and has great influence; yet he muft antecedently be fuppofed invested with a public character, otherwise the public esteem will ferve him in no ftead, nor will his virtue have any influence beyond a narrow sphere.

A Government may endure for several ages, though the balance of power, and the balance of property do not coincide. This chiefly happens, where any rank or order of the ftate has acquired a large fhare in the property; but from the original conftitution of the government, has no fhare in the power. Under what pretence would any individual of that order affume authority in public affairs ? As men are commonly much attached to their ancient government, it is not to be expected, that the public would ever favour fuch ufurpations. But where the original constitution allows any fhare of power, though small, to an order of men, who possess a large fhare of the property, it is easy for them gradually to ftretch their authority, and bring the balance of power to coincide with that of property. This has been the cafe with the house of commons in ENGLAND.

Moft writers, that have treated of the BRITISH government, have fuppofed, that as the lower house represents all the commons of GREAT BRITAIN, its weight in the scale is proportioned to the property and power of all whom it reprefents. But this principle muft not be received as abfolutely true. For though the people are apt to attach themselves more to the house of commons, than to any other member of the conftitution; that house being chofen by them as their reprefentatives, and as the public guardians of their liberty; yet are there inftances where the house, even when in oppofition to the crown, has not been followed by the people; as we may particularly obferve of the tory houfe of commons in

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the

the reign of king WILLIAM. Were the members obliged to receive inftructions from their conftituents, like the DUTCH deputies, this would entirely alter the cafe; and if fuch immenfe power and riches, as thofe of the whole commons of BRITAIN, were brought into the scale, it is not eafy to conceive, that the crown could either influence that multitude of people, or withstand that overbalance of property. It is true, the crown has great influence over the collective body of BRITAIN in the elections of members; but were this influence, which at present is only exerted once in feven years, to be employed in bringing over the people to every vote, it would foon be wasted; and no fkill, popularity, or revenue, could fupport it. I muft, therefore, be of opinion, that an alteration in this particular would introduce a total alteration in our government, and would foon reduce it to a pure republic; and, perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient form. For though the people, collected in a body like the ROMAN tribes, be quite unfit for government, yet when dispersed in small bodies, they are more fufceptible both of reafon and order; the force of popular currents and tides is, in a great measure, broken; and the public intereft may be pursued with some method and conftancy. But it is needless to reafon any farther concerning a form of government, which is never likely to have place in BRITAIN, and which feems not to be the aim of any party amongst us. Let us cherish and improve our ancient government as much as poffible, without encouraging a paffion for fuch dangerous novelties.

ESSAY V.

Of the INDEPENDENCY of PARLIAMENT.

OLITICAL writers have established it as a maxim,

POLITICAL

that, in contriving any fyftem of government, and fixing the feveral checks and controuls of the conftitution, every man ought to be fuppofed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, but private intereft. By this intereft we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him co-operate to public good, notwithstanding his infatiable avarice and ambition. Without this, fay they, we shall in vain boast of the advantages of any conftitution, and shall find, in the end, that we have no fecurity for our liberties or poffeffions, except the good-will of our rulers; that is, we shall have no fecurity at all.

It is, therefore, a juft political maxim, that every man must be fuppofed a knave: Though at the fame time, it appears fomewhat ftrange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which is false in fact. But to fatisfy us on this head, we may confider, that men are generally more honeft in their private than in their public capacity, and will go greater lengths to ferve a party, than when their own private intereft is alone concerned. Honour is a great check upon mankind: But where a confiderable body of men act together, this check is, in a great measure,

D 2,

measure, removed; fince a man is fure to be approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common intereft; and he foon learns to despise the clamours of adverfaries. To which we may add, that every court or fenate is determined by the greater number of voices; fo that, if felf-intereft influences only the majority, (as it will always do) the whole fenate follows the allurements of this separate interest, and acts as if it contained not one member, who had any regard to public interest and liberty.

When there offers, therefore, to our cenfure and examination, any plan of government, real or imaginary, where the power is diftributed among feveral courts, and feveral orders of men, we fhould always confider the feparate intereft of each court, and each order; and, if we find, that, by the skilful divifion of power, this interest must neceffarily, in its operation, concur with public, we may pronounce that government to be wife and happy. If, on the contrary, feparate intereft be not checked, and be not directed to the public, we ought to look for nothing but faction, diforder, and tyranny from fuch a government. In this opinion I am justified by experience, as well as by the authority of all philofophers and politicians, both ancient and modern.

How much, therefore, would it have surprized such a genius as CICERO, or TACITUS, to have been told, that, in a future age, there fhould arife a very regular fyftem of mixed government, where the authority was so diftributed, that one rank, whenever it pleased, might fwallow up all the reft, and engrofs the whole power of the conftitution. Such a government, they would say, will not be a mixed government. For fo great is the natural ambition of men, that they are never fatisfied