ESSAY VII.

Of the BALANCE of POWER.

T is a question, whether the idea of the balance of power be owing entirely to modern policy, or whether the phrafe only has been invented in these later ages? It is certain, that XENOPHON*, in his Inftitution of CYRUS, reprefents the combination of the ASIATIC powers to have arisen from a jealousy of the encreasing force of the MEDES and PERSIANS; and though that elegant compofition fhould be supposed altogether a romance, this fentiment, afcribed by the author to the eastern princes, is at least a proof of the prevailing notion of ancient times.

In all the politics of GREECE, the anxiety, with regard to the balance of power, is apparent, and is expressly pointed out to us, even by the ancient hiftorians. THUCYDIDES + represents the league, which was formed against ATHENS, and which produced the PELOPONNESIAN war, as entirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of ATHENS, when the THEBANS and LACEDEMONIANS difputed for fovereignty, we find, that the ATHENIANS (as well as many other republics) always threw themselves into the lighter fcale, and endeavoured to preserve the balance. They fupported THEBES against

↑ Lib. i.

↑ Lib. i.

SPARTA,

SPARTA, till the great victory gained by EPAMINONDAS at LEUCTRA; after which they immediately went over to the conquered, from generofity, as they pretended, but, in reality from their jealoufy of the conquerors ‡.

Whoever will read DEMOSTHENES's oration for the MEGALOPOLITANS, may fee the utmoft refinements on this principle, that ever entered into the head of a VENETIAN OF ENGLISH fpeculatift. And upon the first rise of the MACEDONIAN power, this orator immediately difcovered the danger, founded the alarm through all GREECE, and at laft affembled that confederacy under the banners of ATHENS, which fought the great and decifive battle of CHAERONEA.

It is true, the GRECIAN wars are regarded by historians as wars of emulation rather than of politics; and each ftate feems to have had more in view the honour of leading the reft, than any well grounded hopes of authority and dominion. If we confider, indeed, the fmall number of inhabitants, in any one republic, compared to the whole, the great difficulty of forming fieges in those times, and the extraordinary bravery and discipline of every freeman among that noble people; we fhall conclude, that the balance of power was, of itself, sufficiently fecured in GREECE, and needed not to have been guarded with that caution which may be requifite in other ages. But whether we afcribe the fhifting of fides in all the GRECIAN republics to jealous emulation or cautious politics, the effects were alike, and every prevailing power was fure to meet with a confederacy against it, and that often compofed of its former friends and allies.

The fame principle, call it envy or prudence, which produced the Oftracism of ATHENS, and Petalifm of SY

XENOPH. Hift. GRAEC. lib. vi. & vii.

RACUSE,

RACUSE, and expelled every citizen whofe fame or power overtopped the reft; the fame principle, I fay, naturally difcovered itself in foreign politics, and foon raifed enemies to the leading ftate, however moderate in the exercife of its authority.

The PERSIAN monarch was really, in his force, a petty prince, compared to the GRECIAN republics; and therefore it behoved him, from views of fafety more than from emulation, to intereft himself in their quarrels, and to fupport the weaker fide in every conteft. This was the advice given by ALCIBIADES to TISSAPHERNES* and it prolonged near a century the date of the PERSIAN empire; till the neglect of it for a moment, after the firft appearance of the aspiring genius of PHILIP, brought that lofty and frail edifice to the ground, with a rapidity of which there are few inftances in the history of mankind.

The fucceffors of ALEXANDER fhowed great jealoufy of the balance of power; a jealoufy founded on true politics and prudence, and which preferved diftinct for feveral ages the partitions made after the death of that famous conqueror. The fortune and ambition of ANTIGONUS threatened them anew with a univerfal monarchy; but their combination, and their victory at IPSUS faved them. And in after times, we find, that, as the Eastern princes confidered the GREEKS and MACEDONIANS as the only real military force, with whom they had any intercourfe, they kept always a watchful eye over that part of the world. The PTOLEMIES, in particular, fupported firft ARATUS and the ACHAEANS, and then CLEOMENES king of SPARTA, from no other view than as a counterbalance to the MACEDONIAN

THUCYD. lib. viii.

5

DIOD. SIC. lib. xx,

monarchs.

monarchs. For this is the account which POLYBIUS gives of the EGYPTIAN politics*.

The reason, why it is supposed, that the ancients were entirely ignorant of the balance of power, feems to be drawn from the ROMAN hiftory more than the GRECIAN; and as the transactions of the former are generally the most familiar to us, we have thence formed all our conclufions. It must be owned, that the ROMANS never met with any fuch general combination or confederacy against them, as might naturally have been expected from their rapid conquefts and declared ambition; but were allowed peaceably to fubdue their neighbours, one after another, till they extended their dominion over the whole known world. Not to mention the fabulous history of their ITALIC wars ; there was, upon HANNIBAL'S invafion of the ROMAN ftate, a remarkable crifis, which ought to have called up the attention of all civilized nations. It appeared afterwards (nor was it difficult to be obferved at the time) + that this was a contest for univerfal empire; and yet no prince or ftate feems to have been in the leaft alarmed about the event or iffue of the quarrel. PHILIP of MACEDON remained neuter, till he faw the victories of HANNIBAL; and then most imprudently formed an alliance with the conqueror, upon terms ftill more imprudent. He ftipulated, that he was to affift the CARTHAGINIAN state in their conquest of ITALY; after which they engaged to fend over forces into GREECE, to affift him in fubduing the GRECIAN commonwealths.

Lib. ii. cap. 51.

+ It was observed by fome, as appears by the fpeech of AGELAUS OF NAUPACTUM, in the general congrefs of GREECE. See POLYR. lib. v. cap. 104.

† TITI LIVII, lib. xxiii. cap. 336

The RHODIAN and ACHAEAN republics are much celebrated by ancient hiftorians for their wisdom and found policy; yet both of them affifted the ROMANS in their wars against PHILIP and ANTIOCHUS. And what may be esteemed ftill a ftronger proof, that this maxim was not generally known in thofe ages; no ancient author has remarked the imprudence of thefe measures, nor has even blamed that absurd treaty above mentioned, made by PHILIP with the CARTHAGINIANS. Princes and statesmen, in all ages, may, before-hand, be blinded in their reasonings with regard to events; But it is fomewhat extraordinary, that hiftorians, afterwards, should not form a founder judgment of them.

MASSINISSA, ATTALUS, PRUSIAS, in gratifying their private paffions, were, all of them, the inftruments of the Roman greatnefs; and never seem to have fufpected, that they were forging their own chains, while they advanced the conquefts of their ally. A fimple treaty and agreement between MASSINISSA and the CARTHAGINIANS, fo much required by mutual intereft, barred the ROMANS from all entrance into AFRICA, and preferved liberty to mankind.

The only prince we meet with in the ROMAN history, who seems to have understood the balance of power, is HIERO King of SYRACUSE. Though the ally of Rome, he fent affiftance to the CARTHAGINIANS, during the war of the auxiliaries; "Efteeming it requifite," fays POLYBIUS," both in order to retain his dominions in "SICILY, and to preserve the ROMAN friendship, that "CARTHAGE fhould be fafe; left by its fall the re"maining power fhould be able, without contraft or ❝oppofition, to execute every purpose and undertaking, + Lib. i. cap. 83.

" And