands the term. There were ten European Nations and the United States-eleven countries in all-which had treaty rights in Egypt which, like mortgages, attached to the soil regardless of the flag that flew over it. These incumbrances are not referred to in Islam as treaty rights. They are known in the Mohammedan world as Capitulations. They confer extraterritorial privileges on all subjects of those Nations which enjoy these special franchises. The Mixed or International Courts of Egypt were created in 1875 in order to attenuate, in a measure, the rigors of this far reaching rule. But their competence extends, for all practical purposes, merely to what the French call civil and commercial matters. They have no criminal jurisdiction. This means that while this composite judicial system has worked out admirably within its allotted sphere, its splendid achievements have left the Capitulations intact in so far as the suppression of crime is concerned and in so far as the power to tax is involved. The text of the speech, as epitomized in the dispatches before quoted, does not deal with the latter particular. It touches solely upon the extension of the attributes of the Mixed Courts.

During the quarter of a century that Lord Cromer ruled over Egypt he sought, with untiring energy, to obtain the abolition of the Capitulations. He attributed to them many of the woes of the country that he governed. After his departure the compass went to pieces. And then came the great war. December, 1914, saw the advent of the Protectorate. It was unwelcome, unhonored and unsung. But it was only after the Armistice that it got under fire. It is hard to judge just what in those days was Britain's programme as to what should be done for the Egyptians. I suppose that Downing Street had a policy. But it kept it so discreetly hidden away that it is impossible for an outsider to make out just what it was. It was kaleidoscopic, protean and chameleon-like in the rapidity with which it changed. But there was one element of constancy. It was that England no longer proclaimed that the Capitulations must go. On the

contrary, London began negotiations with the Powers looking toward their transferring their special franchises to Great Britain. As a return for this favor there was to be conferred upon the Egyptians a very generous measure of self government, perhaps independence without reservations, but coupled with a Treaty of Alliance.

I shall not attempt to follow the ups and downs of the Egyptian question. Suffice it to say that in the early summer of 1921 an official delegation, headed by Prime Minister Adly Yeghen Pasha, left for London to discuss the situation with the British Foreign Office. An official memorandum had already been prepared by a commission headed by Lord Milner which “had traced the general lines along which an agreement could ultimately be drafted", or words to that effect. This document contemplated the abolition of the Protectorate, and the drawing up of a Treaty between England and Egypt definitely establishing the relations between the two countries. But it appears to have been predicated upon the hypothesis that Great Britain would become the Trustee for all of the Capitulatory rights then enjoyed by the ten European Nations and the United States. As a matter of fact when Adly Pasha and his colleagues sailed for London most of the European Powers had already agreed, in principle, to the proposed Trusteeship.

Be that as it may, I was told, at the time, that while a few signatures might still be missing it was morally certain that the deed of trust would be granted by all of the interested beneficiaries. Every Egyptian or Englishman who mentioned the matter to me seemed to take it for granted that Washington would be a cooing dove or a docile eagle, and that as soon as our horn rimmed spectacles found the dotted line we would sign away the Capitulations that Andrew Jackson had obtained for us. But our Department of State had at its head Charles E. Hughes, a diplomatist who did his own thinking. The word "Trustee' cast no spell over his judicial temperament. He found that the proposal, however salutary it might be in principle, however convenient it might be in form, and however perfect it might be in carrying out the wishes of others, did not harmonize with the traditional policy of the United States. It conferred, in its last

analysis, upon another Nation the right to protect our nationals in their relations with a third Power. This ran counter to the genius of our institutions. It, therefore, precluded the possibility of our falling in line with what others had done. This decision of Washington probably surprised many a well informed statesman. But it had about it the ring of finality. The days passed. And then Lord Milner and his friends and Adly Pasha and his associates agreed to disagree. They had, unless I am greatly mistaken, worked along lines which accepted as a postulate a proposition which America could not countenance. And shortly after this Lord Allenby, the British High Commissioner at Cairo, submitted to the Sultan a London-drafted letter which created consternation in Egypt. However, this severity of the Foreign Office was but ephemeral. In February, 1922, the Protectorate was abolished.

For a while the burning questions of the hour were, when will martial law be abolished, when will the Constitution be promulgated, and when will elections be held for members of Parliament? In due course these issues found a solution. Parliament was convened and Zaghloul Pasha, the outstanding popular idol, became Prime Minister. To the best of my recollection he made no official or concerted attempt, during his tenure of the Premiership, to obtain an abolition or a modification of the Capitulations. I thought at the time I may have been mistaken-that he then looked with a certain degree of favor upon these privileges as tending to thwart any one nation from enjoying monopolistic rights in Egypt.

