fhould expect on the first appearance. It is regarded as a fundamental maxim of the TURKISH government, that' the Grand Signior, though abfolute mafter of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to impose a new tax; and every OTTOMAN prince, who has made fuch an attempt, either has been obliged to retract, or has found the fatal effects of his perfeverance. One would imagine, that this prejudice or established opinion were the firmeft barrier in the world against oppreffion; yet it is certain, that its effect is quite contrary. The emperor, having no regular method of encreafing his revenue, muft allow all the bafhaws and governors to opprefs and abuse the fubjects: And thefe he fqueezes after their return from their government. Whereas, if he could impofe a new tax, like our EUROPEAN princes, his intereft would fo far be united with that of his people, that he would immediately feel the bad effects of these diforderly levies of money, and would find, that a pound, raised by general impofition, would have lefs pernicious effects, than a fhilling taken in fo unequal and arbitrary

a manner.

ESSAY IX.

Of PUBLIC CREDIT.

T appears to have been the common practice of an

tiquity, to make provifion, during peace, for the neceffities of war, and to hoard up treasures before-hand, as the inftruments either of conqueft or defence; without trufting to extraordinary impofitions, much less to borrowing, in times of diforder and confufion. Befides the immenfe fums above mentioned *, which were amassed by ATHENS, and by the PTOLEMIES, and other fucceffors of ALEXANDER; we learn from PLATO †, that the frugal LACEDEMONIANS had alfo collected a great treasure; and ARRIAN ‡ and PLUTARCH | take notice of the riches which ALEXANDER got poffeffion of on the conqueft of SUSA and ECB ATANA, and which were referved, fome of them, from the time of CYRUS. If I remember right, the fcripture alfo mentions the treasure of HEZEKIAH and the JEWISH princes; as profane hiftóry does that of PHILIP and PERSEUS, kings of MACEDON. The ancient republics of GAUL had commonly large fums in referve §. Every one knows the treasure

* Effay V.

+ ALCIB. I.

Lib. iii.

PLUT. in vita ALEX. He makes these treasures amount to 80,000 talents, or about 15 millions fterl. QUINTUS CURTIUS (lib. v. cap. 2.) fays, that ALEXANDER found in SUSA above 50,000 talents.

STRABO, lb. iv.

feized in ROME by JULIUS CAESAR, during the civil wars; and we find afterwards, that the wifer emperors, AUGUSTUS, TIBERIUS, VESPASIAN, SEVERUS, &c. always difcovered the prudent forefight, of faving great fums against any public exigency.

On the contrary, our modern expedient, which has become very general, is to mortgage the public revenues, and to trust that pofterity will pay off the incumbrances contracted by their ancestors: And they, having before their eyes, fo good an example of their wife fathers, have the fame prudent reliance on their pofterity; who, at last, from neceffity more than choice, are obliged to place the fame confidence in a new pofterity. But not to wafte time in declaiming against a practice which appears ruinous, beyond all controverfy; it feems pretty apparent, that the ancient maxims are, in this refpect, more prudent than the modern; even though the latter had been confined within fome reasonable bounds, and had ever, in any inftance, been attended with fuch frugality, in time of peace, as to difcharge the debts incurred by an expenfive war. For why should the cafe be fo different between the public and an individual, as to make us eftablish different maxims of conduct for each? If the funds of the former be greater, its neceffary expences are proportionably larger; if its refources be more numerous, they are not infinite; and as its frame should be calculated for a much longer duration than the date of a fingle life, or even of a family, it fhould embrace maxims, large, durable, and generous, agreeably to the fuppofed extent of its existence. To truft to chances and temporary expedients, is, indeed, what the neceffity of human affairs frequently renders unavoidable; but whoever voluntarily depend on fuch resources, have not neceffity,

neceffity, but their own folly, to accufe for their miffortunes, when any fuch befal them.

If the abufes of treafures be dangerous, either by engaging the state in rash enterprizes, or making it neglec military difcipline, in confidence of its riches; the abuses of mortgaging are more certain and inevitable; poverty, impotence, and subjection to foreign powers.

According to modern policy war is attended with every destructive circumftance; lofs of men, encrease of taxes, decay of commerce, diffipation of money, devastation by fea and land. According to ancient maxims, the opening of the public treasure, as it produced an uncommon affluence of gold and filver, ferved as a temporary encouragement to induftry, and attoned, in fome degree, for the inevitable calamities of war.

It is very tempting to a minister to employ fuch an expedient, as enables him to make a great figure during his administration, without overburthening the people with taxes, or exciting any immediate clamours against himself. The practice, therefore, of contracting debt will almost infallibly be abused, in every government. It would scarcely be more imprudent to give a prodigal fon a credit in every banker's shop in London, than to impower a statesman to draw bills, in this manner, upon pofterity.

What then shall we fay to the new paradox, that public incumbrances, are, of themselves, advantageous, independent of the neceffity of contracting them; and that any state, even though it were not preffed by a foreign enemy, could not poffibly have embraced a wifer expedient for promoting commerce and riches, than to create funds, and debts, and taxes, without limitation? Reasonings, fuch as thefe, might naturally have paffed

for trials of wit among rhetoricians, like the panegyrics on folly and a fever, on BUSIRIS and NERO, had we not feen fuch abfurd maxims patronized by great minifters, and by a whole party among us.

Let us examine the confequences of public debts, both in our domeftic management, by their influence on commerce and industry; and in our foreign tranfactions, by their effect on wars and negociations.

Public fecurities are with us become a kind of money, and pass as readily at the current price as gold or filver. Wherever any profitable undertaking offers itfelf, how expensive soever, there are never wanting hands enow tọ embrace it; nor need a trader, who has fums in the public frocks, fear to launch cut into the most extensive trade; fince he is poffcffed of funds, which will answer the most sudden demand that can be made upon him. No merchant thinks it neceffary to keep by him any confiderable cafh. Bank-ftock, or India-bonds, efpecially the latter, ferve all the fame purpofes; because he can difpofe of them, or pledge them to a banker, in ą quarter of an hour; and at the fame time they are not idle, even when in his fcritoire, but bring him in a conftant revenue. In short, our national debts furnish merchants with a fpecies of money, that is continually multiplying in their hands, and produces fure gain, befides the profits of their commerce. This muft enable them to trade upon lefs profit. The fmall profit of the merchant renders the commodity cheaper, causes à greater confumption, quickens the labour of the common people, and helps to fpread arts and industry throughout the whole fociety.

There are alfo, we may obferve, in ENGLAND, and in all ftates, which have both commerce and public debts,