with power; and if one order of men, by pursuing its own intereft, can ufurp upon every other order, it will certainly do so, and render itself, as far as poffible, abfolute and uncontroulable.

But, in this opinion, experience fhews they would have been mistaken. For this is actually the cafe with the BRITISH Conftitution. The fhare of power, allotted by our conftitution to the house of commons, is fo great, that it abfolutely commands all the other parts of the government. The king's legislative power is plainly no proper check to it. For though the king has a negative in framing laws; yet this, in fact, is esteemed of fo little moment, that whatever is voted by the two houses, is always fure to pafs into a law, and the royal affent is little better than a form. The principal weight of the crown lies in the executive power. But befides that the executive power in every government is altogether fubordinate to the legislative; besides this, I fay, the exercife of this power requires an immenfe expence; and the commons have affumed to themselves the fole right of granting money. How eafy, therefore, would it be for that house to wreft from the crown all these powers, one after another; by making every grant conditional, and choofing their time fo well, that their refufal of fubfidies fhould only diftrefs the government, without giving foreign powers any advantage over us? Did the house of commons depend in the fame manner on the king, and had none of the members any property but from his gift, would not he command all their refolutions, and be from that moment abfolute? As to the houfe of lords, they are a very powerful fupport to the crown, fo long as they are, in their turn, fupported by it; but both experience and reafon fhew, that they have no force or

1

authority sufficient to maintain themfélves alone, without fuch fupport.

How, therefore, fhall we folve this paradox? And by what means is this member of our conftitution confined within the proper limits; fince, from our very conftitution, it muft neceffarily have as much power as it demands, and can only be confined by itfelf? How is this confiftent with our experience of human nature? I anfwer, that the intereft of the body is here reftrained by that of the individuals, and that the house of commons ftretches not its power, becaufe fuch an ufurpation would be contrary to the intereft of the majority of its members. The crown has fo many offices at its difpofal, that, when affifted by the honeft and difinterested part of the house, it will always command the refolutions of the whole; fo far, at leaft, as to preserve the ancient conftitution from danger. We may, therefore, give to this influence what name we please; we may call it by the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence; but fome degree and fome kind of it are infeparable from the very nature of the conftitution, and neceffary to the preservation of our mixed government.

Inftead then of afferting + absolutely, that the depen▾ dence of parliament, in every degree, is an infringement of BRITISH liberty, the country-party fhould have made fome conceffions to their adverfaries, and have only examined what was the proper degree of this dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to liberty. But such a moderation is not to be expected in party-men of any kind. After a conceffion of this nature, all declamation must be abandoned; and a calm enquiry into the

† See Differtation on Parties, throughout,

proper

proper degree of court-influence and parliamentary dependence would have been expected by the readers. And though the advantage, in fuch a controverfy, might poffibly remain to the country-party; yet the victory would not be fo compleat as they wish for, nor would a true patriot have given an entire loofe to his zeal, for fear of running matters into a contrary extreme, by diminishing too far the influence of the crown. It was, therefore, thought beft to deny, that this extreme could ever be dangerous to the constitution, or that the crown could ever have too little influence over members of parliament.

All queftions concerning the proper medium between extremes are difficult to be decided; both because it is not easy to find words proper to fix this medium, and because the good and ill, in such cases, run fo gradually into each other, as even to render our fentiments doubt❤ ful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar difficulty in the prefent cafe, which would embarrass the most knowing and most impartial examiner. The power of the crown is always lodged in a fingle perfon, either king or minister; and as this perfon may have either a greater or lefs degree of ambition, capacity, courage, popularity, or fortune, the power, which is too great in one hand, may become too little in another. In pure republics, where the power is diftributed among feveral affemblies or fenates, the checks and controuls are more regular in their operation; because the members of such numerous affemblies may be prefumed to be always' nearly equal in capacity and virtue; and it is only their number, riches, or authority, which enter into confide

+ See NOTE [B].

D 4

ration.

ration. But a limited monarchy admits not of any fuch ftability; nor is it poffible to affign to the crown fuch a determinate degree of power, as will, in every hand, form a proper counterbalance to the other parts of the conftitution. This is an unavoidable difadvantage, among the many advantages, attending that fpecies of government.

ESSAY VI.

Whether the BRITISH GOVERNMENT inclines more to ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, or to a REPUBLIC.

T affords a violent prejudice against almost every

Ife effe, stavio pt againe er fort every

principles, dares prophesy concerning any event, or foretel the remote confequences of things. A phyfician will not venture to pronounce concerning the condition of his patient a fortnight or month after: And ftill lefs dares a politician foretel the fituation of public affairs a few years hence. HARRINGTON thought himself so certain of his general principle, that the balance of power depends on that of property, that he ventured to pronounce it impoffible ever to re-establish monarchy in ENGLAND: But his book was fcarcely published when the king was reftored; and we fee, that monarchy has ever fince fubfifted upon the fame footing as before. Notwithstanding this unlucky example, I will venture to examine an important question, viz. Whether the BRITISH government inclines more to abfolute monarchy, or to a republic; and in which of these two species of government it will most probably terminate? As there feems not to be any great danger of a fudden revolution either way, I fhall at least escape the shame attending my temerity, if I fhould be found to have been mistaken.

Those