1842. V. FORD. advance money upon it before it was due? Then what is the objection to his furnishing the money on it after it is due? For there is no reason why a bill may not STURTEVANT be negotiated after it is due, unless there was an agreement for the purpose of restraining it. But if there had been such an agreement, it should have been stated in the plea; and it might then have been a defence; but that is not so here. This bill, then, must be presumed to be given in order that the party may raise money on it in the ordinary way. I see nothing in the transaction prejudicial to the acceptor, and the plea is bad in substance." ERSKINE J. I am of the same opinion. It must be taken here that the plaintiff was a holder for value. The circumstance that the bill was overdue might have operated as evidence that the bill was an accommodation bill, but it should have been so averred. A jury might infer that the bill was accepted upon an understanding that it was not to be negotiated after it became due. But that would not be an inference of law; it should therefore have been made the subject of an averment. In the absence of such an averment, the question is, whether the mere fact of the bill being an accommodation bill prevents it being negotiable after it becomes due. It is said that a bill indorsed after it becomes due, is taken by an indorsee subject to all the equities. The question is, whether the matter of defence set up, is an equity which attaches to the bill. The drawer of this bill could not sue the acceptor. If the plaintiff has given consideration there is no equity to attach to him. Then is this an equity with which the bill is encumbered? It seems to me that no equity attaches to the bill; because it was placed in the hands of the drawer, for the very purpose of raising money. Looking at the cases of Charles v. Marsden and Stein v. Yglesias I think the 1842. STURTEVANT บ. FORD. plaintiff's right to recover is not concluded by the facts disclosed in this plea. CRESSWELL J. I am of the same opinion. Had this been res integra, I am not prepared to say that I should have come to the same conclusion. I should have thought it a case of doubt. By the law merchant, an indorsement may give to the indorsee a better title than the indorser had. It is said that the indorsee of a bill which is over due, takes it subject to all the equities; perhaps a better expression would be that he takes the bill subject to all its equities. That brings it to the question, whether this is an equity which attaches to the bill. In Charles v. Marsden the court said, that there was no reason why a bill should not be negotiated after it became due, unless there was an agreement for the purpose of restraining it. Attwood v. Crowdie (a) is consistent with the law as laid down in Charles v. Marsden. (a) 1 Stark. N. P. C. 483. In that case Lord Ellenborough ruled, that the acceptor of accommodation bills may reclaim them in the hands of the indorsee of the party for whose accommodation they were accepted, if, at the time they fall due, the balance of accounts, as Judgment for the plaintiff. between the indorser and the indorsee, to whom they have been remitted on account, be in favour of the indorser; but that, if not so reclaimed, the indorsee acquires a lien for subsequent advances made by him to the indorser; and the court refused a rule for a new trial. 1842. FRENCH v. MAULE. April 30. Where the master has fixed the amount of costs to be IN this action, which was brought on an attorney's bill for 275l. 13s. 11d., it appeared that, as the plaintiff resided in Ireland, a judge's order had been obtained to stay the proceedings in the cause till he should give security for security for the costs; and it having been sworn on the part of the defendant, that it was necessary for his defence that several witnesses of a superior station in life should be brought over from Ireland, the master, to whom the matter had been referred, fixed the amount of the security at 400l. Shee Serjt. applied for a rule calling on the defendant to shew cause why the amount of security for costs to be given by the plaintiff in this cause should not be reduced. He submitted that requiring security in so large a sum amounted to a denial of justice, and that the defendant might have the witnesses examined on interrogatories, according to the suggestion of Patteson J. in Kent v. Poole. (a) Per curiam. This is not a case in which we ought to interfere with the discretion of the master, the subject being one so much more within his experience, than within that of the court. There is nothing to shew that the view which he has taken of the matter is erroneous. given by a plaintiff resident in Ireland, the court refused to interfere to reduce the amount. Rule refused. (a) 7 Dowl. P. C. 572, 1842. April 30. BULMER and Others v. GILMAN and Others. A parliamen- ASSUMPSIT, for work and labour, care and dili tary agent, entrusted with the passing of a local bill through parliament, who puts a construction on an order of Lords which is terms, construction being different from that which is gence, as attorneys, in and about soliciting and passing a certain bill in and through the Commons' House of Parliament, and in and about other businesses, &c. with counts, for money paid, and on an account stated. Pleas; first, non assumpsit. Secondly (to the first count), that the work and laof the House bour, care, and diligence by the plaintiffs done, performed, and bestowed for the defendants, as in the said doubtful in its first count mentioned, were by the plaintiffs done, persuch formed, and bestowed in so careless, negligent, and insufficient a manner, that the same, from the time of the doing and performing thereof, and from thence until the time of the commencement of this suit, became and were, and from thence hitherto have been, and still are, wholly useless and unbeneficial to the defendants; and mittee and by the defendants, by and through such carelessness, negligence, and inefficient conduct of the plaintiffs, as aforesaid, derived no benefit whatsoever from the same. Verification. adopted by the standing orders com the House, whereby it becomes necessary to abandon the bill, is not guilty of such gross negligence as to disentitle him to recover a remuner ation for his labour in passing the bill through the House of Commons. Thirdly (to the second count), that the sum, so paid by the plaintiffs for the use of the defendants, as in the second count mentioned, was money paid by the plaintiffs, for, in, about, and in respect of, work and labour by the plaintiffs done and performed for the defendants; and that such work and labour were done and performed by the plaintiffs in a careless, &c. (as in last plea); and from which last-mentioned work and labour, and the money paid by the plaintiffs, for, in, about and in respect thereof, by and through such carelessness, negligence and ignorance of the plaintiffs as aforesaid, the defendants had derived no benefit whatever. (a) Verification. Replication (to the second and third pleas), de injuriâ. At the trial before Tindal C. J., at the Middlesex sittings after last Michaelmas term, the following facts appeared: The plaintiffs are parliamentary agents; and the action was brought by them against the defendants, who were attorneys, residing in Norwich, for conducting a bill for better paving, lighting and improving the city of Norwich and county of the same city," through the House of Commons, in the years 1838 and 1839. There were other acts in existence for similar purposes, but their operation was confined to the city of Norwich. The following are the standing orders of the House of Lords, made in 1838 as to private bills: 66 Standing orders, the compliance with which must be proved before the Standing Orders Committee, in all bills for railways included in the second class, and in any other bill included in any of the three classes, which may be opposed; and before the committee on the bill, in any other case. "1. That notices shall be given in all cases where application is intended to be made for a bill included in any of the three classes above mentioned. "2. That such notices shall be published in three successive weeks in the months of October and November, or either of them; and in the case of such railway bills as are included in the second class, in lieu of (a) The plaintiff had moved to strike out the first plea or the second and third. On shewing cause it was agreed that the pleas should stand, the plaintiff to be at liberty to reply de injuriâ. Quare, whether the special pleas would not have 1842. BULMER บ. GILMAN. |