firft extorted from the fenate the magiftracy of the tribunes, and next the legislative power of the comitia tributa. It then behoved the nobles to be more careful than ever not to provoke the people. For befide the force which the latter were always poffeffed of, they had now got poffeffion of legal authority, and could inftantly break in pieces any order or inftitution which directly opposed them. By intrigue, by influence, by money, by combination, and by the respect paid to their character, the nobles might often prevail, and direct the whole machine of government: But had they openly fet their comitia centuriata in oppofition to the tributa, they had foon loft the advantage of that inftitution, together with their confuls, prætors, ediles, and all the magistrates elected by it. But the comitia tributa, not having the fame reason for refpecting the centuriata, frequently repealed laws favourable to the Ariftocracy: They limited the authority of the nobles, protected the people from oppreffion, and controuled the actions of the senate and magiftracy. The centuriata found it convenient always to fubmit; and though equal in authority, yet being inferior in power, durft never directly give any fhock to the other legiflature, either by repealing its laws, or establishing laws, which, it forefaw, would foon be repealed by it.

No inftance is found of any oppofition or struggle between these comitia; except one flight attempt of this kind, mentioned by APPIAN in the third book of his civil wars. MARK ANTHONY, refolving to deprive DECIMUS BRUTUS of the government of CISALPINE GAUL, railed in the Forum, and called one of the comitia, in order to prevent the meeting of the other, which had been ordered by the fenate. But affairs were then fallen into fuch confufion, and the ROMAN conftitution was

fo near its final diffolution, that no inference can be drawn from fuch an expedient. This conteft, befides, was founded more on form than party. It was the fenate who ordered the comitia tributa, that they might obftruct the meeting of the centuriata, which, by the conftitution, or at least forms of the government, could alone dispose of provinces.

CICERO was recalled by the comitia centuriata, though banished by the tributa, that is, by a plebifcitum. But his banishment, we may obferve, never was confidered as a legal deed, arifing from the free choice and inclination of the people. It was always afcribed to the violence alone of CLODIUS, and to the diforders introduced by him into the government.

III. The third cuftom, which we propofe to remark, regards ENGLAND; and though it be not fo important as those which we have pointed out in ATHENS and ROME, is no lefs fingular and unexpected. It is a maxim in politics, which we readily admit as undisputed and univerfal, that a power, however great, when granted by law to an eminent magiftrate, is not fo dangerous to liberty, as an authority, however inconfiderable, which he acquires from violence and ufurpation. For, befides that the law always limits every power which it beftows, the very receiving it as a conceffion establishes the authority whence it is derived, and preserves the harmony of the conftitution. By the fame right that one prerogative is affumed without law, another may also be claimed, and another, with still greater facility; while the first usurpations both ferve as precedents to the following, and give force to maintain them. Hence the heroism of HAMPDEN'S conduct, who fuftained the whole violence of royal profecution, rather than pay a tax of twenty hillings, not imposed by parliament; hence the care of

all

all ENGLISH patriots to guard against the first encroachments of the crown; and hence alone the existence, at this day, of ENGLISH liberty.

There is, however, one occafion, where the parlia ment has departed from this maxim; and that is, in the preffing of feamen. The exercife of an irregular power is here tacitly permitted in the crown; and though it has frequently been under deliberation, how that power might be rendered legal, and granted, under proper reftrictions to the fovereign, no fafe expedient could ever be proposed for that purpose; and the danger to liberty always appeared greater from law than from ufurpation. While this power is exercised to no other end than to man the navy, men willingly submit to it, from a sense of its use and neceffity; and the failors, who are alone affected by it, find no body to fupport them, in claiming the rights and privileges, which the law grants, without diftinction, to all ENGLISH fubjects. But were this power, on any occafion, made an inftrument of faction or ministerial tyranny, the oppofite faction, and indeed all lovers of their country, would immediately take the alarm, and support the injured party; the liberty of ENGLISHMEN Would be afferted; juries would be implacable; and the tools of tyranny, acting both against law and equity, would meet with the fevereft vengeance. On the other hand, were the parliament to grant fuch an authority, they would probably fall into one of these two inconveniencies: They would either beftow it under fo many restrictions as would make it lofe its effect, by cramping the authority of the crown; or they would render it so large and comprehenfive, as might give occafion to great abuses, for which we could, in that cafe, have no remedy. The very irregularity of the practice,

at prefent, prevents its abufes, by affording fo easy a remedy against them.

I pretend not, by this reafoning, to exclude all poffibility of contriving a register for feamen, which might man the navy, without being dangerous to liberty. I only obferve, that no fatisfactory fcheme of that nature has yet been propofed. Rather than adopt any project hitherto invented, we continue a practice seemingly the moft abfurd and unaccountable. Authority, in times of full internal peace and concord, is armed against law. A continued violence is permitted in the crown, amidst the greatest jealoufy and watchfulness in the people; nay proceeding from those very principles: Liberty, in a country of the higheft liberty, is left entirely to its own defence, without any countenance or protection: The wild ftate of nature is renewed, in one of the most civilized focieties of mankind: And great violence and diforder are committed with impunity; while the one party pleads obedience to the fupreme magiftrate, the other the fanction of fundamental laws.

ESSAY XI.

Of the POPULOUSNESS of ANCIENT NATIONS.

HERE is very little ground, either from reafon or

corruptible. The continual and rapid motion of matter, the violent revolutions with which every part is agitated, the changes remarked in the heavens, the plain traces as well as tradition of an univerfal deluge, or general convulfion of the elements; all thefe prove ftrongly the mortality of this fabric of the world, and its paffage, by corruption or diffolution, from one ftate or order to another. It must therefore, as well as each individual form which it contains, have its infancy, youth, manhood, and old age; and it is probable, that, in all these variations, man, equally with every animal and vegetable, will partake. In the flourishing age of the world, it may be expected, that the human fpecies fhould poffefs greater vigour both of mind and body, more profperous health, higher fpirits, longer life, and a stronger inclination and power of generation. But if the general system of things, and human fociety of course, have any fuch gradual revolutions, they are too flow to be difcernible in that short period which is comprehended by history and tradition. Stature and force of body, length of life, even courage and extent of genius, feem hitherto to have