very nature of language. The word virtue, with its equivalent in every tongue, implies praise; as that of vice does blame And no one, without the most obvious and groffeft impropriety, could affix reproach to a term, which in general acceptation is understood in a good fenfe; or bestow applause, where the idiom requires difapprobation. HOMER'S general precepts, where he delivers any fuch, will never be controverted; but it is obvious, that, when he draws particular pictures of manners, and reprefents heroism in ACHILLES and prudence in ULYSSES, he intermixes a much greater degree of ferocity in the former, and of cunning and fraud in the latter, than FENELON would admit of. The fage ULYSSES in the GREEK poet seems to delight in lies and fictions, and often employs them without any neceffity or even advantage: But his more fcrupulous fon, in the FRENCH epic writer, exposes himself to the most imminent perils, rather than depart from the exacteft line of truth and veracity. The admirers and followers of the ALCORAN infift on the excellent moral precepts interfperfed throughout that wild and abfurd performance. But it is to be fuppofed, that the ARABIC words, which correspond to the ENGLISH, equity, juftice, temperance, meeknefs, charity, were fuch as, from the conftant use of that tongue, must always be taken in a good fenfe; and it would have argued the greateft ignorance, not of morals, but of Janguage, to have mentioned them with, any epithets, befides thofe of applaufe and approbation. But would we know, whether the pretended prophet had really attained a juft fentiment of morals? Let us attend to his narration; and we fhall foon find, that he bestows praife on fuch inftances of treachery, inhumanity, cruelty, revenge, bigotry, as are utterly incompatible with civilized fociety. No fteady rule of right feems there to be at tended tended to; and every action is blamed or praised, fo far only as it is beneficial or hurtful to the true believers. The merit of delivering true general precepts in ethics is indeed very small. Whoever recommends any moral virtues, really does no more than is implied in the terms themselves. That people, who invented the word charity, and used it in a good fenfe, inculcated more clearly and much more efficaciously, the precept, be charitable, than any pretended legiflator or prophet, who fhould infert fuch a maxim in his writings. Of all expreffions, thofe, which, together with their other meaning, imply a degree either of blame or approbation, are the leaft liable to be perverted or mistaken. It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Tafte; a rule, by which the various fentiments of men may be reconciled; or at least, a decifion afforded, confirming one fentiment, and condemning another. There is a fpecies of philofophy, which cuts off all hopes of fuccefs in fuch an attempt, and reprefents the impoffibility of ever attaining any standard of taste. The difference, it is faid, is very wide between judgment and fentiment. All fentiment is right; becaufe fentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself, and is always real, wherever a man is confcious of it. But all determinations of the understanding are not right; because they have a reference to fomething beyond themselves, to wit, real matter of fact; and are not always conformable to that standard. Among a thousand different opinions which different men may entertain of the fame fubje&, there is one, and but one, that is juft and true; and the only difficulty is to fix and ascertain it. On the contrary, a thoufand different fentiments, excited by the fame object, are all right: Becaufe no fentiment reprefents what is really in the object. It only marks a cer tain conformity or relation between the object and the organs or faculties of the mind; and if that conformity did not really exift, the fentiment could never poffibly have being. Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exifts merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. One perfon may even perceive deformity, where another is fenfible of beauty; and every individual ought to acquiefce in his own fentiment, without pretending to regulate those of others. To feek the real beauty, or real deformity is as fruitless an enquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real fweet or real bitter. According to the difpofition of the organs, the fame object may be both fweet and bitter; and the proverb has juftly determined it to be fruitless to dispute concerning taftes. It is very natural, and even quite neceffary, to extend this axiom to mental, as well as bodily tafte; and thus common fenfe, which is fo often at variance with philofophy, especially with the fceptical kind, is found, in one inftance at least, to agree in pronouncing the fame decifion. But though this axiom, by paffing into a proverb, feems to have attained the fanction of common sense i there is certainly a fpecies of common fenfe which opposes it, or at leaft ferves to modify and restrain it. Whoever would affert an equality of genius and elegance between CGILBY and MILTON, or BUNYAN and ADDISON, would be thought to defend no lefs an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as TENERIFFE, or a pond as extenfive as the ocean. Though there may be found perfons, who give the preference to the former authors; no one pays attention to such a tafte; and we pronounce without fcruple the fentiment of thefe pretended critics to be abfurd and ridiculous. The principle of the natural equality of tastes is is then totally forgot, and while we admit it on fome occafions, where the objects feem near an equality, it appears an extravagant paradox, or rather a palpable abfurdity, where objects fo difproportioned are compared together. It is evident that none of the rules of compofition are fixed by reasonings a priori, or can be efteemed abstract conclufions of the understanding, from comparing those habitudes and relations of ideas, which are eternal and immutable. Their foundation is the fame with that of all the practical fciences, experience; nor are they any thing but general obfervations, concerning what has been univerfally found to please in all countries and in all ages. Many of the beauties of poetry and even of eloquence . are founded on falfehood and fiction, on hyperboles, metaphors, and an abufe or perverfion of terms from their natural meaning. To check the fallies of the imagination, and to reduce every expreffion to geometrical truth and exactness, would be the most contrary to the laws of criticism; because it would produce a work, which, by univerfal experience, has been found the most infipid and difagreeable. But though poetry can never submit to exact truth, it must be confined by rules of art, discovered to the author either by genius or obfervation. If fome negligent or irregular writers have pleased, they have not pleafed by their tranfgreffions of rule or order, but in fpite of thefe tranfgreffions: They have poffeffed other beauties, which were conformable to juft criticism; and the force of these beauties has been able to overpower cenfure, and give the mind a fatisfaction fuperior to the difguft arifing from the blemishes. ARIOSTO pleases; but not by his monftrous and improbable fictions, by his bizarre mixture of the ferious and comic ftyles, by the want of coherence in his ftories, or He by the continual interruptions of his narration. charms by the force and clearness of his expreffion, by the readiness and variety of his inventions, and by his natural pictures of the paffions, especially thofe of the gay and amorous kind: And however his faults may diminish our fatisfaction, they are not able entirely to deftroy it. Did our pleafure really arife from thofe parts of his poem, which we denominate faults, this would be no objection to criticifi in general: It would only be an objection to those particular rules of criticism, which would eftablifh fuch circumftances to be faults, and would represent them as univerfally blameable. If they are found to pleafe, they cannot be faults; let the pleasure, which they produce, be ever fo unexpected and unaccountable. But though all the general rules of art are founded only on experience and on the obfervation of the common fentiments of human nature, we muft not imagine, that, on every occafion, the feelings of men will be conformable to these rules. Those finer emotions of the mind are of a very tender and delicate nature, and require the concurrence of many favourable circumstances to make them play with facility and exactness, according to their general and established principles. The leaft exterior hindrance to such small springs, or the leaft internal diforder, difturbs their motion, and confounds the operation of the whole machine. When we would make an experiment of this nature, and would try the force of any beauty or deformity, we must choose with care a proper time and place, and bring the fancy to a suitable situation and difpofition. A perfect ferenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object; if any of thefe circumstances te wanting, our ex, eriment will be VOL. I. fallacious, R |