1842. DODSON V. by canal to Boroughbridge, or sometimes to Ripon ; from which places they were conveyed to Mickley Mill, sometimes by carrier, sometimes in Weatherald's own carts. On the 16th of August 1841, Weatherald ordered WENTWORTH. of the plaintiff 100 bales of jute (a species of flax from the East Indies) "to be sent to Boroughbridge, as usual." On the 21st of August the flax, directed "to T. Weatherald, Mickley Mill, near Ripon," was shipped by the plaintiff on board a vessel, called The Laurel, then lying in the Thames. In the bill of lading The Laurel was described as "bound for Boroughbridge," and the jute was "to be delivered at the aforesaid port of Boroughbridge unto Mr. Thomas Weatherald, Mickley Mill, near Ripon, or to his assigns, he or they paying freight for the said goods, 15s. per ton, delivered free in Boroughbridge." The Laurel arrived at York in due course, and the flax was transhipped into a boat belonging to the Ripon Fly-boat Company, which company conveyed goods by canal from York to Ripon. On the 4th of September the flax was landed from the fly-boat at Boroughbridge, and was lodged there in a warehouse belonging to the Ouse Navigation Company, which had no connexion with the Fly-boat Company. On the 6th of September, Weatherald stopped payment; but his insolvency was not known to the plaintiff until the 8th. On that day the plaintiff wrote to the canal agent at Ripon, desiring him not to deliver the flax to Weatherald. the 10th, the flax was seized by the defendant, under an execution against Weatherald, who had never claimed the flax, or exercised any act of ownership over it. On The agent of the Fly-boat Company stated that goods addressed to Weatherald were always put by him into the warehouse belonging to the Ouse Navigation Company, unless Weatherald's carts were ready, at the time of landing, to receive them. And the warehouseman of the 1842. DODSON U. Ouse Navigation Company added that goods so received were considered to be at the risk of Weatherald, as no wharfage or warehouse charges were ever made in reWENTWORTH. Spect of them; and that when he sent for them, or directed them to be delivered to third parties, they were delivered accordingly, without any further communication with the Fly-boat Company. On the part of the plaintiff, who insisted that the transitus was not at an end, and that his right of stoppage had therefore been properly exercised, James v. Griffin (a) and Jackson v. Nichol (b) were cited; and on the part of the defendant, Wentworth v. Outhwaite (c) and Allan v. Gripper. (d) His lordship thought that the transitus was at an end, and directed a verdict for the defendant; reserving leave to the plaintiff to move to set it aside and enter a verdict for himself for 2497., the amount agreed upon. Channell Serjt. on a former day in this term (2d of November), having obtained a rule nisi accordingly, The goods had Bompas Serjt. now shewed cause. reached their destination, as far as the plaintiff was concerned, when they were landed at Boroughbridge. The Ouse Navigation Company had authority to receive them for Weatherald, the consignee; and the goods would remain in their warehouse until they were again set in motion by him. The right of stoppage in transitu was therefore at an end. The cases relied upon by the plaintiff are distinguishable. In James v. Griffin, though the goods were landed at a wharf by the directions of the (a) 1 M. & W. 20. S. C. (c) 10 M. & W. 436. (not reported at the time of the argument of the principal case.) (d) 2 C. & J.218.; 2 Tyrwh. 217. 1842. DODSON บ. consignee, yet it was clearly proved that he did not intend to take possession of them as owner. In Jackson v. Nichol, the goods were stopped before there had been any delivery to the consignee, either actual or con- WENTWORTH. structive. Dixon v. Baldwen (a) is a strong authority for the defendant. In that case Lord Ellenborough said the transit was at an end "when the goods had so far gotten to the end of their journey, that they waited for new orders from the purchaser to put them again in motion, to communicate to them another substantive destination, and where, without such orders, they would remain stationary." That principle is strictly applicable to the present case. [Tindal C. J. In that case the delivery was to the appointed agent of the consignee. Rowe v. Pickford (b) is much nearer to the present case.] The facts there are almost identical with those in this case. Foster v. Frampton (c) is also to the same effect; though in that case certainly the consignee had done a positive act equivalent to taking possession, in taking samples of the goods sent. The