moderate and confiftent, their claims might be admitted; at leaft might be examined. The country-party might ftill affert, that our conftitution, though excellent, will admit of mal-adminiftration to a certain degree; and therefore, if the minifter be bad, it is proper to oppose him with a suitable degree of zeal. And, on the other hand, the court-party may be allowed, upon the supposition that the minifter were good, to defend, and with fome zeal too, his administration. I would only perfuade men not to contend, as if they were fighting pro aris & focis, and change a good constitution into a bad one, by

the violence of their factions.

I have not here confidered any thing that is perfonal in the prefent controverfy. In the best civil conftitution, where every man is restrained by the moft rigid laws, it is easy to discover either the good or bad intentions of a minifter, and to judge, whether his perfonal character deferve love or hatred. But fuch questions are of little importance to the public, and lay thofe, who employ their pens upon them, under a just suspicion either of malevoJence or of flattery.

N

OTHING appears more furprizing to thofe

who confider human affairs with a philofophical eye, than the casiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit fubmiffion, with which men refign their own fentiments and paffions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we fhall find, that, as FORCE is always on the fide of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the moft defpotic and moft military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular. The foldan of EGYPT, or the emperor of ROME, might drive his harmlefs fubjects, like brute beafts, against their fentiments and inclination: But he must, at leaft, have led his mamalukes, or prætorian bands, like men, by their opinion.

Opinion is of two kinds, to wit, opinion of INTEREST, and opinion of RIGHT. By opinion of interest, I chiefly understand the fenfe of the general advantage which is reaped from government; together with the perfuafion that the particular government, which is established, is equally advantageous with any other that could easily be fettled. When this opinion prevails among the generality

of

1

of a state, or among those who have the force in their hands, it gives great fecurity to any government.

Right is of two kinds, right to POWER and right to PROPERTY. What prevalence opinion of the first kind has over mankind, may easily be understood, by obferving the attachment which all nations have to their ancient government, and even to thofe names, which have had the fanction of antiquity. Antiquity always begets the opinion of right; and whatever disadvantageous fentiments we may entertain of mankind, they are always found to be prodigal both of blood and treasure in the maintenance of public juftice. There is, indeed, no particular, in which, at first fight, there may appear a greater contradiction in the frame of the human mind than the present. When men act in a faction, they are apt, without shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of honour and morality, in order to serve their party; and yet, when a faction is formed upon a point of right or principle, there is no occafion, where men discover a greater obftinacy, and a more determined fenfe of juftice and equity. The fame focial difpofition of mankind is the cause of these contradictory appearances.

It is fufficiently understood, that the opinion of right to property is of moment in all matters of government. A noted author has made property the foundation of all government; and moft of our political writers feem inclined to follow him in that particular. This is carrying the matter too far; but ftill it must be owned, that the opinion of right to property has a great influence in this fubject.

Upon

Upon these three opinions, therefore, of public intereft, of right to power, and of right to property, are all governments founded, and all authority of the few over the many. There are indeed other principles, which add force to these, and determine, limit, or alter their operation; fuch as self-intereft, fear, and affection: But ftill we may affert, that these other principles can have no influence alone, but fuppofe the antecedent influence of those opinions above-mentioned. They are, therefore, to be esteemed the secondary, not the original principles of government.

For, firft, as to felf-intereft, by which I mean the expectation of particular rewards, diftinct from the general protection which we receive from government, it is evident that the magistrate's authority must be antecedently established, or, at least be hoped for, in order to produce this expectation. The profpect of reward may augment his authority with regard to fome particular perfons; but can never give birth to it, with regard to the public. Men naturally look for the greatest favours from their friends and acquaintance; and therefore, the hopes of any confiderable number of the ftate would never center in any particular fet of men, if these men had no other title to magiftracy, and had no feparate influence over the opinions of mankind. The fame obfervation may be extended to the other two principles of fear and affection. No man would have any reason to fear the fury of a tyrant, if he had no authority over any but from fear; fince, as a fingle man, his bodily force can reach but a small way, and all the farther power he poffeffes must be founded either on our own opinion, or on the prefumed opinion of others. And though affection to wisdom and virtue in a fovereign extends very far,

and