that he must, at least, be fecured from all inferior jurif diction; and that nothing less than the fame fupreme legislative affembly, in their subsequent meetings, could tender him accountable for those motions and harangues, to which they had before given their approbation. But thefe axioms, however irrefragable they may appear, have all failed in the ATHENIAN government, from caufes and principles too, which appear almost inevitable. By the ygan wagavour, or indictment of illegality; (though it has not been remarked by antiquaries or commentators) any man was tried and punished in a common court of judicature, for any law which had paffed upon his motion, in the affembly of the people, if that law appeared to the court unjuft, or prejudicial to the public. Thus DEMOSTHENES, finding that fhip-money was levied irregularly, and that the poor bore the same burden as the rich in equipping the gallies, corrected this inequality by a very useful law, which proportioned the expence to the revenue and income of each individual. He moved for this law in the affembly; he proved its advantages *; he convinced the people, the only legislature in ATHENS; the law paffed, and was carried into execution: Yet was he tried in a criminal court for that law, upon the complaint of the rich, who refented the alteration that he had introduced into the finances +. He was indeed acquitted, upon proving anew the usefulness of his law. CTESIPHON moved in the affembly of the people, that particular honours should be conferred on DemostHENES, as on a citizen affectionate and ufeful to the commonwealth: The people, convinced of this truth, * His harangue for it is fill extant; πεξί Συμμορίας. Pro CTESIPHONTE, voted thofe honours: Yet was CTESIPHON tried by the rga¶n wagavouwv. It was afferted, among other topics, that DEMOSTHENES was not a good citizen, nor affec tionate to the commonwealth : And the orator was called upon to defend his friend, and confequently him-. felf; which he executed by that fublime piece of eloquence, that has ever fince been the admiration of mankind. After the battle of CHARONEA, a law was paffed upon the motion of HYPERIDES, giving liberty to flaves, and inrolling them in the troops *. On account of this law, the orator was afterwards tried by the indictment abovementioned, and defended himself, among other topics, by that stroke celebrated by PLUTARCH and LONGINUS. It was not I, faid he, that moved for this law: It was the neceffities of war; it was the battle of CHERONEA. The orations of DEMOSTHENES abound with many inftances of trials of this nature, and prove clearly, that nothing was more commonly practifed. The ATHENIAN Democracy was fuch a tumultuous government as we can scarcely form a notion of in the prefent age of the world. The whole collective body of the people voted in every law, without any limitation of property, without any diftinction of rank, without controul from any magiftracy or fenate +; and confequently without regard to order, juftice, or prudence. The ATHENIANS foon became fenfible of the mifchiefs PLUTARCHUS in vita decem oratorum. DEMOSTHENES gives a different account of this law. Contra ARISTOGITON, orat. II. He fays, that its purport was, to render the aripa stitiμai, or to restore the privilege of bearing offices to those who had been declared incapable. Perhaps these were both claufes of the fame law. + The fenate of the Bean was only a lefs numerous mob, chofen by let from among the people; and their authority was not great. attending attending this conftitution: But being averse to checking themselves by any rule or reftriction, they refolved, at leaft, to check their demagogues or counsellors, by the fear of future punishment and enquiry. They accordingly inftituted this remarkable law; a law efteemed fo effential to their form of government, that ÆSCHINES infifts on it as a known truth, that, were it abolished or neglected, it were impoffible for the Democracy to fubfift. The people feared not any ill confequence to liberty from the authority of the criminal courts; because these were nothing but very numerous juries, chofen by lot from among the people. And they juftly confidered themselves as in a state of perpetual pupillage; where they had an authority, after they came to the use of reafon, not only to retract and controul whatever had been determined, but to punish any guardian for measures which they had embraced by his perfuafion. The same law had place in THEBES+; and for the fame reason. It appears to have been a ufual practice in ATHENS, on the establishment of any law esteemed very useful or popular, to prohibit for ever its abrogation and repeal. Thus the demagogue, who diverted all the public revenues to the support of shows and fpectacles, made it criminal fo much as to move for a repeal of this law *. Thus LEPTINES moved for a law, not only to recal all the immunitics formerly granted, but to deprive the In CTESIPHONTEM. It is remarkable, that the firft ftep after the diffolution of the Democracy by CRITIAS and the Thirty, was to annul the γραφη παρανόμων, as we learn from DEMOSTHENES κατα Τιμ. The orator in this oration gives us the words of the law, establishing the ygan wagavoμar, pag. 297. ex edit. ALDI, And he acc unts for it, from the same principles we here reafon upon. PLUT. in vita PELOP. people people for the future of the power of granting any more ||. Thus all bills of attainder § were forbid, or laws that affected one ATHENIAN, without extending to the whole commonwealth. Thefe abfurd claufes, by which the legislature vainly attempted to bind itself for ever, proceeded from an universal sense in the people of their own levity and inconftancy. II. A wheel within a wheel, fuch as we obferve in the GERMAN empire, is confidered by Lord SHAFTESBURY + as an abfurdity in politics: But what must we fay to two equal wheels, which govern the fame political machine, without any mutual check, controul, or fubordination; and yet preferve the greatest harmony and concord? To establish two diftinct legislatures, each of which poffeffes full and abfolute authority within itself, and stands in no need of the other's affiftance, in order to give validity to its acts; this may appear, before-hand, altogether impracticable, as long as men are actuated by the paffions of ambition, emulation, and avarice, which have hitherto been their chief governing principles. And fhould I affert, that the ftate I have in my eye was divided into two diftinct factions, each of which predominated in a diftinct legislature, and yet produced no clashing in these independent powers; the fuppofition may appear incredible. And if, to augment the paradox, I should affirm, that this disjointed, irregular government, was the most active, triumphant, and illuftrious commonwealth, that ever yet appeared; I should certainly be told, that fuch a political chimera was as abfurd as any vifion of priests or poets. But there is no need for DEMOST. contra LÉPT.` DEMOST. contra ARISTOCRATEM. Effay on the freedom of wit and humour, part 3. § 2, VOL. I. Cc searching searching long, in order to prove the reality of the foregoing fuppofitions: For this was actually the cafe with the ROMAN republic. The legislative power was there lodged in the comitia centuriata and comitia tributa. In the former, it is well known, the people voted according to their cenfus; so that when the firft clafs was unanimous, though it contained not, perhaps, the hundredth part of the commonwealth, it determined the whole; and, with the authority of the fenate, established a law. In the latter, every vote was equal; and as the authority of the fenate was not there requifite, the lower people entirely prevailed, and gave law to the whole ftate. In all party-divifions, at first between the PATRICIANS and PLEBEIANS, afterwards between the nobles and the people, the interest of the Ariftocracy was predominant in the first legiflature; that of the Democracy in the fecond: The one could always deftroy what the other had established: Nay, the one, by a fudden and unforeseen motion, might take the start of the other, and totally annihilate its rival, by a vote, which, from the nature of the conftitution, had the full authority of a law. But no fuch contest is observed in the history of ROME: No inftance of a quarrel between these two legiflatures; though many between the parties that governed in each. Whence arofe this concord, which may feem fo extraordinary? The legiflature established in ROME, by the authority of SERVIUS TULLIUS, was the comitia centuriata, which, after the expulfion of the kings, rendered the government, for fome time, very ariftocratical. But the people, having numbers and force on their fide, and being elated with frequent conquefts and victories in their foreign wars, always prevailed when pushed to extremity, and |