case of Wentworth v. Outhwaite, in which the present defendant was the plaintiff, arose out of circumstances that were nearly precisely similar to those in the present case, connected with other goods consigned to the same party, Weatherald, forwarded by railway to Leeds, and warehoused at the railway terminus there; and the court held that the transit was at an end upon the arrival of the goods at the terminus. It is true, in that case, Weatherald had taken possession of a portion of the goods; but no stress was laid upon that point in the judgment of the court, nor would it determine the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu as to the residue; Dixon v. Yates. (d) The cases of Jackson (a) 5 East, 175. (b) 8 Taunt. 83.; 1 J. B. Moore, 526. (c) 6 B. & C. 107. ; 9 D. & R. 108. (d) 5 B. & Ad. 313.; 2 N. & M. 177. 1842. v. Nichol, Richardson v. Goss (a), Coates v. Railton (b), Stokes v. La Riviere (c), Ellis v. Hunt (d), and Bohtlingk v. Inglis (e), all support the proposition, that where fresh WENTWORTH. directions from the vendee are required in order to set the goods again in motion, the transit is at an end. DODSON บ. Talfourd Serjt. (with whom was Hoggins) in support of the rule. The fact of the vendee having taken possession of part of the goods in Wentworth v. Outhwaite forms a material distinction between that case and the present, and, though not adverted to by the court, cannot be supposed to have escaped their observation. It is a circumstance of weight, as tending to shew the position of the goods. The acts of the vendee are always of the greatest importance to the decision of the question whether or not the transit is at an end. In this case the goods, when warehoused at Boroughbridge, were in an ambiguous situation; the character of which would be determined by a very slight act on the part of the vendee. They are addressed to him at Mickley Mill, thirteen miles from Boroughbridge. (Maule J. By the bill of lading they are to be delivered "at the port of Boroughbridge unto Mr. Thomas Weatherald, Mickley Mill." That must mean of Mickley Mill. It is mere description.) When the goods arrive at Boroughbridge, the vendee gives no direction respecting them; he is not liable for warehouse rent or wharfage dues; and he does not exercise any act of dominion over them. Under these circumstances the goods cannot be said to have come even to his constructive possession. The Ouse Navigation Company cannot be considered as his agents, so as to bring the case within the principle of Dixon v. Baldwen (g): Tucker v. Humfrey (h) is in point. In that case (a) 3 B. & P. 119. • (b) 6 B. & C. 422. ; 9 D. & R. 593. (c) Cited, 3 T. R. 466. (d) 3 T. R. 464. (e) 3 East, 381. 398. (9) 5 East, 175. (h) 4 Bingh. 516.; 1 M. & P. 378. 1842. DODSON the shippers, acting for one G., purchased and paid for with their own money, flour at Stockton, which was sent by a vessel to London, and the invoice forwarded to G. A manifest of the flour was also forwarded by the ship- WENTWORTH. pers to a wharfinger in London, whose practice it was to deliver goods to the consignee named in the manifest, upon application, and, till application, to keep it on board the vessel; if not applied for before the vessel returned, he landed it, and kept it in his warehouse, to the order of the shipper; if the goods were to be delivered to order, he delivered them to persons producing either bills of lading or the shipper's invoices. G. was in the habit of having flour consigned to him at the wharf, and sometimes sold it on board, sometimes when it was landed, and kept for him in the wharfinger's warehouses. The flour in question arrived at the wharf on the 12th April, but was not landed till the 22d; on the 17th, before any application by G., who had become bankrupt, the flour was claimed under an order from the shippers; and it was held that the flour not having been landed, nor any application having been made by G., the shippers might stop in transitu. [Tindal C. J. The great distinction between that case and the present is, that there, if the vendee did not apply for the goods, the wharfinger held them to the order of the shippers; but here the warehouseman held them, and would have delivered them, to the order of Weatherald, and not of the plaintiff.] There was nothing here to shew any command or controul by Weatherald over the goods; the warehouse, in which they were housed, was not his, either actually or constructively, as he was not to pay any rent. [Erskine J. It does not appear that the mere fact of rent being paid would have made any difference ; Hammond v. Anderson. (a)] James v. Griffin shews that (a) 1 N. R. 69. |