And then Sir Lee Stack, the Sirdar, was assassinated, in November, 1924. This was followed by the issuance of a British proclamation which was construed as taking the Sudan out of the domain of the "reserved" points. Zaghloul Pasha resigned. Ziwar Pasha succeeded him and held office until Parliament was permitted to reconvene. The reëstablishment of a Constitutional Government again brought the party of Zaghloul Pasha to power. But he did not take the Premiership. He announced that he preferred to preside over the Chamber of Deputies. Adly Pasha undertook to form a Government. The latter had the active support of the Speaker of the House of

Representatives and remained in office until the spring of 1927. His successor was the present incumbent, Saroit Pasha, who had been a member of the Adly Ministry and who retained practically all of the members of the preceding Cabinet. In June of the same year King Fuad visited Europe and was enthusiastically received by the rulers, Governments and peoples of England, France, Italy and Belgium. His Majesty was accompanied by his Prime Minister. While the celebrations were being carried out, it appears that political discussions of the utmost moment also took place. They seem to have been pitched upon lines that contemplate first of all an enlargement of the powers of the Mixed Tribunals and later on a thrashing out of the relations between England and Egypt.

Zaghloul Pasha passed away while His Majesty was still in Europe and before these verbal flirtations had been completed. Certain facts that took place during the winter of 1926-1927, when the President of the Chamber was at the helm, bear witness however as to how he reacted to a move that was then launched to extend the authority of the Mixed Courts. A brutal murder brought about the conditions that give one this touchstone as to the probable attitude of the beloved husband of the revered Madame Zaghloul. Solomon Cicurel, a wealthy and prominent merchant of Cairo, was killed in his home under circumstances of appalling brutality. Four men, two Italians, a Greek and a local Jew, entered the home of the deceased to commit robbery. They chloroformed Mr. Cicurel and his wife. He resisted. She did not. She feigned to be overcome. He was hacked to death under her very eyes. She recognized the assassins. One was her chauffeur. Under the Capitulations three different sets of laws were applicable to the culprits. They all of them admitted that they were involved in the robbery but sought to put the blame for the murder on one of the Italians. The upshot of the whole thing was that the local Jew was sentenced to death, and one of the Italians was given the maximum penalty allowed by the code of his country, to wit, solitary confinement for life. The other Italian has been sentenced to the peniteniary for a fairly long term and the Greek has got off quite lightly. This inequality of punishment shocked Egyptian public opinion.

Parliament clamored for a unification of criminal justice under the Mixed Tribunals. I know too well Zaghloul Pasha's masterly control of the Chamber of Deputies to imagine for one instant that his followers would have been so insistent in their demands if they had not reasons for believing that he shared their sentiments. If Egypt were not Egypt I would be tempted to say that in asking for the extension of the competence of the Mixed Tribunals Saroit Pasha has his people back to him. But nothing can induce me to attempt to foretell what may or may not happen in that interesting Kingdom, which today is as baffling as it was when the Sphinx first became symbolical of mystery.

But after all this question of whether the International Courts of Egypt are or are not to have criminal jurisdiction is of but academic concern to the average American. We have been trained in the common law. So have Englishmen. They have vital interests at stake in the Land of the Pharaohs. If they can allow these Mixed Tribunals to extend their competence to penal matters affecting subjects of Great Britain, I see no reason why we should not follow their example. To oppose their point of view, when we have no outstanding motive for doing so and, on the contrary, every incentive to see eye to eye with them, would be open to misconstruction. But while we may, therefore, use British lenses in examining this judicial problem, it by no means follows that the eventual fate of Egypt is of no moment to us. I do not mean by this that we should interfere in the details of such arrangements as London and Cairo may see fit to elaborate for the internal administration of the country whose sceptre is now held by the dynasty of Mohammed Ali. But among the "reserved" points there figures what is known as "the security of the communications of the British Empire". This language is but an euphemistic way of saying that England can only see its way clear to withdraw its troops from the Nile Valley provided Egypt agrees to allow it to maintain an armed force within the Suez Canal zone and to take such steps as will assure that the sweet water which supplies this belt shall at all times be accessible to British control.

But

Our interest in this feature of the matter resides in the facts that the United States is a maritime power and that the neutrality