ESSAY X.

Of the DIGNITY or MEANNESS of HUMAN

NATURE.

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HERE are certain fects, which fecretly form themselves in the learned world, as well as factions in the political; and though sometimes they come not to an open rupture, they give a different turn to the ways of thinking of those who have taken part on either fide. The most remarkable of this kind are the fects, founded on the different fentiments with regard to the dignity of human nature; which is a point that seems to have divided philofophers and poets, as well as divines, from the beginning of the world to this day. Some exalt our species to the fkies, and reprefent man as a kind of human demigod, who derives his origin from heaven, and retains evident marks of his lineage and descent. Others infift upon the blind fides of human nature, and can discover nothing, except vanity, in which man furpaffes the other animals, whom he affects so much to defpife. If an author poffeffes the talent of rhetoric and declamation, he commonly takes part with the former: If his turn lies towards irony and ridicule, he naturally throws himself into the other extreme.

I am far from thinking, that all thofe, who have depreciated our fpecies, have been enemies to virtue, and have expofed the frailties of their fellow-creatures with any bad intention. On the contrary, I am fenfible that a delicate fenfe of morals, especially when attended with a fplenetic temper, is apt to give a man a disgust of the world, and to make him confider the common courfe of human affairs with too much indignation. I muft, however, be of opinion, that the fentiments of those, who are inclined to think favourably of mankind, are more advantageous to virtue, than the contrary principles, which give us a mean opinion of our nature. When a man is poffeffed of a high notion of his rank and character in the creation, he will naturally endeavour to act up to it, and will fcorn to do a bafe or vicious action, which might fink him below that figure which he makes in his own imagination. Accordingly we find, that all our polite and fashionable moralifts infift upon this topic, and endeavour to reprefent vice as unworthy of man, as well as odious in itself.

We find few difputes, that are not founded on fome ambiguity in the expreffion; and I am perfuaded, that the prefent difpute, concerning the dignity or meannefs of human nature, is not more exempt from it than any other. It may, therefore, be worth while to confider, what is real, and what is only verbal, in this controverfy.

That there is a natural difference between merit and demerit, virtue and vice, wisdom and folly, no reafonable man will deny: Yet is it evident, that, in affixing the term, which denotes either our approbation or blame, we are commonly more influenced by comparison than by any fixed unalterable ftandard in the nature of

things.

things. In like manner, quantity, and extenfion, and bulk, are by every one acknowledged to be real things: But when we call any animal great or little, we always form a fecret comparison between that animal and others. of the fame fpecies; and it is that comparison which regulates our judgment concerning its greatnefs. A dog and a horfe may be of the very fame fize, while the one is admired for the greatness of its bulk, and the other for the fmallnefs. When I am prefent, therefore, at any difpute, I always confider with myfelf, whether it be a question of comparison or not that is the subject of the controverfy; and if it be, whether the difputants compare the fame objects together, or talk of things that are widely different.

In forming our notions of human nature, we are apt to make a comparison between men and animals, the only creatures endowed with thought that fall under our fenfes. Certainly this comparison is favourable to mankind. On the one hand, we fee a creature, whofe thoughts are not limited by any narrow bounds, either of place or time; who carries his researches into the most distant regions of this globe, and beyond this globe, to the planets and heavenly bodies; looks backward to confider the first origin, at least, the history of human race; cafts his eye forward to fee the influence of his actions upon pofterity, and the judgments which will be formed of his character a thousand years hence; a creature, who traces caufes and effects to a great length and intricacy; extracts general principles from particular appearances; improves upon his discoveries; corrects his mistakes; and makes his very errors profitable. On the other hand, we are prefented with a

creature

creature the very reverfe of this; limited in its obfervations and reasonings to a few fenfible objects which furround it; without curiofity, without forefight; blindly conducted by instinct, and attaining, in a fhort time, its utmoft perfection, beyond which it is never able to advance a single step. What a wide difference is there between these creatures! And how exalted a notion must we entertain of the former, in comparison of the latter !

There are two means commonly employed to deftroy this conclufion: First, By making an unfair reprefentation of the cafe, and insisting only upon the weaknesses of human nature. And fecondly, By forming a new and fecret comparison between man and beings of the most perfect wifdom. Among the other excellencies of man, this is one, that he can form an idea of perfections much beyond what he has experience of in himself; and is not limited in his conception of wisdom and virtue. He can eafily exalt his notions and conceive a degree of knowledge, which, when compared to his own, will make the latter appear very contemptible, and will cause the difference between that and the fagacity of animals, in a manner, to disappear and vanish. Now this being a point, in which all the world is agreed, that human understanding falls infinitely fhort of perfect wifdom; it is proper we should know when this comparison takes place, that we may not difpute where there is no real difference in our fentiments. Man falls much more short of perfect wisdom, and even of his own ideas of perfect wisdom, than animals do of man; yet the latter difference is fo confiderable, that nothing but a comparifon with the former, can make it appear of little mo

ment.

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It is also usual to compare one man with another; and finding very few whom we can call wife or virtuous, we are apt to entertain a contemptible notion of our species in general. That we may be fenfible of the fallacy of this way of reafoning, we may obferve, that the honourable appellations of wife and virtuous, are not annexed to any particular degree of thofe qualities of wisdom and virtue; but arife altogether from the comparifon we make between one man and another. When we find a man, who arrives at such a pitch of wisdom as is very uncommon, we pronounce him a wife man: So that to fay, there are few wife men in the world, is really to fay nothing; fince it is only by their fcarcity, that they merit that appellation. Were the loweft of our fpecies as wife as TULLY, or lord BACON, we should still have reason to say, that there are few wife men. For in that cafe we fhould exalt our notions of wisdom, and should not pay a finguÍar honour to any one, who was not fingularly distinguished by his talents. In like manner, I have heard it obferved by thoughtless people, that there are few women pofsessed of beauty, in comparison of those who want it; not confidering, that we bestow the epithet of beautiful only on fuch as poffefs a degree of beauty, that is common to them with a few. The fame degree of beauty in a woman is called deformity, which is treated as real beauty in one of our sex.

As it is ufual, in forming a notion of our fpecies, to compare it with the other fpecies above or below it, or to compare the individuals of the fpecies among themfelves; fo we often compare together the different motives or actuating principles of human nature, in order to regulate our judgment concerning it. And, indeed, this is VOL. I.

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