fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus attached his officers and men to him. The army lay in camp upon the sandbeach in the neighborhood of the mouth of the Rio Grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of transports to carry it to its new field of operations. The transports were all sailing vessels. The passage was a tedious one, and many of 10 the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at the mouth of the Rio Grande to the time of debarkation south of Vera Cruz. The trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. 15 The transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the discomfort of all. The transports with troops were as- 20 sembled in the harbor of Anton Lizardo, some sixteen miles south of Vera Cruz, as they arrived, and there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition and supplies of all kinds from 25 the North. With the fleet there was a little steam propeller dispatch-boat- the first vessel of the kind I had ever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then with the army. At 30 that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there were were side-wheelers. This little vessel, going through the fleet so fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view, attracted 35 a great deal of attention. I recollect that Lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom I happened to be standing on the deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, Why, 4° the thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances.' Finally on the 7th of March, 1847, the little army of ten or twelve thousand men, given Scott to invade a country with a 45 population of seven or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible natural advantages for defense, was all assembled and ready to commence the perilous task of landing 50 from vessels lying in the open sea. The debarkation took place inside of the little island of Sacrificios, some three miles south of Vera Cruz. The vessels could not get anywhere near shore, so 55 that everything had to be landed in lighters or surf-boats; General Scott had provided these before leaving the North. The breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious. The men were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came to shallow 5 water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions, ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, and therefore their landing took several days. The Mexicans were very kind to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except an occasional shot from their nearest fort. During the debarkation one shot took off the head of Major Albertis. No other, I believe, reached anywhere near the same distance. On the 9th of March the troops were landed and the investment of Vera Cruz, from the Gulf of Mexico south of the city to the Gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected. The landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore. Vera Cruz, at the time of which I write and up to 1880, was a walled city. The wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the water again on the north. There were fortifications at intervals along the line and at the angles. In front of the city, and on an island half a mile out in the Gulf, stands San Juan de Ulloa, an enclosed fortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period. Against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would prove elements of weakness rather than strength. After the invading army had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city, batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front of the line where the troops lay. These batteries were intrenched and the approaches sufficiently protected. If a sortie had been made at any time by the Mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's main line. No serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to drive our troops 29th Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa were occupied by Scott's army. About five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into the hands of the victorious force. The casualties on our side during the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded. . . . Whether General Scott approved of the 1 Mexican war and the manner in which it was brought about, I have no means of knowing. His orders to troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regard for the perpetuation of his 15 own fame. On the other hand, General Taylor's, I think, indicate that he considered the administration accountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himself further than for the faith- 20 ful performance of his duties. Both generals deserve the commendations of their. countrymen and to live in the grateful memory of this people to the latest generation. 25 sides: but troops could have passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the south. 5 It has always seemed to me that this northern route to the City of Mexico, would have been the better one to have taken. But my later experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things are seen plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident critics are generally those who know the least about the matter criticised. I know just enough about the Mexican war to approve heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it. It is natural that an important city like Puebla should not have been passed with contempt; its evacuation insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy in intricate mountain defiles. In this same way the City of Mexico could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in the open field. But General Scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. He invaded a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the interior, with a force at no time equal to `onehalf of that opposed to him; he was without a base: the enemy was always intrenched, always on the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and conquered the the government. Credit is due to the troops engaged, it is true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's. Earlier in this narrative I have stated that the plain, reached after passing the mountains east of Perote, extends to the cities of Puebla and Mexico. The route traveled by the army before reaching 30 Puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south. This pass is very susceptible of defense by a smaller against a larger force. Again, the highest point of the road-bed 35 between Vera Cruz and the City of Mexico is over Rio Frio mountain, which also might have been successfully defended by an inferior force. But by moving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles 40 north of Puebla, both of these passes would have been avoided. The road from Perote to the City of Mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies in Our West. Arriving due 45 north from Puebla, troops could have been detached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west with the rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered before 50 pursued the same course in marching toreaching the City of Mexico. It is true this road would have brought troops in by Guadalupe a town, church and detached spur of mountain about two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same gen- 55 eral name and at this point Lake Texcoco comes near to the mountain, which was fortified both at the base and on the I had now made marches and been in battle under both General Scott and General Taylor. The former divided his force of 10,500 men into four columns, starting a day apart, in moving from Puebla to the capital of the nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large as his own stood ready to resist his coming. The road was broad and the country open except in crossing the Rio Frio mountain. General Taylor ward an enemy. He moved even in smaller bodies. I never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession. I supposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passed over a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessary trains. Later I found the fallacy of this belief. The rebellion, which followed as a sequence to the Mexican war, never could have been suppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the same time than was the custom under Scott and Taylor. turned adrift when no longer wanted. The officers of the lower grades were but little superior to the men. With all this I have seen as brave stands made by some 5 of these men as I have ever seen made by soldiers. Now Mexico has a standing army larger than the United States. They have a military school modeled after West Point. Their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave. The Mexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation. The victories in Mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior numbers. There were two reasons for this. Both 10 General Scott and General Taylor had such armies as are not often got together. At the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca-de-la-Palma, General Taylor had a small army, but it was composed ex- 15 clusively of regular troops, under the best of drill and discipline. Every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession, not at West Point necessarily, but in the camp, in garrison, 20 and many of them in Indian wars. The rank and file were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war; but they 25 were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all there was in them. A better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one commanded by General Taylor in the earliest 30 two engagements of the Mexican war. The volunteers who followed were of better material, but without drill or discipline at the start. They were associated with so many disciplined men and profession- 35 ally educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise. They became soldiers themselves almost at once. All these conditions we would 40 enjoy again in case of war. The Mexican army of that day was hardly an organization. The private soldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants when wanted; his con- 45 sent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, and seldom paid. He was The Mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we would imitate in part, but with more regard to truth. They celebrate the anniversaries of Chapultepec and Molino del Rey as of very great victories. The anniversaries are recognized as national holidays. At these two battles, while the United States troops were victorious, it was at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the Mexicans suffered. The Mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well as any troops ever did. The trouble seemed to be the lack of experience among the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit, without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough. Their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their theme when telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sum of money they forced us to pay in the end. With us, now twenty years after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers who profess devotion to the nation - engaged in trying to prove that the Union forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed around from Donelson to Vicksburg and to Chattanooga; and in the East from Gettsburg to Appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion. There is no difference in the amount of romance in the two stories. - SONGS AND BALLADS OF THE CIVIL WAR Every long war that reaches the heart of a people calls forth songs and ballads in abundance. The poetry of the Civil War was voluminous, how voluminous one may learn by consulting such collections as Moore's Lyrics of Loyalty, 1864; The War Songs of the South, 1862; Lyrics of Freedom, 1862, and Richard Grant White's Poetry of the Civil War, 1866. Much of such collections has little value from the standpoint of real literature, but here and there are to be found spontaneous outbursts that have within them more real life than many more finished products. Many of the 'war songs' of the period were carried into popularity and a permanent place in the national hymnal by the music to which they were joined. Out of the conflict came several national hymns. Poor though much of the mass may be in literary quality, it deserves to be preserved, since it came hot from American hearts, much of it spontaneously and without thought of models, and so is American literature in the fullness of the word, a commentary upon Americanism, a definition of the American soul. Out of the great richness of material, North and South, I have selected what seem to me to be the most significant and typical specimens, the ones that most fully interpret the spirit of the great American struggle of the sixties. |