1 and even, perhaps, licentioufnefs in BRITAIN, as there were formerly flavery and tyranny in ROME. These principles account for the great liberty of the prefs in these kingdoms, beyond what is indulged in any other government. It is apprehended, that arbitrary power would steal in upon us, were we not careful to prevent its progress, and were there not an eafy method of conveying the alarm from one end of the kingdom to the other. The spirit of the people muft frequently be rouzed, in order to curb the ambition of the court; and the dread of rouzing this fpirit must be employed to prevent that ambition. Nothing fo effectual to this purpose as the liberty of the prefs, by which all the learning, wit and genius of the nation may be employed on the fide of freedom, and every one be animated to its defence. As long, therefore, as the republican part of our government can maintain itself against the monarchical, it will naturally be careful to keep the prefs open, as of importance to its own preservation. It must however be allowed, that the unbounded liberty of the prefs, though it be difficult to propofe a fuitable remedy for it, is one of the evils, attending those mixt forms of government. I ESSAY III. That POLITICS may be reduced to a SCIENCE. T is a queftion with feveral, whether there be any effential difference between one form of government and another? and, whether every form may not become good or bad, according as it is well or ill administered +? Were it once admitted, that all governments are alike, and that the only difference confifts in the character and conduct of the governors, most political disputes would be at an end, and all Zeal for one conftitution above another, must be esteemed mere bigotry and folly. But, though a friend to moderation, I cannot forbear condemning this fentiment, and should be forry to think, that human affairs admit of no greater ftability, than what they receive from the casual humours and characters of particular men. It is true; those who maintain, that the goodness of all government confifts in the goodness of the adminiftration, may cite many particular inftances in hiftory, where the very fame government, in different hands, has varied fuddenly into the two oppofite extremes of good and bad. Compare the FRENCH government under HENRY III. and under HENRY IV. Oppreffion, levity, artifice on the part of the rulers; faction, fedition, treachery, rebellion, difloyalty on the part of the fubjects: Thefe compose the character of the former miserable æra. But For forms of government let fools conteft ESSAY on Man, Book 3. when the patriot and heroic prince, who fucceeded, was once firmly feated on the throne, the government, the people, every thing feemed to be totally changed; and all from the difference of the temper and fentiments of these two fovereigns. Inftances of this kind may be multiplied, almoft without number, from ancient as well as modern biftory, foreign as well as domeftic. But here it may be proper to make a diftinction. All abfolute governments muft very much depend on the adminiftration; and this is one of the great inconveniences attending that form of government. But a republican and free government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular checks and controuls, provided by the conftitution, had really no influence, and made it not the intereft, even of bad men, to act for the public good. Such is the intention of thefe forms of government, and fuch is their real effect, where they are wifely conftituted: As on the other hand, they are the fource of all diforder, and of the blackeft crimes, where either fkill or honefty has been wanting in their original frame and inftitution. So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and fo little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that confequences almost as general and certain may fometimes be deduced from them, as any which the mathematical fciences afford us. The conftitution of the ROMAN republic gave the whole legislative power to the people, without allowing a negative voice either to the nobility or confuls. This unbounded power they poffeffed in a collective, not in a representative body. The confequences were: When the people, by fuccefs and conqueft, had become very numerous, and had spread themselves to a great distance from from the capital, the city-tribes, though the most contemptible, carried almoft every vote: They were, therefore, most cajoled by every one that affected popularity: They were supported in idleness by the general diftribution of corn, and by particular bribes, which they received from almost every candidate: By this means, they became every day more licentious, and the CAMPUS MARTIUS was a perpetual scene of tumult and fedition: Armed flaves were introduced among thefe rafcally citizens; so that the whole government fell into anarchy, and the greatest happiness, which the ROMANS could look for, was the defpotic power of the CÆSARS. Such are the effects of democracy without a representative. A Nobility may poffefs the whole, or any part of the legislative power of a state, in two different ways. Either every nobleman fhares the power as part of the whole body, or the whole body enjoys the power as composed of parts, which have each a distinct power and authority. The VENETIAN aristocracy is an inftance of the first kind of government: The POLISH of the fecond. In the VENETIAN government the whole body of nobility poffeffes the whole power, and no nobleman has any authority which he receives not from the whole. In the POLISH government every nobleman, by means of his fiefs, has a distinct hereditary authority over his vassals, and the whole body has no authority but what it receives from the concurrence of its parts. The different operations and tendencies of these two fpecies of government might be made apparent even a priori, A VENETIAN nobility is preferable to a POLISH, let the humours and education of men be ever fo much varied. A nobility, who poffefs their power in common, will preferve peace and order, both among themselves, and their subjects; and no member can have authority enough to controul the laws for a moment. The nobles will preserve their authority over the people, but without any grievous tyranny, or any breach of private property; because such a tyrannical government promotes not the intereft of the whole body, however it may that of fome individuals. There will be a diftinction of rank between the nobility and people, but this will be the only distinction in the ftate. The whole nobility will form one body, and the whole people another, without any of those private feuds and animofities, which spread ruin and defolation every where. It is easy to see the disadvantages of a POLISH nobility in every one of these particulars. It is poffible fo to constitute a free government, as that a fingle perfon, call him doge, prince, or king, shall poffefs a large fhare of power, and shall form a proper balance or counterpoife to the other parts of the legislature. This chief magistrate may be either elective or bereditary; and though the former inftitution may, to a fuperficial view, appear the moft advantageous; yet a more accurate inspection will discover in it greater inconveniencies than in the latter, and fuch as are founded on caufes and principles eternal and immutable. The filling of the throne, in fuch a government, is a point of too great and too general intereft, not to divide the whole people into factions: Whence a civil war, the greatest of ills, may be apprehended, almoft with certainty, upon every vacancy. The prince elected must. be either a Foreigner or a Native: The former will be ignorant of the people whom he is to govern; fufpicious: of his new subjects, and suspected by them; giving his confidence entirely to ftrangers, who will have no other care but of enriching themselves in the quickest manner, while their mafter's favour and authority are able to support them. A native will carry into the throne all |