founded on the different attachments of men towards particular families and perfons, whom they defire to rule over them. These factions are often very violent; though, I muft own, it may feem unaccountable, that men fhould attach themselves fo ftrongly to perfons, with whom they are no wife acquainted, whom perhaps they never faw, and from whom they never received, nor can ever hope for any favour. Yet this we often find to be the cafe, and even with men, who, on other occafions, discover no great generofity of spirit, nor are found to be easily tranfported by friendship beyond their own intereft. We are apt to think the relation between us and our fovereign very close and intimate. The fplendor of majefty and power beftows an importance on the fortunes even of a fingle perfon. And when a man's good-nature does not give him this imaginary intereft, his ill-nature will, from fpite and oppofition to perfons whofe fentiments are different from his own.

ESSAY VIII.

Of the PARTIES of GREAT BRITAIN.

WE

ERE the BRITISH government propofed as a fubject of fpeculation, one would immediately perceive in it a fource of divifion and party, which it would be almoft impoffible for it, under any administration, to avoid. The juft balance between the republican and monarchical part of our conftitution is really, in itself, fo extremely delicate and uncertain, that, when joined to men's paffions and prejudices, it is impoffible but different opinions must arife concerning it, even among perfons of the beft understanding. Those of mild tempers, who love peace and order, and deteft fedition and civil wars, will always entertain more favourable fentiments of monarchy, than men of bold and generous fpirits, who are paffionate lovers of liberty, and think no evil comparable to subjection and flavery. And though ail reasonable men agree in general to preserve our mixed government; yet, when they come to particulars, fome will incline to truft larger powers to the crown, to bestow on it more influence, and to guard against its encroachments with lefs caution, than others who are terrified at the most distant approaches of tyranny and defpotic power. Thus are there parties of PRINCIPLE involved in the very nature of our conftitution, which may properly enough be denominated thofe of COURT and COUNTRY.

The

The ftrength and violence of each of these parties will much depend upon the particular administration. An adminiftration may be fo bad, as to throw a great majority into the oppofition; as a good administration will reconcile to the court many of the most paffionate lovers of liberty. But however the nation may fluctuate between them, the parties themselves will always fubfist, so long as we are governed by a limited monarchy.

But, befides this difference of Principle, thofe parties are very much fomented by a difference of INTEREST, without which they could fcarcely ever be dangerous or violent. The crown will naturally beftow all trust and power upon thofe, whose principles, real or pretended, are moft favourable to monarchical government; and this temptation will naturally engage them to go greater lengths than their principles would otherwife carry them. Their antagonists, who are difappointed in their ambitious aims, throw themselves into the party whofe fentiments incline them to be moft jealous of royal power, and naturally carry thofe fentiments to a greater height than found politics will juftify. Thus, Court and Country, which are the genuine offspring of the BRITISH government, are a kind of mixed parties, and are influenced both by principle and by intereft. The heads of the factions are commonly moft governed by the latter mo tive; the inferior members of them by the former.

As to ecclefiaftical parties; we may obferve, that, in all ages of the world, priests have been enemies to liberty; and it is certain, that this fteady conduct of theirs must have been founded on fixed reasons of intereft and ambition. Liberty of thinking, and of expreffing our thoughts, is always fatal to prieftly power, and to those pious frauds, on which it is commonly founded; and, by

an

an infallible connexion, which prevails among all kinds of liberty, this privilege can never be enjoyed, at least, has never yet been enjoyed, but in a free government. Hence it must happen, in fuch a conftitution as that of BRITAIN, that the established clergy, while things are in their natural fituation, will always be of the Courtparty; as, on the contrary, diffenters of all kinds will be of the Country-party; fince they can never hope for that toleration, which they ftand in need of, but by means of our free government. All princes, that have aimed at defpotic power, have known of what importance it was to gain the established clergy: As the clergy, on their fide, have fhewn a great facility in entering into the views of fuch princes. GUSTAVUS VAZA was, perhaps, the only ambitious monarch, that ever depressed the church, at the fame time that he difcouraged liberty. But the exorbitant power of the bishops in SWEDEN, who, at that time, overtopped the crown itself, together with their attachment to a foreign family, was the reason of his embracing fuch an unusual system of politics.

This obfervation, concerning the propensity of priests to the government of a fingle perfon, is not true with regard to one fect only. The Prefbyterian and Calvinistic clergy in HOLLAND were professed friends to the family of ORANGE; as the Arminians, who were esteemed heretics, were of the LOUVESTEIN faction, and zealous for liberty. But if a prince has the choice of both, it is easy to fee, that he will prefer the epifcopal to the presbyterian form of government, both because of the greater

:

* Judæi fibi ipfi reges imposuere; qui mobilitate vulgi expulfi, resumpta per arma dominatione; fugas civium, urbium everfiones, fratrum, conjugum, parentum neces, aliaque folita regibus aufi, fuperftitionem fovebant; quia honor facerdotii firmamentum potentiæ affumebatur. TACIT. hift. lib. v.

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